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Abstract
This dissertation argues that a sociological definition of ethos as a 
signifier of hierarchized differences among classes or groups offers a 
productive expansion of Aristotle’s rhetorical teaching on ethos. Mass/elite 
tensions in democratic Athens forced a renegotiation of aristocratic ethos 
by ehte orators and provided the context for Aristotle’s Rhetoric. The 
inadequacy of agent-centered, intentional models of Aristotle’s rhetoric for 
contemporary theory can be partially resolved through an awareness of the 
class-demarcating function of ethos in contemporary culture.
Middle-class professional ethos has undergone significant shifts from 
the “personality market” described by Erich Fromm and C. Wright Mills 
to the postmodern knowledge worker or “symbolic analyst” described by 
Robert Reich. The composition classroom, long acknowledged as a training 
ground for the inculcation of middle-class ethos, has undergone an 
analogous shift as computer-mediated writing instruction encourages 
students to perform a postmodern ethos. In contemporary culture, ethos still 
functions to demarcate various classes of knowledge producers. Robert 
Merton’s analysis of scientific ethos, while superseded by subsequent
sociology, still offers insights into the rhetorical strategies of scientists and 
humanists in the Sokal-Socw/ Text affair.
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Ethos and the Politics of Habit:
Class, Character, and Coercion in Aristotelian Rhetorics
Introduction
In an early passage of the Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies ethos, 
persuasion through character, as perhaps the most important element, or 
“controlling factor,” in persuasion. In the case of rhetoric, “where there is 
not exact knowledge but room for doubt,” an audience’s perception of the 
rhetor’s character takes on much greater persuasive significance than it does 
in the discursive realms of demonstration or dialectic, where, for Aristotle, 
the logical processes leading an audience or interlocutor through deductive 
chains of premises and conclusions makes the speaker’s character irrelevant. 
In this passage Aristotle also makes his claim that ethos “should result from 
the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind 
of person.” In twentieth-century rhetorical criticism, this imperative has 
been understood to distinguish Aristotle’s notion of ethos from those of his 
contemporaries, Plato and Isocrates.
Although Plato did not actually use the term ethos in conjunction 
with his critiques of rhetoric, from his insistence on ethical argument and 
language use we can infer a Platonic notion of ethos. For Plato, James 
Baumlin explains, ethos is based on a philosophical model of the self, 
“defined by the space where language and truth meet o r are made incarnate 
within the individual,” and “premised on the moral and, ultimately, 
theological inseparability of the speaker-agent from the speech-act” (xiii). 
Isocrates responded to Plato’s attacks on unethical rhetorical practices by 
arguing that the practice of the art of rhetoric by the orator-statesman 
actually inculcated honorable values into his character, “for who does not 
know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good 
repute . . .  and that the argument which is made by a man’s life is of more 
weight than that which is furnished by words?” {Antidosis §278). For 
Aristotle, though, it is sufficient for persuasion that the rhetor seems to be 
of high character. Baumlin credits Aristotle with the development of a 
“social rhetoric” and a “sociolinguistic model” of discourse in which the 
speaker becomes, through the discursive representation of his character, an 
aspect of a socially shared language, rather than a separate intending 
consciousness standing outside of and originating that discourse (xvi-xvii).
Aristotle also specifies a social view when he explains the impact of 
the ethe of different groups on the rhetor. He instructs rhetors to 
understand “all forms of constitution [politeid] and to distinguish the 
customs and legal usages and advantages of each; for all people are 
persuaded by what is advantageous, and preserving the constitution is 
advantageous” (1.8.1-2). He briefly outlines the organization and “ends” of 
democratic, oligarchic, and aristocratic constitutions, adding that “one 
should distinguish customs and legal usages and benefits on the basis of the 
‘end’ of each [type of constitution], since choices are made in reference to 
this.” Finally, arguing that pisteis, or elements of persuasion, come not only 
through logical demonstration “but from speech that reveals character,” 
rhetors “should be acquainted with the kinds of character [ethe\ distinctive 
of each form of constitution; for the character distinctive of each is 
necessarily most persuasive to each” (1.8.4-5). Thus the rhetor should 
“reveal” through linguistic construction in the speech an ethos in accord 
with that of his audience.
Twentieth-century sociologists typically refer to WilHam Graham 
Sumner’s 1906 Folkways: A Study o f the Sociological Importance of Usages,
Manners^ Customs, Mores, and Morals, for a sociological definition of ethos} 
In that text Sumner appropriates the Greek use of ethos, defining it as “the 
sum of the characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by which a 
group was differentiated and individualized in character from other groups. 
‘Ethics’ were things which pertained to the ethos and therefore the things 
which were the standard of right” (36-37). Twentieth-century sociologists 
have, in adopting this definition, understood ethos as a reflection of the 
demarcation of classes or groups. Although “ethica” in this Greek sense, 
Sumner claims, would be an appropriate name for the work he undertakes, 
he chooses the Latin “mores” because of its greater familiarity and practical 
convenience. Through his investigation into mores, or ethos, Sumner hoped 
to rescue the social sciences from the domination of philosophical 
perspectives on morality, or ethics:
Ethics, having lost connection with the ethos of a people, is an 
attempt to systematize the current notions of right and wrong upon 
some basic principle, generally with the purpose of establishing
" In the sociological literature ethos is typically not italicized, since it has been absorbed 
into the EngUsh lexicon. However, I italicize ethos throughout to emphasize not only its 
appropriation from classical Greek, but its status as a keyword with polysémie 
complexities that are undermined, for rhetorical theory, by attempts at precise 
translation.
morals on an absolute doctrine, so that it shall be universal, absolute, 
and everlasting . , . [These methods] help to hold the social sciences 
under the dominion of metaphysics. (37)
Sumner locates the roots of these philosophical approaches to ethics in 
Greek philosophy, thus marking a spUt between sociological and 
philosophical notions of ethos similar to the division Baumlin outlines 
between Aristotehan and Platonic notions. In contemporary composition 
theory, competing appropriations of ethos perpetuate this division: the 
social view emphasizes the development of effective ethos through 
sociahzation into a particular discourse community and the adoption of its 
mores as a way to make one’s discourse credible, while another school 
emphasizes ethos as “authentic voice,” reflecting “the moral and ultimately, 
theological inseparability of the speaker-agent from the speech-act” that 
Baumhn traces to Plato.
While the three chapters that follow are grounded in a social 
perspective on ethos, they pursue two themes that have been neglected in 
much of the research and theory on discourse communities. I am 
interested, first, in the coerciveness of the audience’s role, a view that 
comphcates both the agent-centered appropriation of Aristotle (in which it 
is the rhetor who coerces the audience) and the dialogical or social
constructionist appropriation (in which rhetor and audience communicate 
via a shared set of values or agreed-upon premises). Secondly, I focus on the 
class-demarcating function of ethos that u n d erm in es dialogical 
appropriations of Aristotle. Much of the important rhetoric and 
composition scholarship on the workings of discourse communities focus 
on internal analysis, that is, on the rhetorical practices that a particular 
group shares within its own group boundaries. I am interested, rather, in 
external analysis that examines how ethos functions to bolster the authority 
of a particular group or class for a public audience when one discourse 
community finds itself in conflict with other groups and its status, relative 
to other groups, threatened.
Addressing the coercive power of the group, Sumner emphasizes the 
dominion of the mores over the individual:
They bring to him codes of action, standards, and rules of ethics. 
They have a model of the man-as-he-should-be to which they mold 
him, in spite of himself and without his knowledge. If he submits 
and consents, he is taken up and may attain great social success. If he 
resists and dissents, he is thrown out and may be trodden under foot. 
The mores are therefore an engine of social selection. Their coercion
of the individual is the mode in which they operate the selection,
and the details of the process deserve study. (173-74).
Although a postmodern view of the audience-rhetor relationship 
deconstructs the social/individual binary that Sumner reHes on in this 
passage, the essentially coercive nature of that relationship is still evident. 
For example, in his chapter on “PoststructuraHsm, Social Constructionism, 
and Audience as Community,” James Porter writes: “the community 
provides speaking and writing roles for its members— an ethos in other 
words. The ‘individual person’ who wishes to ‘identify’ with the 
community adopts the role provided” (81-82). This view also “grants the 
audience considerable power in the production of discourse; the audience is 
a ‘discourse community’ constraining, defining, and in effect creating the 
writer. ‘The writer’ is a role, a subject position, constituted by community 
constraints” (83).
Porter goes on to draw distinctions between the sociological notion 
of discourse community that assumes “a realist perspective” on actual 
sociological groups and a poststructuralist view that “sees the discourse 
community not as an a priori sociological group but as a set of local 
practices or paradigms defined by discourse” (86). In what follows I have 
proceeded on the assumption that this is a distinction without a difference:
I find in Aristotle an understanding of ethos that is tied both to “local 
practices defined by discourse” and to materially enacted habits that extend 
beyond their textuality. Porter critiques the sociological view by arguing 
that it simply substitutes the “group” for the “writer” in an agent-centered, 
management communication model, and that from this perspective “we 
have not changed our attitude toward the audience much, and we still do 
not have a model accounting for the influence of the social on the rhetor” 
(90). On the contrary, it is my contention that sociological perspectives on 
ethos and character have offered such a model for a long time; rhetoricians 
simply have yet to appropriate it.
In Chapter One, “Habit, Topoi, and Audience in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric” I begin by addressing contemporary responses to Aristotle’s 
rhetorical theory that dismiss him as an elitist teaching elite rhetors to 
manipulate audiences with the enthymeme and emotional ploys in a 
monological communication model. Opponents of this view argue that 
Aristotle’s rhetorical theory is in fact dialogical, based in a social view of 
rhetorical invention that understands communication within the shared 
context and common cultural values of rhetor and audience. Both 
monological and dialogical views of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, however, 
undervalue his notion of ethos.
I a j^ e  that ethos cannot be understood as simply as the 
monological/ dialogical debate would have it, and suggest that Aristotle’s 
discussion of ethos evokes a more problematic relationship between elite 
rhetors and the politically empowered demos to whom they presented 
their arguments. Rather than ethos simply functioning as another strategic 
tool in an agent-centered intentional model, or as a reflection of the shared 
communal values of the dialogical model, I argue that Aristotle’s notion of 
ethos is more adequately understood in sociological terms as the sum of 
habits that demarcate one group or class from another, and is therefore 
contextually bound to the ideological tensions between mass and elite in 
fourth century Athens. The relationship between ethos and habit in 
Aristotle’s rhetorical, political, and ethical treatises suggests that Aristotle 
understood habit as an indicator of class; thus the etymological connections 
between ethos as “character” and ethos as “habit” are essential to 
understanding Aristotle’s theory of ethos. By defining ethos as the politics of 
habit, I read Sumner’s understanding of ethos as the collection of traits, 
values, and mores that distinguish or demarcate one social class from 
another through a rhetorical lens. Thus I argue that the ethe of social 
groups or classes are constructed in order to establish or maintain a 
demarcation from other classes or communities with which they are in
present or potential conflict, and that appropriations of the classical notion 
of ethos by contemporary rhetoricians can be enhanced by historical and 
sociological perspectives on those classes.
In Chapter Two, “The Managed Character: Ethos and W ork at the 
End of the Twentieth Century,” I turn to  contemporary notions of ethos 
and character that sparked sociological analyses of the middle-class worker 
in this century. I begin with the mid-century fascination with middle-class 
character as evidenced in classic works such as David Riesman’s The Lonely 
Crowd: A Study o f the Chan^ng American Character, and C. Wright Mills’ 
White Collar: The American Middle Classes. It has long been acknowledged 
that middle-class values provide the characterological grounding for 
freshman writing classes; however, even theoretically sophisticated 
composition textbooks that deploy classical terminology present ethos in 
terms of the agent-centered strategic and intentional model, teaching 
students that the rhetorical choices they make affect their audience as in the 
monologic interpretation of Aristotle. Students are taught to present an 
ethos in their texts that will be acceptable to their middle-class professors 
and to prepare them for the successful performance of ethos when they are 
on the job. Needless to say, learning to persuasively deploy the topoi of
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middle-class ethos is more difficult for non-middle-class students than for 
those who have long been socialized to those norms.
I also analyze in Chapter Two how computer-mediated composition 
reflects broad cultural changes in what counts as acceptable ethos in a late 
twentieth-century workplace that has itself been radically transformed by 
electronic writing practices. I use former Labor Secretary Robert Reich’s 
category of “symbolic analyst” to describe what has become a new middle 
class of postmodern knowledge workers, and examine popular 
management literature to develop a list of topoi from which the ethos of 
that class is constructed. The “management revolution” has superseded the 
older mid-century notion of middle-class ethos and has adjusted postmodern 
ethos to the needs of a high-tech economy. This ethos is reflected not only in 
computer-mediated classrooms, but in broader postmodern reforms in 
humanities curricula in general, assuring the affective and characterological 
education of knowledge workers for the needs of a new economy. In 
particular, Lester Faigley’s discussion of his computer-mediated classroom 
reflects the so-called “radical democratizing” of the workplace, and an 
onhne discussion among computer classroom teachers demonstrates the 
coercive nature of this pedagogical medium, despite claims that it 
democratizes and decenters the classroom.
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In Chapter Three, “Demarcating Science: Ethos and Knowledge 
Production in the Science Wars,” I look at the demarcation of science from 
other realms of knowledge-making through the sociological lens of Robert 
Merton’s analysis of scientific ethos. Porter, in the same chapter discussed 
above, examines the scientific community as an important example that 
highhghts his problems with the “realist” sociological model of discourse 
communities, using Foucault’s work to make his case:
Foucault’s work leads us to ask such questions as, why does ‘science’ 
constitute itself as such, giving itself a separate status under the 
rubric ‘science’? W hat function does the signifier ‘science’ serve for 
authors who claim the role of ‘scientist’? . . . [Science is] a signifier 
with a certain rhetorical purpose, exercising certain dividing 
strategies (science versus what? literature? humanities? culture?). 
(91-92)
The demarcation of science from other spheres of activity is a theme with a 
long history in philosophy and sociology of science. Merton’s analysis of 
scientific ethos, written in 1942, reflects my dual focus on coercion and 
conflict in social models of the audience/rhetor relationship. He recognizes 
the coercive power of ethos in his description of the norms, or mores, of 
science as “prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions,”
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imperatives that constrain scientists’ representations of themselves and of 
science itself. He also understands ethos as a demarcation strategy that 
enhances science’s methodological and epistemological privileges when the 
status of scientific knowledge is threatened by attacks from outside groups. 
This chapter examines the deployment of scientific ethos in two public 
disputes over the epistemic privilege of science: the McLean v. Arkansas 
case, in which scientific ethos successfully functioned to deny scientific 
status to creation-scientists, and the Alan Sokal-5ocw/ Text affair, in which 
scientists and their supporters again rely on scientific ethos to fortify the 
class boundaries defiled by incursions from humanists and sociologists.
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Chapter One
Habit, Topoi, and Audience 
in Aristotle’s Theory of Ethos
Introduction
The championing, debunking, and rethinking of classical Greek 
rhetorical theories have been prominent concerns of rhetoric and 
composition scholars since the beginnings of their discipline in the early 
1960s. Although this work has focused on a variety of issues, one recurrent 
theme has been the relationship between the Greek development of 
rhetorical theory and emerging forms of democratic political institutions. 
Interpretations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric that form the background for this 
chapter have ranged from a recuperation of Aristotelian rhetorical theory 
as dialogical and hence reflective of his rhetoric as participatory and 
democratic, to harsh critiques of his essentially elitist goal of teaching 
aristocratic rhetors to control monologically the mass audience that held 
nominal political power in democratic Athens.
This chapter examines Aristotle’s notion of ethos and its role in the 
ideological webs that structured the conflicted politics of mass and elite in
14
fourth century BCE Athens. I begin by reviewing two analyses of the anti­
democratic tendencies in the Rhetoric: James Berlin’s “Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
in Context: Interpreting Historically” and Arthur Walzer’s “Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, Dialogism, and Contemporary Research in Composition.” I then 
focus on two issues that are important in my attempt to rehistoricize 
Aristotle’s insistence that ethos be an effect only of the speech itself, not of 
the rhetor’s previous reputation, position of authority, or habits of life. 
First, using arguments by twentieth-century communications and classics 
scholars, I complicate the monological and dialogical interpretations of 
Aristotle as explained by Berlin and Walzer by demonstrating the close 
connection that Aristotle makes between character and habits and the role 
of habits in constructing ethos. With this connection in mind, I then 
examine the function of Aristotle’s epideictic topoi in establishing character 
within the ideological webs that structure the habits and practices of elite 
statesmen-orators in democratic Athens. By understanding these topoi as 
both Unguistic markers of ethos and as material practices (habits) that 
demarcate one social class from another, I complicate traditional rhetorical 
notions of topoi with a sociological perspective on ethos, and argue that 
Aristotle’s separation of the linguistic markers of ethos in public address
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from their manifestation in material relations results from his politicized, 
class-based understanding of the role of habit in the development of arete.
The Elitism of Aristotle*s Rhetoric
Aristotle opposed democracy, particularly in those extreme forms 
which, he claimed, bred demagogues who pandered to the debased desires 
of the demos. Barry Strauss’s analysis of the Politics concludes that Aristotle 
“considered the kind of democracy that existed in most of the Greek poleis 
of his day—what he calls in the Politics the most recent {neotate), last 
{hystate), final {teleutaia) or extreme {eschate) democracy—to be 
undisciplined, lawless, despotic, vulgar, hostile to the upper classes, and 
likely to be unstable” (213).
A notoriously conflicted text, the Rhetoric functioned to teach elite 
future orators strategies for speaking to mass audiences. Although ehtist in 
its ideology, it does, then, make necessary concessions to democracy. In 
“Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Context; Interpreting Historically,” James Berlin 
argues that the conflicted and competing perspectives contained in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric have fueled diverse rationalist, social constructionist.
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elitist, and democratic interpretations of his rhetorical theory." These 
competing appropriations by twentieth-century rhetoric scholars engaged 
in contemporary ideological battles are made possible not only because 
their readings, Hke all readings, are culturally and ideologically situated, 
but, Berlin claims, because the political conflicts of Aristotle’s century are 
inscribed within the text itself in ways that Aristotle does not neatly 
resolve. Teaching rhetoric in an Athenian poHs that had extended the 
franchise to all native-born adult males, Aristotle instructed elite future 
orators who were likely committed to reinstating a modified oUgarchy or 
who were reactionaries in favor of monarchy. As a “conflicted response to 
its own conflicted moment,” the Rhetoric, Berlin claims, stands as evidence 
that “Aristotle remains committed to an elitist politics while offering 
enough contradictory concessions to the democratic polis to give support 
to those who later appropriate him in the service of an egalitarian rhetoric” 
(56). While I agree that a wholesale democratic appropriation of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric is untenable, Berlin’s claim that his rhetorical theory is grounded 
in a monologic model of communication between rhetor and audience is
" I would add “sexist” to Berlin’s List of competing interpretations.
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oversimplified, particularly in regard to Berlin’s analysis of ethos?
Berlin traces some of the well-known passages in the Rhetoric 
regarding the inability of an audience made up of ordinary citizens to grasp 
an intricately logical argument and their preference for sophistic appeals to 
their emotions, noting that these passages are contradicted elsewhere. For 
instance, Aristotle appears to appeal to the Athenian belief in the 
superiority of the mass decision-making process when he writes that 
“humans have a natural disposition for the true and to a large extent hit on 
the truth” {Rhetoric 1.1.11; Berlin 62). The same conflict, Berlin argues, 
arises in Aristotle’s discussion of ethos. Six of the eight topoi that Aristotle 
lists for the construction of a praiseworthy character are qualities, Berlin 
writes, “that derive from birth, wealth, and extensive education 
. . . .  [and are] exemplified through the wise management of one’s money 
and possessions.”"* The passage under analysis is from Chapter One, Book
 ^ It should be noted that Berlin devoted very little of his influential and valuable 
scholarship to classical rhetoric. I use this particular article here because it offers a 
compact description of the monological interpretation of the Rhetoric, and his trenchant 
critique of Aristotle’s elitism provides a useful introduction to my own argument. For a 
more detailed analysis of Berlin’s version of classical rhetoric, see Welch, 52-59.
* Topoi, “places,” is generally understood to refer to the “places” in memory (or, later, in 
written catalogues) where lines of argument are stored and made available for rhetorical 
invention. The precise nature and function of Aristotle’s twenty-eight koinoi (common) 
topoi for the construction of enthymemes in Rhetoric Book 2, Chapter 23, and their 
relationship to the dialectical topoi in his Topics have long been the subject of scholarly 
discussion. Aristotle also distinguishes koinoi topoi, applicable to any discourse, from idia
18
Nine of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle Usts the epideictic topoi (and their 
opposites) for constructing praiseworthy (and blameworthy) character in 
speeches:
Now virtue [aretel is an abiHty, as it seems, that is productive and 
preservative of goods, and an abüity for doing good in many and 
great ways, actually in all ways in all things. The parts of virtue are 
justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, 
liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. Since virtue is defined 
as an abiHty for doing good, the greatest virtues are necessarily those 
most useful to others. For that reason people most honor the just 
and the courageous; for the latter is useful to others in war, and the 
former in peace as well. Next is liberality; for the Hberal make 
contributions freely and do not quarrel about the money, which 
others care most about. Justice is a virtue by which all, individually.
topoi, arguments applicable to specific disciplines, such as physics or ethics. The term 
koinoi topoi, as “common topics,” has also been, perhaps problematically, identified with 
the Latin loci communes and Vico’s sensus communis. However, Aristotle uses topoi" in 
this more general sense in Rhetoric 3.19.1 regarding the conclusion of speeches, where he 
teaches that the ethos of the speaker should again be emphasized: “One should aim at 
showing one or the other o f two things: either that the speaker is a good man in terms of 
the issues or that he is good generally; or either that the opponent is a bad man in terms 
of the issues or that he is bad generally. The topoi from which such characterizations are 
derived have been discussed” (i.e., in the section of Book 1, Chapter 9 that I quote here). 
My use of “topoi” in the discussion to follow reflects Aristotle’s more general use of the 
term in this passage.
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have what is due to them and as the law required; and injustice [is a 
vice] by which they have what belongs to others and not as the law 
requires. Manly courage [is a virtue] by which people perform fine 
actions in times of danger and as the law orders and obedient to the 
law, and cowardice is the opposite. Self-control is the virtue through 
which people behave as the law orders in regard to the pleasures of 
the body, and lack of control [is] the opposite. Liberality is the 
disposition to do good with money, illiberality the opposite. 
Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits [for others], and 
magnificence is a virtue in expenditures, productive of something 
great, while little-mindedness and stinginess are the opposites. 
Prudence is a virtue of intelligence whereby people are able to plan 
well for happiness in regard to the good and bad things that have 
been mentioned earlier. (1.9.4-13)
I have quoted this section of the Rhetoric in its entirety because it will 
figure heavily in my later discussion. Here it will suffice to note that Berlin 
concludes, based on his reading of these topoi, that the construction of a 
credible or praiseworthy ethos “requires membership in a privileged social 
class,” the class for which Aristotle’s rhetorical training offered the means 
to control an unruly and ill-educated demos. Recognizing the political
20
power of the demos and the improbabiHty of an aristocratic coup, Aristotle 
provided his ehte audience w ith discursive strategies “designed to render 
hegemonic the ideology of a rich and poHtically ambitious ehte.” Berhn 
even suggests a parallel between the function of modem mass media and 
Aristotle’s recognition of the power of discourse to ideologically control 
the demos (63).
Berlin does not explore o r explain, however, why the Athenian 
demos would find an ehte ethos compeUing enough to continue voting in 
favor of orators who presented themselves in these aristocratic terms. His 
notion of these ehte discursive strategies provided by Aristotle invokes a 
problematic understanding of ideology as false consciousness imposed from 
above onto the masses, and an understanding of Aristotle’s rhetoric as a 
theory of coercive control of a passive audience in a system of one-way 
communication. Such an imposition of a twentieth-century understanding 
of the technocratic control of mass ideology in representative democracies 
by powerful media elites is not applicable to Aristotle’s century, when mass 
audiences had the opportunity to immediately respond to verbal 
constructions of ehte ethos not only through catcalls and inattention in the 
assembly and courts, but also through the direct democratic process of 
voting immediately on their deliberative proposals and forensic arguments.
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Arthur Walzer makes an argument similar to Berlin’s in “Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, Dialogism, and Contemporary Research in Composition.” 
Walzer contextuaHzes his claim that the goal of Aristotle’s rhetoric is 
audience control by first debunking the arguments for a dialogical 
interpretation. According to Walzer, contemporary claims that Aristotle’s 
rhetorical theory is dialogical are based on a misunderstanding of Lloyd 
Bitzer’s classic essay, “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited.” In that essay, 
Bitzer offered a new analysis of the enthymeme as an inferential structure 
that requires an audience to supply missing premises by drawing on 
“common cultural beliefs” that the rhetor has tacitly assumed. This 
analysis, according to Walzer, has been improperly deployed by 
contemporary composition scholars to argue that, if the enthymeme 
requires the participation of the audience, however passive that 
participation may be, then Aristotle’s Rhetoric presents a dialogical 
understanding of persuasive discourse.
Walzer on the contrary makes a case for a monological Aristotelian 
rhetoric, one whose goal is the control of audience response rather than 
equal, dialogic participation from it. Echoing Berlin’s comparison to 
modem mass media, Walzer calls on modem advertising as a parallel 
instance of Aristotle’s focus on controlling the audience. He agrees with the
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dialogical interpretations that, certainly, Aristotle’s rhetoric “assumes that 
the audience’s needs influence the message,” but sees Uttle room  for true 
dialogism in that concession, since the monologic and control-driven 
discourse of modem advertising assumes the same thing, drawing on 
“common cultural assumptions” and audience beliefs while promoting a 
speaker-audience relationship that is “directive and unilateral, not 
interactive and reciprocal” (49-50). Walzer concludes that in the Rhetoric 
there is no ambiguity concerning the rhetor’s relationship w ith the 
audience: “The influence is one-way, and the speaker seeks to  control the 
response and direct the judgment of a . . .  cognitively Umited audience” 
(51).
Walzer’s essay Umits the possibilities for understanding the 
relationship between rhetor and audience in Aristotle to two options: 
either the relationship is a dialogic, mutually interactive one based on the 
cultural assumptions shared between rhetor and audience (and a misreading 
of Bitzer), or it is a manipulative, control-driven relationship based on the 
rhetor’s strategic deployment of those same cultural assumptions. I propose 
in this chapter another option unexamined by Walzer and ignored by 
Berlin. Rather than the rhetor controlling the audience, it is the audience, I 
suggest, through its demand for a credible ethos from the rhetor, that
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coerces him into conforming to its habitsJ’ This relationship is a complex 
one, ideologically structuring the tensions between mass and elite in fourth 
century Athens. Given Aristotle’s critique of democracy and his 
recognition of the relationship between habit and ethos, this power of the 
demos to coerce the orator-statesman into conformity to its own inferior 
habits creates a tension in Aristotle’s theory of ethos. It will be necessary to 
begin by examining the relationship between ethos and habit, a thorny 
problem for elite teachers of rhetoric like Aristotle. The relationship 
between ethos and habit created an “ethical” problem in the political 
context of Athenian democracy and led Aristotle to insist that ethos be an 
effect only of the speech, not of the rhetor’s previously established 
reputation.
Ethos and Habit
Both monological and dialogical appropriations of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric neglect the rich ambiguities associated with the keyword ethos. To 
briefly outHne several interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of ethos in this
’ Since my discussion in this chapter confines itself to Aristotle’s context of public 
speech-making in fourth century Athens, I use the masculine pronoun in its specific, not 
generic, sense.
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century, providing a background for my definition of ethos as the politics 
of habit, I begin somewhat arbitrarily with William Sattler. In his 1947 
contribution to the ongoing controversy among rhetoric scholars over the 
precise denotation of ethos, Sattler maintains that an overly precise 
definition would only preclude the productive ambiguity of the word. 
Ethos, he argues, did not have “a single and standard meaning among 
ancient classical writers” but was rather “of complex and somewhat fluid, 
or at least changing, denotation.” His own definitions waver between the 
sociological notion of the ethos of a group or class and the rhetorical notion 
of ethos as conscious, strategy-driven choices made by rhetors in individual 
speech acts. Citing WiUiam Graham Sumner’s 1906 Folkways, Sattler 
defines ethos in essentially sociological terms as the “totahty of 
characteristic traits,” suggesting that the term easily sUdes toward denoting 
“ethical argument,” since “customs of any class or society are obviously 
given a stamp of approval” (55).
He does seem to recognize, in a Umited way, the connection 
between ethos and social hierarchy. Drawing on the etymological branch of 
ethos meaning “habits” and following Sumner’s lead, Sattler claims that in 
its early manifestations ethos denotes “usages, habits, and traditions of one 
social group as distinguished from another” (55). Shifting from his
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sociological focus to a rhetorical one, he notes Aristotle’s recognition of the 
power of custom: “the speaker who conforms to the ethos of the class— 
who likes what we like—will be highly regarded” (59). But Sattler stops 
here, without exploring the imphcations of this intersection of a 
sociological definition with a rhetorical one. The sociological definition of 
ethos as “usages, habits, and traditions o f one social group as distinguished 
from another” suggests that ethos bears some essential function in relation to 
a larger cultural process of manifesting, maintaining, and reproducing the 
distinctions or demarcations between social groups or classes. Ethos as class- 
demarcating habits, then, creates a greater problem for the would-be rhetor 
whose discourse attempts to cross class lines, as was the case for the elite 
orator of democratic Athens, than would ethos as a technical choice of, say, 
which ethical topoi to deploy in a speech addressed to class cohorts with 
shared habits. Aristotle, I argue below, was well aware of this problem, for 
the rhetorical training recorded in the Rhetoric was addressed to students 
who belonged to a social group that was clearly demarcated from the group 
making up the rhetorical audience.
Twenty years after Sattler’s discussion appeared, Thomas Corts 
criticized his definition, arguing that problems arise because of Sattler’s 
confusion of two “distantly related” Greek words: sOog, which means
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custom or habit, and rjOog, which means custom, disposition, character, or 
bearing. The second of these is the word used by Aristotle to denote one of 
the three pisteis. According to Corts, Sattler makes a “strained comparison” 
to “folkways” that conflates these separate Greek words, and complains 
that this kind of “inaccurate transliteration is responsible for a nebulous 
understanding of ancient rhetoricians’ concept of ethos” (201). Sattler makes 
“dubious etymological generalizations” that “fog a distinction made by 
writers of antiquity” (202). Corts’s argument that sOog meaning habits, is 
morally neutral, while rjGog czixies connotations of right and wrong, is 
intended to create as wide a gulf as possible between these two terms. This 
moralizing position leads him to urge rhetoric scholars to “emphasize the 
positive moral quality of rfôoç, rather than the behavioral neutrality of its 
sister term which is not vital to ancient rhetoric” (202). This plea stands, it 
seems to me, in contradiction to Corts’s own quotation of Plato’s Laws 
(792e), where Plato states that rjOoç 'xs the result of eOog character is the 
result of habit. Corts cites this passage to show that the ancients made a 
clear distinction between these terms, but Plato hardly seems to insist on 
the moral neutrality of eôoç 'xi it is so integrally connected to the formation 
of (moral) character. Corts seems to miss Plato’s and Sattler’s point that.
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although perhaps distinct, the terms definitely share a meaningful 
relationship which we can interrogate and productively exploit as a rich 
ambiguity. By arguing for monovocal meanings of both sOoç-isià rj6oç, 
Corts attempts to restrict the polysemy of their multiple meanings and 
intersections to a narrow philosophical understanding of ethos as “ethical 
argument,” with a philosophical notion of ethical virtue attached to it. 
Hence the possibilities nascent in Sattler’s sociological definition and in his 
rhetorical definition are precluded, as well as any fruitful analysis of the 
interconnected relationship between them. By insisting on the “moral 
neutrality” of eOoç, he also precludes any further probing into Sattler’s 
sociological recognition that these habits, and constructions of character 
based on them, are deeply marked by class. In light of his plea for a narrow 
ethical understanding of ethos {T]do<^  that excludes any consideration of 
habit {sOo( ,^ Corts claims that the meaning of sôoç “may be subsumed 
under rjOoç, but rjOoç-wiW not bear the converse relationship” (201 n.l).
I disagree. The r/Oogihzt Aristotle used for one of the three 
entechnic pisteis certainly can bear the converse relationship: rjOogzs 
character can be subsumed under sOog as habit. Corts would disapprove of 
my transliteration ethos since it does not distinguish between rjôogtcoà
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sôoç. I persist in my orthography, minus diacritical markers to distinguish 
the eta and epsilon, for precisely this reason, to maintain what I aip ie is the 
relevant ambiguity and productive polysemy.
In 1974, Arthur B. Miller, comphcating Sattler’s discussion of habit 
{sôoç, which he transHterates ethos) and character {rjOog, which he 
transhterates eethos), disagrees with Corts’s position that sôoçcztries no 
moral importance. Miller opens with a passage from the Nicomachean 
Ethics in which Aristotle states that '^rjOnaf is the product of habit {s$0 (^ y 
and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that 
word” (2.1.1). Relying on Aristotle’s own etymology to argue that both 
eethikee and eethos are derived from ethos (habit). Miller even claims that, 
some differences of nuance notwithstanding, a “basic consubstantiality” 
exists between eethos and ethos (309). His point is that, for Aristotle, “when 
one portrays character (eethos) he does it best by showing its origin in habit 
and disposition” (311). Miller’s argument thus raises the issue of the 
relationship between ethos and the topoi from which it is constructed, 
which I return to in a later section of this chapter.
 ^Ethike, problematically rendered as “moral or ethical virtue” here by Miller. But cf. W. 
D. Ross’s translation, which uses “moral excellence,” and explains in a footnote: “’Moral’, 
here and hereafter, is used in the archaic sense of ‘pertaining to character or mores'.”
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In many ways the most provocative of these essays, certainly the 
most useful for understanding the cultural baggage that circulated with 
connotations of rjdog before Aristotle, Charles Chamberlain’s “From 
H aunts’ to ‘Character’: The Meaning of Ethos and its Relation to Ethics,” 
delves into uses of before the fifth century BCE. According to 
Chamberlain, the word appears three times in Homer, each time in 
reference to animals and the “arena or range in which the animal naturally 
belongs” (97). Chamberlain cites a particularly useful passage from the 
Iliad:
As when a stabled horse, having been fed at a manger, breaks his 
bonds and runs galloping over the plain, since he is accustomed 
[eiothos— habituated] to bathe in the flowing river, glorying. He 
holds his head high, and his mane leaps on his shoulders on both 
sides. His knees swiftly bear him, trusting in his splendor, to the 
ethea and pasture of horses. {Iliad 6.506-11, qtd in Chamberlain 98) 
As Chamberlain explains, in the manger, humans manipulate the horse, 
through its hunger, in an attempt to domesticate it, to rehabituate it, to 
change its habits to serve human ends. When released from the bonds of 
this “second nature,” the horse returns to earher habits to which he is more 
strongly accustomed than he is to the habits of the manger. This power of
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his previous, “first nature” habituation {eiothos), Chamberlain writes, “is 
too strong to be overcome” (98). Chamberlain goes on to explain that, “for 
later Greeks at least, animals differed from humans in having no share in 
logos, ‘reason,’ or what we might call the principle of order” (98). However, 
he argues, the horse in H om er’s simile clearly does follow some principle of 
order by returning to its ethea, which is not simply a random place or set of 
habits. Animals, Homer seems to suggest, demonstrate some measure of 
logos because they, like humans, are susceptible to the ordering process of 
habituation which, we shall see, ultimately functions to keep them— or put 
them— “in their place.” I will return to the close connection between logos 
and ethos below.
Chamberlain goes on to discuss uses of ethos in Hesiod and 
Theognis, where some significant developments occur. In Hesiod, for 
example, ethos is “now applied to human beings, made singular, and used in 
a derogatory sense” (98). Theognis, too, sees ethos “as potentially bad or 
deceptive” (99). In other words, ethos as habit becomes entangled in the pre- 
Socratic fascination with appearance and reality, as the following verse 
from Theognis indicates:
Many who have a tricky and counterfeit ethos hide it and put on a 
temporary show of desire. But time shows forth the ethos of all
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these. I too made a great mistake in judgment; I praised you before 
learning your ethea thoroughly. But now like a ship I steer clear.
(qtd in Chamberlain 99)
Chamberlain avoids reading these uses of ethos and ethea as “character.” 
Instead, he claims, “ethos refers to the range or arena where someone is 
most truly at home and which underhes all the fine appearances that people 
adopt” (99). As I explain in the next section, this understanding of ethos as 
deeply entrenched habits related to one’s “place” is congruent with Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Chamberlain argues for an essential similarity 
between this ethea of the false friend and the Homeric horse’s old ethea and 
pasture: just as the horse is unaffected by attempts to rehabituate it in the 
stable, so too is the false friend unchanged by the pleasing, artful ethos he 
adopts for purposes of temporary gain. Similarly, Pindar writes: “The fox 
and the lion could not exchange their innate ethos” (qtd in Chamberlain 
100). Like the horse and the false friend, ethos in this context seems to be 
unchangeable, highly resistant to reconstructive attempts, an “unreachable 
essence” (100).
On the other hand, Chamberlain offers a few textual examples from 
ancient sources which suggest that ethea can be affected through education, 
although only to a limited extent. Concerning gender, for instance, an
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occurrence in Hesiod advises a man to marry a young woman, so that he 
may “teach her shrewd ethea” concerning barbarians, the Ethiopians, after 
“learning Egyptian ethea” are then considered to be more civilized; and 
Salmoxis, a Thracian slave of Pythagoras, acquired “deeper ethea” than 
other Thracians because of his habituation to Greek culture. Although 
Chamberlain almost treats these instances as anomalies, I would argue that 
they are highly significant for demonstrating the evolution of ethos into a 
signifier of the hierarchized differences among poUtical or socially classed 
groups of humans, with the attendant suggestion that the habits exhibited 
by members of those groups, whether inculcated by elite education or 
through the socialization practices of uneducated classes, become essential 
to their natures and virtually unchangeable.
Ethos and Ideology
Habits make a second nature. This long-lived maxim has roots in 
Aristotle’s ethical treatises and makes a cameo appearance in the Rhetoric. 
In its Aristotelian guise, the maxim suggests that the control of an (elite) 
agent over his habitual actions will result in arete, if proper habits are 
inculcated at an early age and continually practiced as a conscious, rational 
choice-making process. In the twentieth century, the power of rationally
33
chosen and practiced habits to construct a praiseworthy ethos has been 
appropriated by management theorists in such texts as Steven Covey’s The 
Seven Habits o f Highly Effective People. These folk philosophies for the 
businessman and woman derive from an Aristotelian theory of aristocratic 
character. I discuss them in Chapter Two.
The maxim also appears, with different consequences, in Hegelian 
and Marxist traditions that deny agents conscious choice-making control 
over their ethos. In traditions that define ideology as mystification leading 
to the false consciousness of oppressed groups, habits of mind, institutional 
practices, and relations of production create a “second nature” that alienates 
the potential agent from his “first nature,” from an awareness of the real 
relations of production that oppress him. In “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Georg Lukacs argues that Marx’s analysis 
shows how the commodity structure conceals “every trace of its 
fundamental nature: the relation between people” (83). That is, the 
relationship between ideology and relations of production requires 
practices that hide a “first nature.” With the advent of modern capitalism, 
“the commodity becomefs] crucial for the subjugation of men’s 
consciousness . . .  and for their attempts to comprehend the process or to 
rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate themselves from servitude to
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the ‘second nature’ so created” (86). Like the domesticated, stabled horse 
that is rehabituated to serve its master’s ends, ideology as false 
consciousness presupposes the possibdity of hberation and a return to a 
“first nature.”
Departing from traditions of ideology as “false consciousness,” Louis 
Althusser defines ideology as a necessary medium through which human 
subjects are interpellated and produced. Ideology becomes a structure that 
is in many ways imposed upon us unconsciously, a structure which we 
“hve” as habitual behaviors, “actions inserted into practices” that “are 
governed by the rituals in which these practices are inscribed . . .  a small 
mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports’ club, a school 
day, a poHtical party meeting, etc.” (168). Hence we live “naturally” in 
ideology: “man is an ideological animal by nature,” and, “[a]s St Paul 
admirably put it, it is in the ‘Logos,’ meaning in ideology, that we ‘live, 
move and have our being’” (171). Rather than false consciousness as 
“second nature,” ideology here is simply “first nature.” Althusser’s use of 
“Logos” resonates with Chamberlain’s analysis of the Homeric horse: the 
“liberated” horse follows a logos, or principle of order, by returning to its 
ethea, the habits with which it feels most at home.
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Similarly, Bourdieu’s explanation of habitus emphasizes structures 
that inculcate particular habits into subjects, but Bourdieu highlights 
habitus as a class marker:
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. 
the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class 
condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures. (72)
The colligation of habits, or disposition, is inculcated and performed, as in 
earlier Marxist traditions, largely unconsciously: habitus is regulated 
without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, 
objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to 
attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without 
being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (72) 
Bourdieu’s rejection of strategic agency does not proclaim a simplistic 
determinism here: habitus does provide subjects with various strategies or 
“regulated improvisations,” but “without being the product of a genuine 
strategic intention” (73). Habitus functions as a cultural unconscious, 
constructing, I suggest, a logos of ethos, as for Chamberlain’s Homeric
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horse. Humans, too, are susceptible to an ordering principle that seems 
“natural” {logos)y and ethoSy the collection of habits inscribed by that 
ordering principle, becomes a signifier of hierarchized differences between 
differently habituated classes. Bourdieu writes that “the unconscious 
principles of the ethos which, being the product of a learning process 
dominated by a determinate type of objective regularities, determines 
‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ conduct for every agent subjected to those 
regularities” (77). Habitus is “history turned into nature,” the unconscious 
being “the forgetting of history which history itself produces by 
incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of 
habitus” (78-79).
Thus it would appear that the maxim “habits make a second nature” 
functions ideologically within two competing constellations of meaning:
(1) for the Greek elite (or for the professional middle class who must 
construct an ethos appropriate to their status and economic function, as I 
discuss in Chapter Two), Aristotle’s notion of habits and ethos imply an 
agency, a rational choice-making strategizing of habitual performances 
leading to arete-y (2) for the ideological critic, the “second nature” 
inculcated by the ideological pressures of habitus is imposed by a structure 
which offers minimal strategizing, a nature that still bears the mark of an
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earlier generation of Marxists for whom “second nature” meant alienation 
and false consciousness. Terry Eagleton explains that for Bourdieu habitus 
tends to induce in social agents such aspirations and actions as are 
compatible with the objective requirements of their social 
circumstances. At its strongest, it rules out all other modes of 
desiring and behaving as simply unthinkable. Habitus is thus 
‘history turned into nature,’ and for Bourdieu it is through this 
matching of the subjective and the objective, what we feel 
spontaneously disposed to do and what our social conditions 
demand of us, that power secures itself. (156)
The “second nature” generated by the spontaneous actions and practices 
required by the habitus and performed through ethos naturalizes, o r makes 
tacit, an arbitrary structure.
Aristotle’s theory of ethos  ^however, was presented within the 
context of class warfare in which the “naturalness” of previous class 
structures and political organization were contested. Thus power “secured 
itself” through more complex channels than is suggested by Berlin’s and 
Walzer’s monological interpretations, which assume an agent-centered 
model of the rhetor who seeks to control a cognitively limited audience. 
Aristotle’s recognition of the power of habit in the Politics and
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Nicomachean Ethics sheds light on his theory of ethos as it functioned 
within class struggle for political power.
Habits of Mass and Elite in the Politick
Aristotle’s arguments for performing habits that lead to arete were 
intended for an elite class. Democracy was marked by extending citizenship 
to those of low birth and slavish employment, those whose conditions 
required them to work as artisans, merchants, or manual labor to make a 
living, banausic employments that required habits that could not lead to 
excellence. In Books Seven and Eight of the Politics, Aristotle describes his 
vision of the best polis, one whose end is the kind of “good life” 
(eudaimonia) only possible through the achievement of arete by its citizens. 
To achieve this “best state,” those laboring in banausic and mercantile 
occupations would be denied citizenship: “the citizens must not lead the 
life of artisans or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical to
 ^ I follow Josiah Ober’s definitions of mass and elite. “Masses” refers to citizens wlio had 
political rights but were not members o f an elite that was distinguished by education, 
wealth, or birth. His definition of “masses,” therefore, excludes slaves, women, and 
laboring-class ahens (metics) who were denied political enfranchisement in fourth- 
century Athens. To plethos (the mass), hoi polloi (the many), and ho ochlos (the mob) are 
among the ancient Greek terms that Ober renders as the citizen-masses. Ehtes were 
referred to as gnorimoi (notables), kaloi kagathoi (the beautiful and good), charientes 
(worthies), aristoi (the excellent), and chrestoi (the prominent). See Ober 11-13.
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excellence. Neither must they be farmers, since leisure is necessary both for 
the development of excellence and the performance of pohtical duties” 
(1328b39-41). And, “artisans or any other class which is not a producer of 
excellence have no share in the state” (1329al9-20). Obviously, democracy 
could never achieve political excellence.
In his perfect state, “the good man is absolutely the same as the good 
citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to 
his own form of government” {Politics 1293b5-8). Aristotle is not here 
suggesting, as some of his democratic appropriators might hope, that in any 
kind of state the role of a “good citizen” will be that of a “good man,” but 
rather that in an aristocracy, the rule of the best, only the best men have 
the status of citizens. Aristotle specifically outlines the difference that labor 
makes in the potential achievement of arete: the “good man” and the “good 
citizen” clearly are not the same thing:
The good citizen need not of necessity possess the excellence which 
makes a good man. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good 
men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well, 
and must therefore have excellence, still, inasmuch as all the citizens 
cannot be alike, the excellence of the citizen and of the good man 
cannot coincide. (1276b35-1277al)
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Banausic employments, Aristotle explains, cannot lead to arete because they 
are in essence slavish. In fact, those employed as artisans or in mechanical 
trades are in some ways more slavish than the slave:
for the slave shares in his master’s life; the artisan is less closely 
connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he 
becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and 
separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the 
shoemaker or other artisan. (1260a40-1260b2)
The slave, by the nature of his relationship to his master, attains a higher 
excellence through his proper service to the master than does the artisan or 
the mechanic, who, through their labor, are deprived of the opportunity to 
achieve excellence. These laborers, although granted citizenship in 
democratic Athens, are hardly fit to make decisions that would lead to 
Aristotle’s “best state.”
For the aristocrat who would pursue arete  ^danger lies in his practice 
of the habits of those who perform banausic labor: “Certainly the good 
man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to leam the crafts of 
inferiors except for their own occasional use; i f  they habitually practise them, 
there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave” (1277a31- 
1277b7, my italics). There are, then, distinct habits for the good man (the
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elite who seek aretê) and the ordinary laboring citizen, habits which create 
and maintain the demarcation between their respective potentials for 
excellence, and “no man can practise excellence who is living the life of a 
mechanic or labourer” (1278a20). Thus Sattler’s definition of ethos that 
hinted at class-demarcating habits is easily discernible in Aristotle’s 
treatises.
As Aristotle continues his critique of democracy and makes clear his 
preference for small ruling bodies of elites, he notes another problem 
related to ethos:
But if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices 
according to merit, then they must know each other’s characters; 
where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to 
offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the 
population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, 
which clearly ought not to be. {Politics 1326b 14-20).
In a large democracy, the entire voting demos does not have personal 
knowledge of the character of each political official. Is, then, Aristotle’s 
statement in Rhetoric 1.2.4 that persuasion through character should result 
from the speech rather than the speaker’s reputation, to be interpreted as a 
concession to democracy? O r is he attempting to negotiate a position on
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ethos that takes into consideration the power of habit, consistent with his 
statement in the Politics that those striving for arete must not “habitually 
practice” the habits of ordinary laboring citizens, who nevertheless 
exercised control over ehte representations of ethos in the assembly and 
courts?
O f the three debased regimes he details in the Politics (tyranny, 
ohgarchy, and democracy) democracy is the best. One reason for this status 
is that it provides an opportunity for the function of Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean. The middling classes act as arbiters between rich and poor: “the 
arbiter is always the one most trusted, and he who is in the middle is an 
arbiter” (1297a5-6). This does not suggest that the “middle class” makes the 
best rulers; only that, based on his doctrine of the mean, an ethos that 
reflects the mean holds in check the excesses of both the wealthy and the 
poor. He goes on to explain that aristocratic governments can go wrong if 
they give too much power to the rich; they err by cheating or deceiving the 
demos. This relationship between the mean and “trust” is clearly shown to 
be a rhetorical process, through the ideological and rhetorical functioning 
of topoi, in the Nicomachean Ethics.
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The Ethos of the Mean
Aristotle opens the Nicomachean Ethics by situating the study of 
ethics within the larger study of politics. The contradictions of this text 
have long fueled controversy over whether Aristotle presents intellectual 
virtue (through philosophical contemplation) or moral virtue (through 
practical action) as the high road to the best life {eudaimonia). Aristide 
Tessitore negotiates this controversy by reading the Ethics to determine its 
implied audience. He argues that the Ethics is addressed to legislators, 
politicians who shape citizen behavior by implementing laws that habituate 
citizens to virtue. Thus, Aristotle addresses a politically minded elite 
audience, specifically the kales k ’agathos, the citizen of a certain social and 
political class whose “way of life requires both economic well-being and the 
presence of others” in order to practice the virtues embodying the highest 
aims of the poHs (17-18).
In the Ethics, two things become clear about those topoi useful for 
establishing ethos that Berlin criticizes because they are available only to the 
elite: first, these qualities of character are means between extremes, and 
second, as topoi, they are linguistic labels for habits that are praised by a 
particular community. Although Aristotle discusses the proper mean of 
other states, such as honor, anger, and friendliness, several of the topoi
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listed in Rhetoric 1.9 are discussed in detail here. For example, Aristotle 
explains:
With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is Uberality, 
the excess and the defect prodigaHty and meanness. They exceed and 
fall short in contrary ways to one another: the prodigal exceeds in 
spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in 
taking and falls short in spending. {NE 1107b9-14)
Likewise in regard to magnificence: an excess in this category produces 
tastelessness and vulgarity in the spending of large sums of money, the 
deficiency, stinginess.
Aristotle’s language suggests that epideictic topoi are actually 
structuring his discussion of the mean. He frequently explains the value of 
the mean by couching his discussion in the language of praise or blame 
attached to these states by the community: “for our excellences and our 
vices we are praised or blamed” {NE 1106al-2), and “excellence is 
concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, 
and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success” 
(1106b25-28). The mean, then, is regarded as “excellent” by the habits of 
thought and action in a particular culture that structures mores or 
character traits along a continuum from defect to excess. It is the mores of
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the community that result in praise of the intermediate and blame of the 
extremes; hence the intermediate is the excellence to be striven for, because 
it is what is praised by the community. Aristotle writes, “the man who 
exceeds in his desires is called ambitious” (1107b28), “we call the 
intermediate person good-tempered” (1108a5), “one man is said to be 
intermediate, and another to exceed” (1108a33). In Bourdieu’s terms, 
achieving the mean produces symboUc capital for the orator, or, topoi that 
can be most successfully manipulated in an oratorical contest by making 
the orator least susceptible to the opponents’ arguments against his ethos.
Arete, then, is a language game. Although Aristotle discusses several 
states for which no specific word exists naming either the mean or its 
deviations, structural slots exist for the excess, the deficiency, and the 
mean, each of which is praised or blamed by the culture: “With regard to 
feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who 
exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have 
no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash” {NE 1107a35- 
1107b2). One is a coward, or rash, or courageous, because the communal 
language names him thus, judging his actions on a continuum from 
deficiency to excess. Hence, Aristotle rightly notes, “it is no easy task to be 
good,” to find this mean in our actions (1109a24). Especially in democratic
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Athens, it is no easy task for the aristocrat, the ehte orator or statesman, to 
act in ways that will be consistently praiseworthy. It is easy to get angry, or 
to give or spend money, Aristotle writes, “but to do this to the right 
person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the 
right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; that is why goodness is 
both rare and laudable and noble” (1109a26-29). Berlin’s “demanding 
demos” will always be eager to label aristocratic actions as deviating from 
the mean, veering off toward the edges of deficiency or excess on the 
character continuum.
This understanding o f the shared language of the epideictic topoi 
seems close to the dialogical interpretations of Aristotle’s rhetoric that 
Walzer criticizes. Walzer bases his critique on misappropriations of Bitzer’s 
article about enthymemes in which he argued that the unstated premises of 
enthymemes are drawn from “common cultural beliefs.” What I am 
suggesting here is an expansion of this notion of “common cultural beliefs” 
into a notion of common cultural habits and practices, a collection of 
common cultural habits of discourse, habits of belief, and the material and 
institutional habits by which a culture arranges classed subgroups into 
relations of production. In addition, I suggest that the topoi can be 
productively understood as the linguistic markers, manifestations, or
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organizers of these habits and practices. These “common cultural habits” 
accepted and practiced by the audience fully determine what that audience 
understands as acceptable ethos in the rhetor. These topoi, tacitly held by 
the audience through years of habituation to their material equivalents, are 
not simply a pool of resources for the rhetor to use to manipulate the 
audience; they also act coercively on his or her own discourse, and thereby 
on his or her own position in the social hierarchy.
Aristotle’s discussions and listings of topoi in the Rhetoric are shot 
through with references to character and ethos. His exhaustive lists of topoi 
are not simply a source of enthymemes, but they are actually the source of 
ethos\ as habitual practices and valuations held by the audience, the topoi 
are a source for the establishment of a credible character, enabling one to 
speak the habits of a particular political field, discourse community, 
constitution, or class. In Chapter Nine of Book One of the Rhetoric (cited 
above in my discussion of Berlin’s article), Aristotle lists topoi regarding 
virtue and the honorable, sources of arguments that make another person 
seem praiseworthy in epideictic oratory as well as sources for enhancing 
the rhetor’s own ethos. The habits and practices that structure Athenian 
relations of production are evident in this list. Justice is defined in terms of 
the legalities involved in property ownership; courage is also defined in
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terms of obedience to the law. Athenian hierarchy is embedded in these 
topoi: “the virtues and actions of those who are superior by nature are 
more honorable, for example, those of a man more than those of a woman 
(1.9.22); and “possessions that bring no fruit [are more honorable]; for 
[they are] more characteristic of a free man,” that is, of a member of the 
aristocratic class, who does not w ork for a living (1.9.25).
These topoi— habits of thought that reflect and organize habits of 
social relations— function as a rhetorical resource for establishing 
credibility. Topoi are the places where social relations are kept in language, 
a linguistic, rhetorical storehouse of the elements of discourse that reflect 
the stratification and organization of social groups in any given culture. 
Ethos, then, may be defined both as the rhetor’s skillful rhetorical use of 
those topoi to make himself or herself appear credible and of high 
excellence, and as the material, habitual hving-out of the relations that 
those topoi reflect and construct. Like “common cultural beliefs,” those 
social relations are, in the vast majority of communicative interchanges, 
assumed, unspoken, unquestioned. Ethos as the politics of habit is, then, the 
material living out of these social relations, habitually, unquestioningly. 
And ethos in the rhetor’s speech is his skillful drawing from that hnguistic 
pool that reflects/constructs social relations, to make himself not only
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appear to be, but, through habituation, to become a credible, upstanding 
member of the culture that maintains those social relations. This power of 
discourse to habituate its practitioners to existing social relations by an 
audience that demands an appropriate ethos creates a problem for Aristotle, 
for, as we have seen, ehte orators damage their potential for achieving arete 
if they engage habitually in the practices of the demos.
Just because Aristotle understood the importance of communally 
shared topoi for constructing symboHc capital in service of ehte ethos 
hardly makes his rhetorical theory dialogical in any Bakhtinian sense, as 
Walzer argues. But, neither does it mean, as Walzer suggests, that 
Aristotle’s rhetoric was based on a monological, one-way, top-down 
control of the audience. The ideological function of those topoi useful for 
constructing an ehte ethos acceptable to the voting demos also involves 
powerful constraints on the ehte. In his investigation of the political 
sociology of democratic Athens, Josiah Ober offers a detailed rhetorical 
analysis of numerous speeches of Attic orators (Lysias, Andocides, Isaeus, 
Demosthenes, and others, between 404 and 322 BCE) to discover how the 
ideology of mass and elite structured the pohtical confhcts of fourth 
century Athens. Ober suggests an explicit equation between ethos and 
ideology:
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As Aristotle clearly recognized, an orator who wishes to persuade a 
mass audience must accommodate himself to the ethos— the 
ideology— of his audience. He must therefore in general speak well 
of what the audience thinks is good and ill of what the audience 
thinks is evil. He will present his own behavior and character as 
conforming to the values of his audience, his opponent’s as failing to 
conform. (43)
The vast majority of orators speaking to the mass audiences in the assembly 
and courts were male elites. Ober emphasizes the ideological function of 
the manipulation of public discourse, some elements of which were 
standardized into topoi, in maintaining the relationship between elite 
orators and the mass audience that functioned as judges of their deliberative 
proposals and forensic arguments. Many of these orators, he claims, were 
“men whose reputations, and sometimes lives, rested upon their ability to 
manipulate symbols to good advantage” (45). Thus the elite Utigant had a 
pressing need to appeal to the ideology, or ethos, of the mass audience, and 
Ober analyzes these speeches in terms of their ideological function rather 
than in terms of the immediate motives of the speakers. The ethos 
demonstrated in the speeches not only manifest Athenian political 
ideology, but to a large extent provide a means to regulate mass-elite
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tensions. Ober’s detailed analyses of two particular problems facing the 
elite orator are particularly useful in complicating both Berlin’s and 
Walzer’s claims: how the ehte orator managed to construct an ethos 
acceptable to the demos with regard to (1) his superior education and (2) his 
wealth.
Education and Wealth Topoi in Elite Ethos
In the 440s, with Pericles’ institution of jury pay, the masses were 
empowered to judge the behavior of all citizens regardless of social rank, 
Ober presents a detailed study of jury pay and demographic analysis to 
contradict scholars who argue that the voting assembly was predominantly 
attended by leisured elites. His extensive evidence suggests, rather, that the 
assembly must have been composed largely of ordinary laboring citizens 
and large numbers of rural residents and farmers who, depending on the 
season, had the time to journey to Athens. Indeed, many assembly voters 
might have been very poor Athenian citizens, attending regularly to collect 
jury pay. The scorn of elitists like Aristotle for the democratic audience is 
further evidence that the assembly was not dominated by elites.
The elite orator or litigant was, then, scrutinized and judged by the 
standards of a class of citizens whose property and education were inferior
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to  his own. Ober suggests that it was no accident that eUtes formalized the 
study of rhetoric: “Rhetoric and acknowledgement of mass control over 
public behavior were intimately connected: rhetoric provided the means 
not only to promote policy and to ‘oppose’ the people but also to 
demonstrate to them one’s own conformity to mass ideology” (90). Like 
Berlin’s and Walzer’s interpretations of Aristotle, Ober’s analysis of Attic 
speeches proceeds on the unstated assumption of an agent-centered strategic 
model of communication. However, unlike Berlin’s and Walzer’s vision of 
an Aristotelian rhetoric that teaches the manipulation of a passive audience, 
O ber recognizes the power of the audience to force the representation, if 
not the habitual lived practices, of the ethos they demand. Certainly the 
construction of such an ethos required that the elite rhetor draw from the 
ideology of the mass audience, as the dialogical model suggests. But Ober 
presents a vision of an empowered demos that actually had the upper hand, 
having the power to impose a particular ethos onto the elite: “The decisions 
of juries could . . .  be regarded as a means of forcing elite citizens to 
conform to the norms established by the masses” (162). Given Aristotle’s 
understanding of the power of habit, demotic control over elite ethos 
presented a tangible threat to aristocratic “nature.”
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As I discussed above, Berlin argues that Aristotle’s topoi for the 
construction of ethos reflect qualities of character that derived from wealth 
and education, and that these quahties were possessed by the elite orator 
prior to the rhetorical situation. The use of these elements of aristocratic 
habitus for the representation of ehte character reflects my definition of 
ethos as class-demarcating habits. But rather than suggesting that they are 
used to control the “worst impulses” of the masses or “render hegemonic 
the ideology of a rich and pohtically ambitious ehte” (Berlin 63), Ober 
complicates the deployment of education and wealth topoi, emphasizing 
the power of the audience to force ehtes’ conformity to democratic 
ideology— at least in their speeches.
The superior education of ehtes clearly demarcated them from their 
audience. The demos was suspicious of rhetorical education in particular, 
because rhetorical skill could lead jurors astray, subverting their judicial 
and legislative powers and threatening the validity of democratic decision­
making processes: “an orator who attempted to use his power of speech to 
deceive a mass audience into voting against its coUective interests was 
obviously setting himself up as superior to the masses, a situation the 
demos must regard as anathema” (Ober 166). Thus the rhetoricaUy 
educated elite orator was in a difficult position. He must, in his speech.
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construct an ethos that aligned his interests with those of the audience, 
demonstrating that his preferences and desires were the same as the 
majority of his hsteners. Demosthenes displays this tactic in Against 
Theocrinesi
The honorable course for you, men of the jury, is not to put the 
laws or your own selves in the power of the expert speakers but to 
keep the speakers in your own power and to make a distinction 
between those who speak well and lucidly and those who speak 
what is just; for it is concerning justice that you have sworn to cast 
your votes, (qtd in Ober 176)
The elite orator reminds the audience of the anti-democratic potential of 
his ehte opponent’s seductive rhetoric, often at the same time emphasizing 
his own inarticulateness. Demarcating himself from his opponent by de­
emphasizing his own rhetorical skill and training, the rhetor aligns his 
interests with those of the demos, predisposing them to distrust any 
arguments that might be made against him  as a cleverly trained speaker. 
Ober identifies this “imskilled speaker” topos in numerous speeches. For 
this strategy to work, however, the audience must bring a willing 
suspension of disbelief to the drama of the oratorical contest, accepting 
“the fiction that those who warned them of the danger were as innocent of
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rhetorical skill and preparation as they claimed to be” (Ober 177). In fact, 
O ber suggests that Greek theater had helped to train the demos as 
audiences for forensic and deliberative oratory.
Critics of Aristotle’s elitism point out, correctly, his constant 
deprecation of the audience’s limited cognitive abihties, but, following 
Aristotle’s lead, they ignore that audience’s potential power over ehte 
speakers. For instance, when Aristotle discusses the use of maxims, he says 
they “make one great contribution to speeches because of the uncultivated 
mind of the audience. . . .  Thus, one should guess what sort of assumptions 
people have and then speak in general terms consistent with these views” 
{Rhetoric 2.21.15). Aristotle goes on to explain, in the discussion of 
enthymemes that immediately follows, that the mass audience of rhetoric 
cannot follow a complete syllogism (as in dialectical reasoning, and that
[tjhis is the reason why the uneducated are more persuasive than the 
educated before a crowd . . . for [the educated] reason with axioms 
and universals, [the uneducated] on the basis of what [particulars] 
they know and instances near their experience. Thus, one should not 
speak on the basis of all opinions but of those held by an identified 
group, for example, either the judges or those whom they respect. 
{Rhetoric 2.22.3)
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Aristotle seems to allude to what Ober identifies as the unskilled speaker 
topos here, tying it to his “social view” of rhetoric that demands arguments 
drawn from the common beliefs of the audience. For Aristotle, this 
strategy simply speaks to the lack of the audience’s reasoning abihties and 
the rhetor’s need to adjust his own superior reasoning capacities to the 
lower level of the uneducated mass audience. Ober’s analysis, on the other 
hand, comphcates this strategy in a way that emphasizes the power of the 
audience to force the skilled speaker into certain stances. Although the 
demos feared that elite rhetorical training presented a danger to democratic 
practices, they also recognized its usefulness to the polis. These antithetical 
attitudes toward ehte education were bound up with the clash between 
egalitarian and elitist ideologies. Ober concludes that the ehte, when 
addressing the demos, “participated in a drama in which they were required 
to play the roles of common men and to voice their solidarity with 
egalitarian ideals” (191). Although Aristotle’s own aristocratic stance led 
him to articulate a rhetorical theory that continually deprecated the 
audience’s reasoning abilities, his rhetoric demonstrates O ber’s emphasis on 
dramatic performance that established demarcation between elite and 
mass—the ehte “play the roles of common men,” but only in their
57
speeches. Thus for Aristotle rhetorical speech is separated from the Hved 
discursive practices that could actually effect a change in character.
Like superior education, the possession of superior wealth also had 
the potential to prejudice a jury against ehte orators. In Antidosis^ for 
example, Isocrates defends himself against what he claims are 
misrepresentations of his own wealth, and writes:
When I was a boy, wealth was regarded as a thing so secure as well as 
admirable that almost every one affected to own more property than 
he actually possessed, because he wanted to enjoy the standing which 
it gave. Now, on the other hand, a man has to be ready to defend 
himself against being rich as if it were the worst of crimes . . . for it 
has become far more dangerous to be suspected of being well off 
than to be detected in crime; for criminals are pardoned or let off 
with shght penalties, while the rich are ruined utterly, and it will be 
found that the number of men who have been spoiled of their 
property is greater than those who have been punished for their 
misdeeds. (§§159-60)
Ober locates in numerous speeches the “dramatic fiction” that ehte 
speakers possessed no greater wealth than the ordinary citizens of his 
audience, or at least that they used their wealth in the common interest.
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Through these “fictions” they evoked a sense of their own solidarity with 
poorer citizens while constructing their opponents as selfish aristocrats 
whose wealth and power endangered the polis. In the oratorical drama of 
ehte versus ehte, each side castigated the other for pointing out his 
opponent’s superior wealth. However, orators and htigants did not want to 
appear poor, either, because Athenian juries would then suspect them of 
being susceptible to bribery. The state’s dependence on aristocratic wealth 
and the desire to avoid open warfare between classes created a tension 
between rich and poor that was ideologicaUy mediated through the 
dramatic use of wealth topoi (Ober 220-223).
Aristocratic ethos, clearly demarcated from that of the ordinary 
laboring citizen, continued to be important to Athenian democracy. But 
Ober demonstrates that this continued influence was not achieved by 
“direct domination,” as Berlin’s comments on ehte ethos seem to suggest. 
The demos had the power to force elite ethos into a shape that met with its 
approval and to harness aristocratic behavior for the good of the masses 
(Ober 289-91). Aristotle resisted what he considered to be an unjust, forced 
equalization of the elite, and this is the tension, Berlin rightly argues, that 
we see reflected in the contradictions of the Rhetoric. My concluding 
section presents a case for interpreting Aristotle’s teaching on ethos in light
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of his understanding of habit in this pohtical tension. He lim its demotic 
control of aristocratic ethos to the speech.
Ethos in the Speech
In the Rhetoric Aristotle instructs his students that persuasion is 
effected “through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as 
to make the speaker worthy of credence; . . .  And this should result from 
the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind 
of person (1.2.4). Aristotle’s insistence that the rhetor construct a 
persuasive ethos in the speech itself rather than depend on a previously 
established position or reputation in the poUs to establish character is 
typically explained in terms of Aristotle’s distinctions between entechnic 
pisteis (methods of persuasion invented by the rhetor) and atechnic pisteis 
(“non-artistic” means of persuasion, such as previously-established 
reputation, available for the rhetor’s use but not invented as a part of the 
“art” of rhetoric). For example, George Kennedy, in a footnote to this 
passage, situates Aristotle’s discussion of ethos here as an entechnic pistis in 
the context of the Greek practice of logography, professional speech- 
writing paid for by defendants who were required to argue their own cases 
but did not have the training to compose their own defenses. To write a
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persuasive speech for a person who m ay not have held a position of 
authority or even of high repute, the logographer had to construct in the 
speech itself a credible character for his client to present to the jurors. 
Similarly, in her textbook based on classical rhetoric, Sharon Crowley 
updates this distinction between “invented ethos” and “situated ethos” by 
pointing out that contemporary writers are read by large audiences who do 
not have first-hand knowledge of the w riter’s hved character or reputation; 
therefore modem writers largely depend on invented ethos within their 
texts to carry the conviction that they are reputable, knowledgeable, and 
trustworthy (84, 86).
I offer a different interpretation that reads Aristotle’s instruction in 
the context of competing notions of ethos that circulated in the various 
rhetorical schools during this period of continuing political conflict 
between aristocratic ehtes and the newly empowered demos. Unlike 
Aristotle, who specifically dismisses the “argument which is made by a 
man’s life,” Isocrates taught that the rhetor’s character must be in evidence 
through his personal history of behavior in the polis:
the man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to 
the matter of character; no, on the contrary, he will apply himself 
above all to establish a most honourable name among his fellow-
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citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction 
when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men 
who hve under a cloud, and that the argument which is made by a 
man’s Ufe is of more weight than that which is furnished by words? 
Therefore, the stronger a man’s desire to persuade his hearers, the 
more zealously will he strive to be honourable and to have the 
esteem of his fellow-citizens. {Antidosis §278)
In the passage immediately preceding this one, Isocrates has conceded that 
the study of the art of rhetoric cannot “implant honesty and justice in 
depraved natures,” but he still argues that those who deeply engage in the 
art of speaking well “can become better and worthier.” This moral 
improvement, as for Aristotle, is achieved by means of habituation, but 
Isocrates grants a higher place than does Aristotle to the practice of rhetoric 
in this process: the student of rhetoric
will select from all the actions of men which bear upon his subject 
those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying; 
and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, 
he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a given 
discourse but in all the actions of his life. (§277)
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Rhetoric, for Isocrates, does not merely teach orators how to perform a 
dramatic fiction that persuades an audience that he has a certain character, 
nor does it teach him simply to maintain his public reputation because it 
will enhance his ethos in his oratory; rather, habits learned through 
rhetorical study are actually embodied in the rhetor and materiahzed in “all 
the actions of his life.” Rhetorical habits, for Isocrates, make a second 
nature.
Such a thesis, 1 suggest, would horrify Aristotle, given his assiduous 
attention to the inferior habits and practices of the demos, and, throughout 
the Rhetoric, his constant awareness of that audience’s power to determine 
elite public discourse. Thus his politics forces him into his teaching that 
ethos, controlled by topoi acceptable to the masses, be restricted to 
speeches. Habits construct character, and those habits standardized into 
topoi for discursive use function to demarcate one social class from 
another. As Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics demonstrate, the habits of the 
ordinary laborer make him “slavish,” unable to achieve arete-, the habits of 
aristocrats make them better or worse aristocrats. His explicit framing of 
his rhetorical theory around the power of the audience and their inferior 
habits precludes his adoption of an Isocratean stance on the power of 
rhetoric to remake aristocratic “nature.”
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Chapter Two
The Managed Character: Ethos and Work 
at the End of the Twentieth Century
Introduction
Aristotle introduces his list of epideictic topoi in Book One,
Chapter Nine of the Rhetoric by saying:
Moreover, as we speak of these, we shall incidentally also make clear 
those things from which we shall be regarded as persons of a certain 
quality in character, which was the second form of pistis\ for from 
the same sources we shall be able to make both ourselves and any 
other person worthy of credence in regard to virtue [excellence]. 
{Rhetoric 1.9.1)
In the previous chapter I addressed Aristotle’s list of epideictic topoi and 
how they were negotiated as markers of an elite, “virtuous” class while 
being approved of, and even demanded by, a demos that was not defined by 
these characteristics, and indeed to whom  these habits were denied. This 
chapter continues to examine epideictic topoi that rhetorically and 
materially construct the evolving dominant social ethos of the late
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twentieth century. My field of exploration in this chapter is not the 
pohtical arena of direct democracy in fourth-century Athens, but the 
twentieth-century workplace, where employees on a daily, habitual basis 
must perform an ethos that makes them “worthy of credence.” In 
democratic Athens one’s participation in direct democracy made one’s 
citizenship an important part of one’s identity.® In twentieth-century 
America, however, I begin with the assumption that one’s position in the 
workforce (which largely but not completely also defines one by social 
class) is the main determiner of identity and the main shaping force of 
character. To emphasize the shift in middle-class ethos that has occurred in 
the second half of this century, I begin by examining the ethos-loTxnxn% 
topoi that were prevalent at mid-century.’ In the 1950s a new middle-class 
character, the product of American affluence and corporate expansion, 
created a cultural fascination that was evidenced by best-sellers like David 
Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd, Wilfiam H. Whyte’s The Organization Man,
* O f course, my generic pronoun here excludes from citizenship, as did Athenian 
democracy, large numbers of the population of the “democratic” polis based on gender, 
freebom status, and alien origin.
’ I will use the construction “erAos-forming topoi” rather than the more traditional 
“ethical topoi” to avoid any possible connotation of “ethical” in the philosophical sense 
that I discussed in the Introduction.
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C. Wright Mills’ White Collar, and Erich Fromm’s The Sane Society and 
Man for Himself The epideictic topoi gleaned from mid-century already 
mark a shift from an even older middle-class ethos. I will disagree to an 
extent with Lynn Bloom, who claims that freshman composition is still a 
middle-class enterprise based on the inculcation of habits largely derived 
from Benjamin Frankhn’s hst of virtues. Drawing from popular 
management materials (which are great storehouses for the topoi that 
structure the new middle-class ethos, and the forum in which they are urged 
upon large middle-class audiences), I devise my own Hst of topoi for a 
postmodern ethos, and locate their emergence in several texts by teachers of 
computer-mediated composition.
Since Aristotle categorizes his et/?os-forming topoi under the 
epideictic genre, a brief discussion of contemporary understandings of that 
genre will introduce some themes of this chapter. Classical epideictic 
oratory is traditionally explained as “praise and blame” speech that 
provides instruction and reinforcement in the audience of the commonly 
held, orthodox community values. Dale Sullivan sums up the traditional 
understanding: “Theoretically, the orator’s praising virtuous acts and 
blaming vicious acts moves the audience to admiration; feeling emulation, 
they then imitate the praiseworthy characteristics and the value system of
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one generation is passed on to the next” (115). I address two problems with 
this view: first, the notion that the audience is being urged to emulate and 
imitate the values presented, and second, the notion that the epideictic 
genre and its ef^os-forming topoi reinforce and pass on traditional, 
orthodox values of a culture. With regard to the first problem, as I 
discussed in Chapter One, if ethos is understood as class-demarcating habits, 
then the ethos presented by the elite orator was not intended to be emulated 
by the demos. As Berlin argued, such an ethos was not even available to the 
demos. How, for instance would a member of the demos, of even the 
middling economic class, emulate the virtue of magnificence 
{megaloprepeia), the praiseworthy disposition of large sums of money? A 
simple understanding of epideictic topoi as the presentation of values to be 
emulated by the audience is insufficient, and ignores complex power 
relations between the Athenian elite and demos. Epideictic, or ethos- 
forming topoi, I suggested in Chapter One, more likely functioned to force 
at least apparent conformity with demos-approved values onto the elite 
rhetor rather than to inculcate desired qualities into the audience. In a 
direct democracy, where the demos had immediate control over decisions 
that affected the entire polis, this coercive function of ethos benefited the 
demos by providing a check on the powers of the elite. The magnificence
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of the elite, for instance, while unavailable for emulation by the demos, 
could certainly benefit those in less privileged classes.
Sullivan expands this traditional understanding of the epideictic 
genre somewhat by defining the ethos constructed in the epideictic 
encounter as “not primarily an attribute of the speaker, nor even an 
audience perception: It is, instead, the common dwelling place of both, the 
timeless, consubstantial space that enfolds participants in epideictic 
exchange” (127). If, however, ethos is more productively seen as class- 
demarcating habits, this “common dwelling place” is a forced relocation 
(like the horse to the stable) into a space where any “consubstantiality” is 
coerced. Of course, consubstantiafity with regard to er/?os-forming topoi 
does exist when rhetors address an audience of their class peers, but 
consubstantiality also acts coercively here to hold the class peers in check; 
they all help each other keep themselves in their places. If we look at ethos 
not as a consubstantial glue that binds together the whole community 
through shared values, but rather see ethos as the rhetorical power to keep 
us or put us in our place in the class system, and indeed even as an 
argument for particular class habits constructed through class-demarcating 
topoi, then ethos becomes an important element of power. The ways in 
which that power devolved to the Athenian demos are not directly
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transferable to our own brand of democracy that offers little of the 
Athenian function of ethos for holding elite excesses in check. What has 
been called the “revolt of the elites” (Christopher Lasch) or the “secession” 
of the professional-managerial class (whom Robert Reich dubs “symbolic 
analysts”) translates into a widening gap between rich and poor with little 
of the old aristocracy’s noblesse oblige left to counter its abusive potential. 
What this means with regard to shifting w ork demands and the 
“management revolution” is one of the pursuits of this chapter. Certainly 
the new breed of managers touts a “consubstantiality” among themselves, 
lower-level employees, and the highest corporate elites with wild claims of 
the radical democratizing of the workplace, but the “common dwelling 
place” is really a new set of et^os-forming habits that are coercively 
inculcated into the working demos in service of profit.
Regarding the second problem with the standard view of the 
epideictic genre, that is, that ethos-ioTvain% topoi have the conservative 
function of passing on traditional values, this claim does not help us 
understand how shifts occur in the dominant social ethos, or, put another 
way, how or why one list of topoi might come to supersede an outdated 
one. What happens when a particular constellation of er^os-forming topoi 
no longer serves those in power? In particular, what new arguments for
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character-forming habits arise when the “modem” ethos of the mid- 
twentieth-century white-collar worker becomes outdated, no longer 
serviceable in a radically altered economy that now focuses on the 
marketable labor of knowledge workers in the “nanosecond nineties”? A 
new ethos, structured through revised topoi, meets the needs of “the 
emerging ^ost)modem labor force of late capitaUsm” (Zavarzadeh and 
Morton 67). This chapter examines the shift from the mid-century ethos of 
the white-collar, middle-class employee of the core corporation to the late- 
century postmodem ethos that makes a person “worthy of credence in 
. regard to virtue” in decentered, unpredictable, disaggregated global 
enterprise webs.
The Personality Market and the Commodification of Character
Ethos is sometimes, particularly in textbooks, defined as the 
“personality” of the rhetor. For instance, in her chapter on ethos in Ancient 
Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, Sharon Crowley writes, “I use the 
terms character and ethical proof in this chapter to refer to proofs that rely 
on a rhetor’s personality or reputation” (81). She does explain that 
“personality” is an inadequate word to convey the rich connotation of ethos 
in Greek. But “personality” has been, and remains, a powerful component
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of ethos in the second half of the twentieth century, even though these two 
terms cannot be directly equated with each other. In this section I examine 
some of the relationships between personality and character, how they are 
used to talk about the behavioral and attitudinal habits of the middle class, 
particularly in regard to work, and how they are related to ethos and to 
ethos-ioTVDXQ.^  topoi.
In his 1953 White Collar: The American Middle Classes, C Wright 
Mills writes:
When white-collar people get jobs, they sell not only their time and 
energy but their personaHties as well. They sell by the week or 
month their smiles and their kindly gestures, and they must practice 
the prompt repression of resentment and aggression. For these 
intimate traits are of commercial relevance and required for the 
more efficient and profitable distribution of goods and services. Here 
are the new little Machiavellians, practicing their personable crafts 
for hire and for the profit of others, according to rules laid down by 
those above them, (xvii)
Personality here seems to have to do with one’s efforts to repress hostile or 
negative emotions and to display pleasing emotions while on the job. 
Reading this description of personality against Aristotle’s pisteis, I
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understand Mills here to be examining work-related instances of pathos 
rather than ethos. Of course, Aristotle’s pisteis are complexly intertwined in 
their persuasive effects and in their relationship to each other, but for my 
purposes here I will attempt to partially disentangle pathos from ethos for 
the purpose of distinguishing Mills’ use of “personaHty” from my own 
focus on “character,” That Mills’ “personaHty market” concerns pathos is 
made clear by a later work influenced by his.
Sociologist ArHe Russell Hochschild, in The Managed Heart: 
Commercialization o f Human Feeling, does not use rhetorical terminology, 
but I would argue that her subject is actually the commodification of 
pathos, influenced as she is by Mills’ analysis of the personality market. 
Hochschild studies service jobs, especially flight attendants and bill 
collectors, who, in her analysis, are paid to engage in “emotional labor.”
She defines emotional labor as “the management of feeling to create a 
publicly observable facial and bodily display;” here she refers to the 
management of the worker’s own feehng, which is a necessary precursor to 
the rhetorical work of producing the marketed product— “a state of mind” 
in the customer (6, 7). Flight attendants, for instance, suppress their 
spontaneous feelings of anger toward obnoxious passengers and create in 
them a feeling of safety and of their own concern for the passengers’
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comfort, while bill collectors suppress their spontaneous feeHngs of 
empathy and create in the debtor feelings of anxiety, guilt, or fear. For both, 
“the problem for the worker becomes how to create and sustain the 
appropriate feeling” in the customer, client, or client’s debtor (138). This is 
precisely the process of “disposing the listener in some way” that Aristotle 
describes concerning pathos: “[There is persuasion] through the hearers 
when they are led to feel emotion [pathos] by the speech; for we do not give 
the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and 
hostile” {Rhetoric 1.2.3, 5). O f course, given Aristotle’s focus on public 
oratory, he is not concerned with the emotional habits o f the rhetor, the 
habitual labor of suppressing feelings so the marketable product can be 
manifested. But for the twentieth-century middle-class worker who must 
alter her own emotional habits in order to create a product— a desired 
emotional state in another— the situation is quite different. Ethos and 
pathos— the worker’s character and the emotional state she creates in her 
customers— become intertwined with each other and with her own 
emotional well being. Hochschild suggests that this management of one’s 
own feeling in order to create desired emotional states in customers can be 
damaging to the worker’s psyche. She has to change herself through 
emotional labor that “calls for a coordination of mind and feehng, and it
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sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to 
our individuahty.” Thus the worker’s face, body, and feelings become 
company resources for making money. For the flight attendant, “smiling is 
separated from its usual function, which is to express a personal feehng, and 
attached to another one—expressing a company feeling” (127). This 
habitual emotional performance ahenates the worker from her non­
working self.*°
As will Hochschild thirty years later. Mills claims that self-aHenation 
is a result of the commodification of personaHty; “In many strata of white- 
collar employment, such traits as courtesy, helpfulness, and kindness, once 
intimate, are now part of the impersonal means of liveUhood. Self­
alienation is thus an accompaniment of his alienated labor” (xvii). Mills 
analyzes the major shifts in the labor force and the resulting changes in 
definitions of “middle-class” from the nineteenth century, when the old 
middle class of small farmers and entrepreneurs frequently owned the 
property with which they worked, to the mid-twentieth century, when the 
white-collar middle class, contrary to some definitions, is “wor between
O f course, even when not at work, we engage, more or less, in what Hochschild calls 
“emotion work” or “emotion management” with family and friends in a private context. 
Hochschild explains the difference in terms of “use value” and “exchange value,” the 
production of emotions in strangers for a wage being by definition alienating.
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Capital and Labor: they are in exactly the same property-class position as 
the wage-workers;” that is, they do not own the means of production, even 
though they exercise some authority, derived from above, over wage 
workers (71). Another of these major shifts meant that in middle-class 
labor, “few individuals manipulate things, more handle peop/e and symbols 
The white-collar worker therefore needs skills to deal with large numbers 
of people “transiently and impersonally; they are masters of the 
commercial, professional, and technical relationship” (65). Although they 
may have management functions, they are not the source of their 
managerial authority: at mid-century, the managerial class was “a link in 
the chains of commands, persuasions, notices, bills, which bind together 
the men who make decisions and the men who make things” (80). Their 
functions of working with symbols and w ith other people are still carried 
out as dependent employees.
Mills’ analysis of the personality market is an attempt to understand 
the effect on personality of the major economic shift from selling goods to 
selHng services. Rather than buying a w orker’s physical labor and skill, the 
employer of white-collar labor buys employees’ “social personalities:” 
“Whenever there is a transfer of control over one individual’s personal 
traits to another for a price, a sale of those traits which affect one’s
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impressions upon others, a personality market arises. . . .  With anonymous 
insincerity the Successful Person thus makes an instrument of his own 
appearance and personaHty" (182). This instrumentalization of the worker’s 
feelings and personal traits, through the habitual repression of his feelings, 
finally, Mills claims, shapes workers into personaHties with acceptable, 
effective, salable traits. PersonaHty “must now also be managed, must 
become the alert yet obsequious instrument by which goods are 
distributed” (184). Through management, which in this case means the 
repression of certain feeHngs and their replacement by more marketable 
ones, these changed habits eventually result in a changed person, one whose 
very being has been molded by the forces of the personaHty market into a 
marketable one: “Sincerity is detrimental to one’s job, until the rules of 
salesmanship and business become a ‘genuine’ aspect of oneself” (183).
Thus, for Mills, “personaHty” is a collection of personal traits that can be 
managed, altered through habits, and instrumentalized to market products 
and services. In the workings of personality-market capitaHsm, “[m]en are 
estranged from one another as each secretly tries to make an instrument of 
the other, and in time a full circle is made: one makes an instrument of 
himself, and is estranged from It also” (188). This emphasis on “self­
estrangement” and “alienation” sounds oddly outdated, even quaint, in our
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postmodern era, like an adolescent fascination with the existential 
condition, perhaps, or the product of a superseded Marxism that naively 
beheved there was something to be ahenated from , a “first nature,” or a 
“real self,” as if the habituated middle-class workers in the personality 
market, suddenly released from the constraints of the workplace, would 
freely bound back to a place in which they were more truly “at home.” By 
the end of the century, technological communication habits and changing 
market needs dissolve the distinction between work and leisure, and the 
“second nature” of work absorbs the subjectivity of the postmodern 
worker completely.
Training for the personality market was instituted in public schools 
to accommodate evolving business needs. Mills describes one such course as 
offering “training in attitudes of courtesy, thoughtfulness and friendliness; 
skills of voice control, etc.” to train future middle-class workers to “sell 
themselves” (187). But as we have seen. Mills and Hochschild both 
emphasize the affective training in new emotional habits that accompanies 
success in many of these middle class jobs: emotions must be managed, 
both by the individual worker and by management; the necessary traits 
that Mills describes as necessary for the personality market are largely 
emotional management habits that, through what Hochschild later calls
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“emotional labor,” sell products and services by creating a particular feeling 
in the audience. My discussion below avoids the use of “personaHty” 
because I define it as expHcitly referring to these affective traits, which, 
since their function is to make profit through pathos, I distinguish from 
character and ethos.
Addressing many of the same mid-century concerns as Mills, Erich 
Fromm couches his analysis of middle-class work ahenation in terms of 
character rather than personality. In one place, Fromm defines character in 
evolutionary terms, hypothesizing that human character evolved as a 
substitute for instincts that humans lost as they evolved. The substitute 
“had to have the function of instincts: enabling man to act as z/he were 
motivated by instincts.” The biological function of instincts, and the social 
function of character, then, allow the Qiuman) animal to act “without 
being delayed by too much doubt and in a relatively integrated manner” 
[Anatom-y 251). This dynamic function of character, its potential for action, 
becomes a central theme in Chaim Perelman’s and Lucie Olbrechts- 
Tyteca’s discussion of the epideictic genre. They expand the traditional 
notions of this genre that I outHned in the introduction to this chapter by 
arguing that epideictic rhetoric has considerable relevance for their study of 
argumentation “because it strengthens the disposition toward action by
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increasing adherence to the values it lauds” (50). When the epideictic topoi 
are deployed for persuasive purposes, the aim is not an immediate decision 
o r intellectual adherence to a proposed probability, but future action. As 
adherence to these topoi is achieved, they are acted upon, made habitual, 
and thus the formation of character out of them allows future action, in 
Fromm’s terms, without delay or undue deliberation, habituated traits that 
allow action as if it were instinctual, a second nature. This is a more subtle 
and insidious process than the simple presentation of values to be emulated. 
In addition, as we have seen, the process is also highly coercive for the 
rhetor: she must impress upon herself those epideictic topoi most favorable 
to her audiences, thereby increasing her own disposition toward actions in 
line with the character she performs for that audience. In the workplace, 
this habitual performance means she acts her way into an acceptable 
character, that, if she had not been early habituated to it, is for her a 
“second nature.”
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca thus use a rhetorical genre to 
analyze the same social process that Fromm approaches through social 
psychology. For Fromm, every social group, culture or social class, needs 
to channel and shape human energy into specific forms, or characters, that 
allow for the continued functioning of that group: “Its members must want
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to do what they have to do if the society is to function properly. This 
process of transforming general psychic e n e i^  into specific psychosocial 
energy is mediated by the social character” {Anatomy 252-253). Fromm 
details several character types which have developed to support capitalistic 
modes of production. Twentieth-century capitalism needed a worker who 
had been
molded into a person who was eager to spend most of his energy for 
the purpose of work, who acquired discipline, particularly 
orderhness and punctuahty, to a degree unknown in most other 
cultures.. . .  The necessity for work, for punctuality and orderliness 
had to be transformed into an inner drive for these aims. This means 
that society had to produce a social character in which these 
strivings were inherent. {Sane Society 77)
Fromm outUnes several character orientations produced by twentieth- 
century capitalism. Here I will discuss only one, which Fromm calls the 
marketing orientation, because of its similarity to Mills’ and Hochschild’s 
analyses of the personality market. While Mills and Hochschild seemed 
concerned specifically with the emotional and affective ingredients of 
“personality,” Fromm provides a stronger link to the rhetorical concept of
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ethos through his focus on character informed by the values and needs of 
the market:
The hmction of the market has been, and still is, predominant 
enough to have a profound influence on the character formation of 
the urban middle class, and, through the latter’s social and cultural 
influence, on the whole population. The market concept of value, 
the emphasis on exchange value rather than on use value, has led to a 
similar concept of value with regard to people and particularly to 
oneself. The character orientation which is rooted in the experience 
of oneself as a commodity and of one’s value as exchange value I call 
the marketing orientation. {Man for H im self 68)
Whether these members of the middle class are salaried employees or self- 
employed, charging for their services, whether they are doctors, artists, 
clerks, lawyers, business executives, or salesmen, “all are dependent for 
their material success on a personal acceptance by those who need their 
services or who employ them” (69). By “personal acceptance,” I interpret, 
through a rhetorical lens, Fromm to say that the audience (chent, 
customers, employer/manager) has a particular power over not just the 
behaviors of the middle class worker, but over his or her very character, by 
demanding that the w orker/rhetor display acceptable habits, or said
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another way, materialize middle-class ethos-lotxam^ topoi. In the marketing 
orientation, Fromm writes, one must
find the conviction of identity not in reference to himself and his 
powers but in the opinion of others about him. His prestige, status, 
success, the fact that he is known to others as being a certain person 
are a substitute for the genuine feeling of identity. This situation 
makes him utterly dependent on the way others look at him and 
forces him to keep up the role in which he once had become 
successful. {Man fo r H im self 71>)
Fromm, like Mills, was interested in what he understood as the self­
estrangement that occurs when “modem man [sic] experiences himself both 
as the seller and as the commodity to be sold on the market.” The 
requirements of middle-class work at mid-century forced the worker in the 
personality market to create himself as “something for others to judge and 
to use; thus his feeling of identity . . .  is constituted by the sum total of 
roles one can play: 'I  am as you desire me' ” {Man for H imself 72-73). Unlike 
the postmodern subject who is defined by her collection of roles and the 
discourse communities to which she belongs, Fromm and Mills resist seeing 
the roles and the ethos demanded by the personality market as the worker’s 
“real” character. The audience, whether boss or customer or client, for this
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middle-class ethos largely calls the shots for the character it desires. Fromm 
seems to argue that this kind of alienation is structured deep into the 
character of the middle class; it is derived from a concern for what others 
think, for audience, a concern which demarcates the middle class from 
those below and above it.
In his irreverent look at class, Paul Fussell uses this concern for 
audience as a demarcator of the middle class. For example, situated at a 
great distance from the main road, William Randolph Hearst’s San Simeon 
might be thought to indicate his top-out-of-sight upper class status. But 
Fussell notes that the building’s facade “is designed to evoke respect, or 
rather awe, in the breast of the apprehender, and that indicates how very 
un-top-out-of-sight Hearst remained despite his pseudo-aristocratic airs. He 
cared too much what effect he was having on people” (32). His concern for 
what others think— the effect he has on an audience— drops Hearst to 
upper middle-class status. O f course, as I considered in Chapter One, many 
of the Greek elites found in rhetoric a way to pursue their own need to 
care what effect they had on the demos; they had to care what their 
empowered audience thought in order to protect their own interests. Such 
concerns, Fussell claims, indicate nervousness about “status slippage” (58), 
certainly a condition relevant to the Greek aristocracy in an era of direct
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democracy, and to the middle class in the mid- to late twentieth century. In 
addition to an extreme concern with audience, other characteristics of the 
middle class that Fussell notes include: earnestness and a psychic insecurity 
that leads to a desire to not offend, leading to excessive concern with 
cleanliness and correctness (39); the desire to belong, making “[o]ddity, 
introversion, and the love of privacy” enemies of the middle class (while 
these qualities function to demarcate it from the upper orders) (41-42); and 
“optimism and his belief in the likelihood of self-improvement if you’ll just 
hurl yourself into it” (43). The next section explores the roots of some of 
these middle-class ef6os-forming topoi, and the institution of freshman 
composition as a significant force for instilling them into middle-class 
aspirants.
Middle-Class Ethos and Freshman Composition
The er/?os-forming topoi for elite rhetors that Aristotle lists in 
Rhetoric 1.9 are: justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence, 
magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. The locus 
classicus for a list of er/zos-forming topoi for the modem era, particularly as 
they began to inform the work ethos of the ever-changing “middle class,” is 
found in Benjamin Franklin’s autobiography, where he lists the virtues he
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desires to instill into his own character. His discussion of these desirable 
habits follows a story about his disappointment with a church sermon that 
he had anticipated would address the moral principles needed for the 
making of good citizens. His pretext, then, is the church’s apparent 
inability not only to inculcate but even to articulate principles for effective 
pubhc participation. His “bold and arduous project of arriving at moral 
perfection” is expHcitly designed to be achieved by the daily habitual 
practice of these virtues (much to his frequent frustration): “contrary habits 
must be broken, and good ones acquired and established” (73-74). He 
creates his list as a clarification of the various catalogues and enumerations 
of moral virtues he has studied, and arrives at thirteen (four more than 
Aristotle’s):
1. TEMPERANCE. Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation.
2. SILENCE. Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; 
avoid trifling conversation. 3. ORDER. Let all your things have their 
places; let each part of your business have its time. 4. RESOLUTION. 
Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what you 
resolve. 5. FRUGALITY. Make no expense but to do good to others 
or yourself; i.e., waste nothing. 6. INDUSTRY. Lose no time; be 
always employed in something useful; cut off all unnecessary
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actions. 7. SINCERITY. Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and 
justly, and, if you speak, speak accordingly. 8. JUSTICE. Wrong none 
by doing injuries, or omitting the benefits that are your duty.
9. MODERATION. Avoid extreams; forbear resenting injuries so 
much as you think they deserve. 10. CLEANLINESS. Tolerate no 
uncleanliness in body, cloaths, or habitation. 11. TRANQUILLITY, be 
not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or unavoidable.
12. CHASTITY. Rarely use venery but for health or offspring, never 
to dulness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace 
or reputation. 13. HUMILITY. Imitate Jesus and Socrates. (74-75) 
This list bears similarities to Aristotle’s, (frugality, justice, moderation), but 
Franklin’s topoi are updated and resituated for his era and the fluidity of 
the middle class that it gave rise to. Aristotle says, after listing his “parts of 
virtue,” that “since virtue is defined as an ability for doing good, the 
greatest virtues are necessarily those most useful to others” (1.9.4). Many of 
Franklin’s “virtues” reflect this notion of benefit to others; silence, for 
instance, frugality, justice, and even chastity reflect a concern for others, 
and Franklin even suggests that estimations of his character rose as those in 
his company recognized how his new habits took their interests into 
consideration (82-83). O ther of his ethos-iorvam% topoi bespeak the
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employments of an aspiring middle-class: order, resolution, industry, and 
cleanliness begin to impress themselves upon the middle-class ethos and 
demarcate it from the lower classes, already in Franklin's time being 
defined by a nascent industrial revolution. The middle classes of the 
nineteenth century, small property owners, farmers, and entrepreneurs, 
would find order, resolution, and industry necessary to the achievement 
and maintenance of their class status. In White Collar, Mills examines 
numerous inspirational books and “success ideologies” that appeared 
between 1856 and 1947, and found that these topoi were constantly 
reiterated: “will power and thrift, habits of order, neatness, and the 
constitutional inability to say Yes to the easy road;” “upright, exactly 
punctual, and high-minded; he will soberly refrain from liquor, tobacco, 
gambling, and loose women;” “self-reliance in all things;” “caution and 
prudence.” Mills suggests that this hterature was largely intended for an 
audience of boys from rural areas and small towns, instructing them in 
“polish” and conduct befitting their middle-class aspirations.
That this list changed little from Franklin’s mid-eighteenth century 
aspirations, through the nineteenth century, to the very differently situated 
middle class of the mid-twentieth century United States is evidenced by the 
fact that these et^os-forming topoi have, until very recently, formed the
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backbone of the value system inculcated in freshman composition. In fact, 
Lynn Bloom, in “Freshman Composition as a Middle-Class Enterprise,” 
situates her own analysis in relation to FrankHn’s Hst. His autobiography, 
which. Bloom notes, “has for two centuries been the template for 
American ascendancy into the middle class,” she situates in the context of 
eighteenth century rhetoricians (Adam Smith, Hugh Blair, George 
Campbell). These teachers of rhetoric and middle-class values rewrote 
classical rhetorical principles from their aristocratic origins, shaping them 
into a form that was more amenable to aspiring middle-class needs and 
making them available for translation into nineteenth century pedagogical 
practices (655-56). Bloom sees these same middle-class values articulated by 
Franklin still promulgated in freshman composition. She unabashedly 
admits her own middle-class upbringing, and makes no apology for her and 
her misddle-class colleagues’ “preachfing] what we had been practicing all 
our lives . . . for all of us knew right from the start how to function as 
middle-class teachers” (658). Her equation of the teaching of composition 
to “preaching” deeply habituated, apparently unquestioned, middle-class 
practices suggests that her move into teaching composition must have felt 
“natural” for her. I want to enumerate and briefly discuss her own list of 
middle-class character topoi that she argues are thoroughly embodied in
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writing courses, “no matter what theories, pedagogical philosophies, or 
content we embrace,” because in the next section I will take issue with 
them and devise a different list of et^os-forming topoi for a different kind of 
“middle class.”
Bloom begins with SELF-RELIANCE and RESPONSEBILITY, middle- 
class values that are imparted, she suggests, through an emphasis on 
avoiding plagiarism and an insistence that students do their own work. 
R e s p e c t a b il it y  is achieved through the absorption of handbook rules and 
proper forms, inculcating “academic assumptions about the appropriate 
hierarchy of authority.” That “respectability” is still a governing character 
value of the writing classroom becomes apparent in Bloom’s discussion of 
the professor’s horror at receiving an “offensive” paper, one that presents a 
blatant affront to middle-class morality. Likewise, DECORUM and 
PROPRIETY are still required of the first-year writer, whose papers must 
“show respect, deference, and the proper degree of formality” from a 
subordinate writing to someone in the hierarchy above her. Bloom then 
turns to style to explain the values of MODERATION and TEMPERANCE (be 
clear, avoid fancy language), and THRIFT (don’t use more words than you 
need to make your point). EFFICIENCY is instilled through effective, time- 
saving heuristic procedures and writing strategies, gleaned from years of
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empirical research on the writing process. BeHeving, as teachers will, that 
“disorganized writing is as disreputable as disorderly conduct, for it both 
impUes mental laxity and shows disrespect for one’s readers,” teachers can 
become “organization poUce” as they attempt to inculcate middle-class 
ORDER into their students. CLEANLINESS and PUNCTUALITY require that 
students clean up their manuscript for deHvery and turn it in on time. 
Finally, the attempt to justify the need for a composition course to 
freshmen because it will help them in future courses, and in work and Hfe 
beyond college, relies on another middle-class virtue, DELAYED 
GRATIFICATION (663-64). Needless to say, a speaker or writer, at least in 
the 1950s, without these qualities would have what a middle-class audience 
perceived as a damaged ethos in a rhetorical situation; should such a speaker 
by chance happen to have the ear of a middle-class audience, his or her 
persuasive powers would be severely hmited. This is, of course, why 
freshman composition textbooks, and even those addressed to more 
advanced student audiences, are at such pains to instill these habits into 
middle-class aspirants. These middle-class topoi creep insidiously into 
various kinds of texts, from theoretically informed composition textbooks
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to sophisticated postmodern theory, where one might expect, if not a 
thoughtful departure from them, at least an exphcit recognition of them."
For instance, in Ancient Rhetorics fo r  Contemporary Students, a 
rhetoric and composition textbook for advanced undergraduates, Crowley 
discusses a letter to the editor in an Arizona newspaper to introduce a 
lesson on persuasive ethos. Complaining about a “homosexual festival,” the 
writer of the letter calls his readers “you narrow-minded people,” blames 
AIDS on homosexuals, and concludes by suggesting that if his too-Uberal 
audience is disturbed by the way of life in Flagstaff, they are invited to 
move elsewhere. Crowley writes:
It is not hard to see where his ethos begins to go wrong. Most 
Americans would not be offended by anything in the first or second 
paragraphs, since these sections of the letter express commonplaces 
from American ideology. Perhaps sensitive readers would be put o ff 
by the quotation marks around ‘festival’ and the use of the term 
‘narrow-minded, ’ but these usages do not do serious damage to the
" For the following discussion, I have chosen the texts of two women, Sharon Crowley 
and Nedra Reynolds. Since my focus is on class demarcations rather than gender, one of 
my purposes is to suggest that middle-class ethos is compelling and powerful enough to 
absorb a potentially radical feminist ethos. I would argue, of course, that a truly non­
middle-class ethos cannot be achieved within academic discourse. Barbara Ehrenreich 
reminds us that “[t]he university is, after all, the core institution of the professional 
middle class” (58).
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writer’s ethos as a sensible and reasonable American. In the third 
paragraph, however, the 'writer begins to lose control of his ethos 
when, without further proof or elaboration, he connects AIDS and 
the mass-murderer Jeffrey Dahmer to homosexual activity . . .  [but] 
conceivably, this audience might read this third paragraph without 
being offended. In the final paragraph, however, the writer . . . shows 
himself to be not only homophobic but provincial as well. (83, my 
itahcs)
Well in line with Bloom’s list, Crowley explains to students that they 
should perform an ethos that displays respectability and propriety, always 
appearing “reasonable and sensible” in order not to “offend” or “put off” 
their audience, whose own middle-class status remains an unspoken 
assumption. “Loss of control” suggests that this writer has problems living 
up to the middle-class requirements of moderation and temperance. The 
offense of provincialism is not covered by Bloom’s list, but bespeaks a very 
old class demarcation that takes on a new flavor in a postmodern, globally 
webbed world.
N ot only when writing for undergraduates, humanities professionals 
constantly rely on these middle-class topoi in texts addressed to their peers, 
where they can take on some unusual contours. In Ethos as Location: New
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Sites for Understanding Discursive Authority,” for example, Nedra 
Reynolds makes a useful connection between the poststructuralist 
keyword, “site,” and the etymological roots of ethos as “haunts” or “place,” 
to argue that ethos is fashioned in the shifting locations that construct the 
subject as a coUigation of positions or sites. “These notions of identity and 
site,” she writes, “packed with currency from recent theories, have long 
been important to the rhetorical concept of ethos, which encompasses the 
individual agent as well as the location or position from which that person 
speaks or writes” (326). H er definition oi ethos shares some important 
elements of my own: ethos is a social construction “m which subjects are 
formed by the habits of their culture,” and “[c]haracter is formed by habit, 
not engendered by nature, and those habits come from the community or 
culture”(328-29). Recognizing that the “community” or “culture” from 
which these habits arise is always a conflicted one, she turns to a discussion 
of ethos from the margins,” citing Donna Haraway’s use of standpoint 
theory to plead for a recognition of the validity of situated knowledges and 
partial perspective. But even the “view from below” is constrained by the 
middle-class demand for responsibility: Reynolds praises those feminist 
writers who “earn their rhetorical authority by being responsible— by 
stating explicitly their identities, positions or locations, and political goals.
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In their acknowledgment of differences and their insistence on 
responsibility, feminist theorists of location . . . contribute to a revised 
notion of ethos” (330-331, my italics). Is this the same middle-class 
insistence on “responsibility” that Bloom found in freshman composition? 
W hy this requirement that those “on the margins” be “responsible” for 
“stating explicitly” their positions or locations and goals? Is it because their 
audience is middle-class, and they must therefore appeal to that ethos} O r is 
it because these writers seek the authority and status granted to the middle- 
class, and therefore are forced to emulate its “responsible” habits? Granted, 
Reynolds is challenging in important ways some forms of middle-class 
ethos, particularly the ethos emerging from a scientific literacy that values 
“objective” knowledge in ways that pretend its “authority comes from on 
high or from the printed page itself” (332). Haraway states her version of 
standpoint theory in her often cited “Situated Knowledges” essay:
Many currents in feminism attempt to theorize grounds for trusting 
especially the vantage points of the subjugated; there is good reason 
to believe vision is better from below. . . . this essay is an argument 
for situated and embodied knowledges and an argument against 
various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims, 
(qtd in Reynolds 331, my italics)
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Haraway’s liaison here between locatedness and responsibility is 
quintessentially middle class and concerns only speakers or writers who are 
besieged by the demands of a middle-class audience. Haraway is simply 
labeling the enemy— unsituated, “objective,” knowledge with universal 
claims— as the “irresponsible” other, not deserving of their middle-class 
privileges because of their irresponsibility. However, Reynolds’ demand 
that “we recognize our partial perspective” and admit that “our sight or 
location is never representative of all experience” (331), is largely available 
only to the educated middle class. Being “explicit” about one’s location, she 
writes, “is also being responsible” and “rhetors must take responsibility for 
their ways of knowing” (334). But one’s awareness that one’s perspective is 
partial, and one’s ability to be explicit about one’s situatedness, are 
competencies that accrue only to the fortunately educated. To claim that 
such awareness and explicitness makes one “responsible” functions here to 
align rhetors from the margins with middle-class values. Since the feminist 
writers who acknowledge and articulate their locatedness, and are therefore 
praised by Reynolds (Adrienne Rich, bell hooks), are absorbed into the 
middle-class through readership and earning capacity if not by class origin, 
one wonders whether this “responsibility” is an Aristotelian construction 
of “character in the speech” or if it has been practiced as a middle-class
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habit leading to middle-class status and acceptability. At any rate, taking 
“responsibility” for recognizing one’s location on the margin at least saves 
one from denouncement as “provincial.” The middle-class aspirant is beset 
on all sides with pitfalls: provincialism and sophisticated forms of 
irresponsibihty can trap her into betraying a less than middle-class 
character to the watchful eyes of her middle-class audience.
Barbara Ehrenreich’s Fear o f Falling draws from popular sources and 
undergraduate sociology textbooks from which (along with the ethos taught 
in composition textbooks) students absorb middle-class topoi that have 
been deployed in the past fifty years to demarcate the middle-class from 
those it defines as other than itself. Responsibility, decorum and propriety, 
delayed gratification, and provincialism have all enjoyed long runs in 
middle-class attempts to demarcate itself from the won-middle-class, even as 
it struggled with its own evolving ethos in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Ehrenreich demonstrates how the “discovery” of the poor in the 
1950s and of the working class in the early 1970s relied on many of the 
topoi I have discussed to define the character of these lower classes through 
their lack of or resistance to middle-class qualities. Drawing from mid­
century undergraduate sociology textbooks, she finds that sociologists 
explained to students how the lower class man “sedulously avoids work.
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responsibility, and the consequences of tomorrow. His life is drunkenness, 
momentary hedonism, sexual license, violence and street scenes” (qtd in 
Ehrenreich 27). Obviously he [sic] does not quaHfy as middle class, since he 
does not exhibit responsibility, moderation, thrift, efficiency, delayed 
gratification, or, returning to Franklin’s list, chastity, temperance, or 
industry. Those unfortunates mired in the “culture of poverty” discovered 
in the late 1950s were defined with the “blame” topoi of helplessness and 
dependence—not the self-praising middle-class’s self-rehance, responsibiHty, 
or resolution. Oscar Lewis, whose study of Mexican families originated the 
phrase “culture of poverty,” explicitly credits them with “a strong present­
time orientation with relatively little disposition to defer gratification and 
plan for the future” (qtd in Ehrenreich 49). Middle-class et^os-forming topoi 
that had been in circulation for nearly two centuries were easily marshaled 
by these sociologists to demarcate themselves from what Ehrenreich calls 
“the invented poor.” O f course, unlike the ancient Athenian demos who 
could at least vote on elite constructions of ethos, the impoverished groups 
defined by sociologists had no such power to determine what went into the 
sociology books, and the invention of a working-class ethos was aided by 
the fact that the working class itself “was never invited to participate in the 
great middle-class enterprise of image-making and social ‘discovery’” (121).
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The working class character “discovered” by the middle class and clearly 
demarcated from itself was characterized by its vulgar language (as opposed 
to middle class decorum and propriety), and, in the wake of the upheavals 
of the 1960s, class-demarcating topoi suddenly become explicitly political: 
the working class was bigoted (not displaying the respectability of middle- 
class liberals), and too intolerant and authoritarian to be very good at 
democracy. The lower class man s provincialism, too, had been described in 
the textbooks as early as the 1950s: “His perspective is limited, and so is his 
ability to understand the world aroimd him” (qtd in Ehrenreich 27).
By the 1970s the textbooks seem to shift to a different set of topoi to 
demarcate the working class. The blue-collar person is “more ethnocentric, 
more authoritarian, and more isolationist than people at higher levels,” and 
is “reluctant to meet new people and new situations, to form new social 
relationships, and above all, to initiate contact with strangers. O n the 
contrary, he values and seeks out, more than anybody else, the routine, the 
familiar, the predictable” (qtd in Ehrenreich 112). I do not find middle-class 
topoi oppositional to these in Franklin’s and Bloom’s lists: we seem to have 
entered a new territory. The assumption here is that the middle class 
person is not “reluctant to meet new people,” is perhaps even eager “to 
form new social relationships and . . .  to initiate contact with strangers,”
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and avoids “the routine, the famiHar, the predictable.” The middle-class 
character, it seems, has shifted away from emphasizing Bloom’s values and 
now busies itself with gregarious, extraverted activities that involve novel 
situations and even risk. The working-class person is simply old-fashioned, 
still bound to outdated characteristics like “loyalty” that had been, in the 
1950s era of the core corporation, important for white-collar employees 
too, but already outdated for the middle class by the 1970s.
In the next section I will look at these new middle-class topoi and 
situate them in the rapidly changing work environments and the attendant 
“management revolution” of the late twentieth century.
Postmodern Ethos in the High-Value Enterprise
I set up this section by introducing central themes from former 
Labor Secretary Robert Reich’s The Work o f Nations. Reich’s analysis of the 
evolution of the core corporation into disaggregated global enterprise webs 
sets the stage for my consideration of the shift from the mid-century 
middle-class ethos that fascinated Fromm and Mills to the postmodern ethos 
of a new brand of employee. This section articulates several key ethos- 
forming topoi that have emerged in the last several decades and that 
demarcate this class of worker from the responsible, always appropriate
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middle-class ethos of Franklin and Bloom and the alienated, personality- 
market ethos of Mills and Fromm.
Reich discusses the mid-century worker briefly, Usting “conformity 
and tractabihty” as needed traits, “perfectly consistent with the 
standardized, high-volume system of production he oversaw” (54). High- 
volume production (the large-scale mass production of standardized goods 
for the standardized needs of mass consumption), the supreme achievement 
of the twentieth-century core corporation, has shifted to high-value 
production, where knowledge workers in “decentralized groups and 
subgroups continuously contracting with similarly diffuse working units all 
over the world” are paid to achieve the more specialized goal of serving 
more individualized needs for particular customers (82-83). The high-value 
organization produces and sells knowledge services: “the speciahzed 
research, engineering, and design services necessary to solve problems; the 
speciahzed sales, marketing, and consulting services necessary to identify 
problems; and the specialized strategic, financial, and management services 
for brokering the first two” (85). These high-value services require a work 
ethos that shares few topoi with Franklin’s or Bloom’s lists. In fact, we shall 
see that self-reliance, efficiency, and order have become particularly suspect 
in a business environment where problem-solvers, problem-identifiers, and
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strategic brokers all work together to continually forge new and profitable 
knowledge links between needs and solutions.
Reich groups problem-solving, problem-identifying, and strategic 
brokering into a job-class that he names symbohc-analytic services. Various 
symbohc analysts in the decentered corporation “need to be in direct 
contact with one another to continuously discover new opportunities. 
Messages must flow quickly and clearly” (87). Thus the much-vaunted 
leveling of the old hierarchical corporate order and the “management 
revolution” evolved alongside structure-changing communications 
technologies. With the elimination or radical redefining of middle 
management, webs are extolled over hierarchies, and communication and 
idea-management in webs need speed and agility. The willingness to take 
risks and experiment with new opportunities is paramount: the master 
er/?os-forming topos becomes flexibihty.
The symbolic analyst is one of three job-class categories that Reich 
claims are becoming more solidified in an increasing global economy where 
the “economic fates of Americans are beginning to diverge.” These three 
job-class groups are: routine production services, in-person services, and 
symbolic-analytic services. Routine production services include traditional 
blue-collar line- and piece-work with metal and other materials, but also
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include routine supervisory jobs, and many “high-tech” jobs— circuit board 
manufacture and installation, information- and data processing, and routine 
software coding. These workers are “guided on the job by standard 
procedures and codified rules” and their required work ethos retains the 
flavor of the mid-century middle-class ethos that I outlined in the previous 
section: “their cardinal virtues are reUabiHty, loyalty, and the capacity to 
take direction. Thus does a standard American education, based on the 
traditional premises of American education, normally suffice” (175).
In-person servers, unlike routine producers, are in direct contact 
with specific customers and include retail sales, waiters, janitors, cashiers, 
nurses aides and orderHes, taxi drivers, secretaries, fhght attendants, and so 
on. In addition to being “as punctual, reliable, and tractable as routine 
production workers,” most in-person servers “must also have a pleasant 
demeanor. They must smile and exude confidence and good cheer, even 
when they feel morose. They must be courteous and helpful, even to the 
most obnoxious of patrons. Above all, they must make others feel happy 
and at ease” (176). We have seen these requirements, and the alienation they 
cause, explained by Hochschild and Mills. As for routine producers, the 
role of technology in the lives of in-person servers is often one of
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automation and control (fast-food and lodging are two prominent 
examples).
The third category, symbolic-analytic services, includes the problem­
solving, problem-identifying, and strategic-brokering services mentioned 
above. Workers in this job-class, “research scientists, design engineers, 
software engineers, civil engineers . . .  investment bankers, lawyers, real 
estate developers . . .  advertising executives, art directors, 
cinematographers, pubhshers, writers, musicians, television and film 
producers,” consultants of all kinds and “even university professors,” 
produce and market “manipulations of symbols— data, words, oral and 
visual representations.” These workers' income and status depends on 
“quality, originality, cleverness,” teamwork, or, when not with teammates, 
“examining words and numbers, moving them, altering them, trying out 
new words and numbers, formulating and testing hypotheses, designing or 
strategizing.” They add value in a high-value organization by 
“conceptualizing the problem, devising a solution, and planning its 
execution.” According to Reich, this job-class is the only one of the three 
who is, in the 1990s, not on a sinking ship (177-179). While the job-class 
labeled by “symbolic analyst” might also be called the professional middle
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class or the professional/managerial class*', I have chosen to use Reich’s 
syntactically odd term (derived from “symbolic-analytic services”) for 
several reasons: it highlights the complex rhetorical and literacy skills 
required of these workers, it serves as a constant reminder of the other two 
job-classes (on sinking ships) against which it and its ethos are defined, and 
it locates these workers at the end of the twentieth century in global webs 
of high-value enterprise.
The disruptive changes resulting from the shift from high volume to 
high value production are also outlined by management guru Tom Peters 
in Thriving on Chaos: Handbook fo r a Management Revolution. In a chart he 
titles “A World Turned Upside Down,” he lists the functions and 
requirements of the old, core corporation, where the emphasis was on mass 
markets, mass advertising, and volume, where sales and service workers 
were “second-class citizens” whose main function was to “move the 
product,” and where there was a need for tight managerial control, 
hierarchical structure, detached leadership, and centralized strategy 
planning. In the latter half of the century, fueled by financial uncertainties.
The professional/managerial class has been fragmented anyway, since the managerial 
class has been under attack “from below, by the rank-and-file, from above, by senior 
management and from outside, largely by university-based management scientists and 
theorists” (Demarest).
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technological transformation, changing tastes, and market fragmentation, 
the successful business must now focus on market niche creation and 
flexibility in manufacturing; it must recognize that even its sales and service 
employees are a major source of value added; and its internal organization 
must be flexible enough to survive the flattening of old hierarchical 
structure (management “delayering”) by self-managed teams and new 
leadership models that allow strategy development from the bottom up 
(42-43).
These changes have been touted by many as radically democratic, a 
workplace revolution driven by the ideology of the knowledge revolution. 
Philip Brook Man ville even attempts to compare the new democratic 
organization to the Greek democratic revolution in “Ancient Greek 
Democracy and the Modem Knowledge-Based Organization; Reflections 
on the Ideology of Two Revolutions.” Manville justifies his apples-and- 
oranges comparison by pointing out that in the near future “nation-states 
will not be the only important ‘political entities’;” hence the global 
enterprise web becomes the new democratic polis (378). Both the Greek 
democratic revolution and the late twentieth-century knowledge/ 
management revolution, he claims, represent structural shifts based on 
collapsed hierarchies and the attendant reconfigurations of social roles for
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redefined groups and individuals. The Greek revolution, too, led to a 
cultural transformation marked by “the development of a self-conscious, 
group identity of the demos— a collective understanding and set of 
behaviors that exemplified the rule of the people” (379). Manville sees a 
similar transformation at work in the evolving group identity of 
knowledge workers. The citizen of the democratic Greek polis “was 
expected to participate in pubHc life, and one’s citizenship exemphfied the 
obligation” (380). For Manville, a similar expectation of participation 
devolves to workers at all levels in the knowledge-based organization. 
Public debate and discussion allowed Greek citizens “to reach sounder, 
more sensible decisions than could individuals or any elite” (381-82). 
Likewise, the knowledge-based organization emphasizes “participatory 
leadership” through internal debate and discussion among collaborative, 
co-equal associates with different kinds of specialized knowledges and 
expertise.
What new ethos is required for the symbolic analyst in the new 
economy? Various kinds of management literature offer a range of ethos- 
forming topoi, which I have gathered under the following terms:
LABILITY. In the “world turned upside down” that Peters describes, 
“loving change, tumult, even chaos is a prerequisite for survival, let alone
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success” {Chaos 45). Adaptability and flexibility become part of the 
requisite character structure. Margaret Wheatley, in Leadership and the New 
Science, writes that employees in the new order must leam to tolerate 
“fluctuations, disturbances, imbalances,” and to develop a new 
understanding of the order that arises out of chaos and fluctuation (20).
The old character defined by mid-century topoi, like the organization 
struggling to survive in the new economic order, must “refinquish most of 
what [it has] cherished” (Wheatley 5). Wheatley uses metaphors from the 
sciences of quantum physics, systems theory, and chaos to contrast the 
management challenges of the new order with the comfortable old styles 
based, metaphorically at least, in a Newtonian science where predictability, 
planning, and hierarchical control made sense for a bureaucratic age. Now 
management theorists must contend with “more fluid, organic structures” 
and “boundaryless organizations” (13). The new economy requires a labile 
character that thrives in situations of unpredictability, seeking out and 
instigating change. The marketplace has “turned ephemeral,” so “we must 
turn ephemeral too” (Peters Liberation 18).
That lability has become an ethos-{orrmn% topos, and a class- 
demarcating one, in the new economy can be seen in jokes that dot the 
business literature: “What is a Luddite? A boss who doesn't know the
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difference between stability and paralysis.” Recall my discussion in the 
previous chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics^ where the rhetor, to construct 
a credible ethos  ^had to steer a praiseworthy middle course between 
disparaged extremes. Here, “love of change” is now that necessary middle 
course. “Stability” lies on the belittled edge of the continuum, hardly 
praiseworthy in the present business climate. Wheatley writes, “I’ve 
observed the search for organizational equilibrium [i.e., stability] as a sure 
path to institutional death, a road to zero trafficked by fearful people” (76). 
New science gives Wheatley the metaphors she needs to argue that “staying 
put or keeping in balance” or “stasis” are defenses of the fearful; 
disequilibrium and change are part of the process of life and self-renewal. 
The non-labile person’s ethos can now be attacked with impunity: he or she 
is “fearful,” “paralyzed,” or, in the information age’s favorite pejorative, a 
Luddite. But where does this topos stop describing the worker’s character 
and start describing the needs of the business enterprise in the new 
economic order? The “adaptive organization,” Wheatley writes, will 
“develop a capacity to respond with great flexibility to external and 
internal change” (91). Wheatley’s discussion of equilibrium also targets the 
old middle-class topos of order. As “equilibrium busters,” managers are “no 
longer the caretakers of order [but] the facihtators of disorder. We stir
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tilings up and roil the pot, looking always for those disturbances that 
challenge and disrupt until, finally, things become so jumbled that we 
reorganize work at a new level of efficacy” (116). The needs of the 
organization— lability and a creative tolerance of disorder— easily become 
the characteristics that are required of its employees, and new topoi for a 
new economy structure the ethos that will be required of its most privileged 
workers, the symbolic analysts.
SPONTANEITY. Although similar to  labiHty, spontaneity captures 
the mode of work of many symbolic analysts who are no longer strapped 
to an outdated emphasis on predictability and control. Peters argues that 
innovation is essential, and the key players in an innovator’s market don’t 
ponder and plan, they “leap, then look.” They have a glimmer of an idea, 
cobble together a prototype, then deal with modifications. Planning is out, 
spontaneous decision-making is in. Peters offers these examples:
Tomorrow’s effective ‘organization’ will be conjured up anew each 
day. At Oticon, for example, after a quick scan of the on-line project 
listings, employees decide what to w ork on, whom to work with, 
and what desk to take their personal cart to for the day! At CN N , a 
30-minute, 8:00 a.m., 9-bureau, on-line ‘meeting’ invents the 
network for the coming day— until everything changes, which it
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visually does in short order. Such odd procedures will become/are 
becoming as commonplace in ‘hardware’ companies as in ‘software’ 
firms; Oticon, after all, makes hearing aids. {Liberation 11).
As Wheatley leams from quantum physics and chaos theory, we no longer 
live in the Newtonian world of linear cause-and-effect predictability, but in 
a “world of constant flux and unpredictability” (3); the managed ethos must 
offer up for company profit habits that conform to such a world. The fall 
1998 FranklinCovey catalogue, offering a range of products marketed as 
“tools for highly effective living,” opens its section on day planners with a 
full-page photograph of a man with a boy on his shoulders, enjoying a walk 
along a country road. The text reads, “All spontaneity seeks is the 
opportunity,” and the facing page, picturing refill pages for a variety of 
high-priced planners, advises, “Effective living is something you plan.” 
Expensive products are marketed to symbolic analysts so they can record 
and plan their “spontaneity;” otherwise the “effective” management of 
“opportunities” might elude their grasp.
GREGARIOUSNESS. This topos serves as an umbrella term for many 
of the new economy buzzwords: connectedness, networking, participation, 
team-building, collaboration. In the “symbolic-analytic zone,” Reich 
tells us.
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insights and experiences are widely shared. The sharing extends 
beyond the immediate working team to include friends, former 
associates, informal acquaintances. It occurs spontaneously over 
lunches, at dinner parties, over drinks, at the g y m .. . .  continuous 
chatter about w ho’s doing what, who’s discovering what, where the 
action is. (236)
This symbolic analyst is not simply a mid-century white-collar extravert on 
the personality market: the gregariousness required for networking and 
team-building reaches far into the psyche to redefine the very nature of the 
worker’s “selP or subjectivity. Wheatley finds metaphors from field theory 
to make her case for the “web of relationships” and “unseen fabric of 
connectedness” that exert a powerful influence over entities (the kinds 
studied by physical scientists or the kinds studied by management theorists) 
that move within its structure. She writes:
It is well known that the era of the rugged individual has been 
replaced by the era of the team player. But this is only the 
beginning. The quantum world has demoHshed the concept of the 
unconnected individual. More and more relationships are in store 
for us, out there in the vast web of universal connections. (38)
111
Wheatley exhorts managers to “stop thinking of roles or people as fixed 
entities,” and echoes, for a management audience, a sense of the 
postmodern subject when she defines a person as “an intriguing network of 
interactions, a structure of processes and potential relationships.” This 
networked subjectivity defined by its relationships, however, neatly 
dovetails with the new needs of the organization; the old Enlightenment 
subject, defined by traditional humanist notions like individuality (a 
coherent, separate centeredness not dependent on webs of relationships for 
its identity) and certainty (control over his own individual meaning-making 
processes aided by reason in a predictable world), sufficed an older 
economy. But now, Wheatley claims, “I cannot describe a person’s role, or 
his or her potential contribution, without understanding the network of 
relationships and the energy that is required to create the work 
transformations that I am asking from that person.. . .  I then see the 
person as a conduit for organizational energy” (71). The commonplace 
shibboleth of the postmodern humanities, “we are a collection of subject 
positions,” loses some of its hoped-for subversive potential in this light. I 
return to this argument in the final section of this chapter.
LOQUACITY. Gregariousness, as we learned from Reich, involves 
“continuous chatter” and widely shared informal communications.
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Symbolic-analytic work requires conversation. Alan Webber, former 
editorial director of the Harvard Business Review and founder of Fast 
Comparry magazine claims that “the most important work in the new 
economy is creating conversations;” conversations are the main source of 
added value in a knowledge economy. His water-cooler example epitomizes 
the shift: while the mid-century white-collar worker who stood around the 
water cooler chatting with co-workers would be reprimanded and told to 
“get back to work,” in today’s economy the taciturn or reserved symbolic 
analyst aspirant would be told, “Get to work! Get talking!” In Manville’s 
words, “The essential tools of the new knowledge organization are 
language and words— whether written, electronic, or face-to-face. These are 
the tools whereby consensus is achieved, ideas are voiced and incorporated, 
and mission, purposes, and goals are challenged, tested, and refined” (389).
SELF-MANAGEMENT. As workplace flexibility becomes the 
postmodern ideal, early- and mid-century Taylorization becomes the 
burden of the symbolic analyst who now must internalize and perform his 
or her own time management strategies. Self-management habits become 
part of the worker’s very nature, erasing the earUer distinction between
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work and leisure, work and home.'^ Hochschild documents the effects of 
this shift in The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes 
Work. Working parents discover a “second shift” at home, where necessary 
tasks must be carried out in a Hmited amount of time. Home thus develops 
a Taylorized feel: “quahty time” turns into job time that takes “discipline, 
focus, and energy, just like work;” time-saving products are marketed and 
consumed to increase home-shift efficiency; and functions that used to be 
based in the home are “outsourced:” psychological counseling, tutoring, 
eating, and exercise classes segment family time into a jumble of 
appointments and anxiety about being “on time” (49-50; 212). The 
postmodern workplace, by contrast, can seem leisurely, with self-managed, 
gregarious team workers chatting around the postmodern water cooler.
The self-help genre offers numerous books and products to assist 
symbolic analysts in their attempts to mold themselves— and those they 
manage— into effective self-managers. Stephen Covey’s The Seven Habits o f 
Highly Effective People remains by far the most popular example of this
O f course these early- and mid-century distinctions were highly gendered, and men’s 
leisure time was frequently spent away from home, or they escaped the home by 
spending longer hours at work. Hochschild’s documentation of changing work habits in 
The Time Bind demonstrates that as women move into the postmodern labor force, they, 
too, often escape home-management tasks and find a “home” at work.
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genre, having spawned its own marketing industry that offers leather- 
bound paper and electronic day planners (there is even “a planner for kids” 
in elementary, middle, and high school versions), self-help books for home 
and family “management,” briefcases, electronic Rolodexes, motivational 
office posters, and time management seminars.
Covey’s book opens with a distinction between the personahty ethic 
and the character ethic. He distinguishes his lessons in self-management 
from the “superficial” success fiterature that addressed the needs of the 
personality market over the last fifty years, which understood success as “a 
function of personality, of public image, of attitudes and behaviors, skills 
and techniques, that lubricate the processes of human interaction” and 
whose “basic thrust was quick-fix influence techniques, power strategies, 
communication skills, and positive attitudes” (19). His character ethic, on 
the other hand, reaches back to an earlier kind of success literature that 
emphasized “things like integrity, humifity, fidehty, temperance, courage, 
justice, patience, industry, simplicity, modesty, and the Golden Rule,” as 
represented by Franklin’s autobiography, which is “the story of one man’s 
effort to integrate certain principles and habits deep within his nature” (18). 
The problem with the personality ethic success strategies is essentially a 
problem of ethos, because it breeds distrust:
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If I try to use human influence strategies and tactics of how to get 
other people to do what I want, to work better, to be more 
motivated, to like me and each other— while my character is 
fundamentally flawed, marked by duphcity and insincerity— then, 
in the long run, I cannot be successful. My duphcity will breed 
distrust, and everything I do— even using so-called good human 
relations techniques— will be perceived as manipulative. It simply 
makes no difference how good the rhetoric is or even how good the 
intentions are; if there is Uttle or no trust, there is no foundation for 
permanent success. (21)
Although he connects his character ethic to the older list of middle-class 
topoi that I outhned above, his focus on trust as “the highest form of 
human motivation” is tied to a new generation management strategy of 
“stewardship delegation” that serves the needs of a post-industrial 
economy. If managers train employees in this delegation model, “the 
steward becomes his own boss, governed by a conscience that contains the 
commitment to agreed upon desired results” (178-79). His example of 
training his son to assume “stewardship” over yardwork illustrates this 
managerial method, effective both at work and at home. After a thorough 
training process, his son becomes “his own boss,” having internalized self-
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management and self-supervision habits. Thus his son’s conscience is 
governed by “the commitment to agreed upon desired results,” which, of 
course, are the father’s desired results about the condition of the yard. The 
father therefore can “trust” the son’s internalized habits of self­
management; having internalized his father’s desires, the son’s new habits 
create a credible ethos.
The above topoi function, as I have claimed all erAos-fomiing topoi 
do, as class demarcators. Routine producers and in-person servers are not 
required to perform the ethos described by the above topoi; in fact, the mid- 
century topoi in Franklin’s and Bloom’s lists would serve their employers 
better. The above list also illustrates my earlier suggestion that epideictic 
topoi (used to praise this new character and censure the outdated) do not 
have the conservative function of passing on traditional values; hence, ethos- 
forming topoi also operate to demarcate the new, praiseworthy character 
from the outdated, blameworthy one. In The Pursuit o f WOW! Peters does 
a remarkable job of dismissing, one by one, nearly all of the old middle- 
class topoi on Franklin’s and Bloom’s lists. Order is definitely outdated: 
“beware the champions of order,” he warns, who would clean up the 
messiness of the free market. And, on a personal level, Peters recommends 
the inefficient behavior of keeping vast amounts of disorganized
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information around (being a pack rat), and counsels us, “Don’t exalt order 
at the cost of innovation.” The old topoi of efficiency and order have been 
superseded by the productive messiness of the information explosion: 
efficiency is transmuted into effectiveness, because in an age of information­
intensive products and services, some inefficient behaviors can be very 
effective. (Covey’s bestseller is titled The Seven Habits o f Highly Effective 
People, not of highly efficient people, as it might have been in an earlier 
era.) Peters urges aspiring symboUc analysts and entrepreneurs to break the 
rules, to “risk the establishment’s ire” and push the boundaries— Bloom’s 
decorum and propriety are no longer necessary, and probably even hinder 
effectiveness and profits. He urges his listeners to take wild chances, engage 
in “raucous dissent” and innovative disorder, and, as corporations 
disaggregate into decentralized units, not fear thumbing their noses at the 
boss. In the knowledge economy, where knowledge is collaboratively 
negotiated, always changing, and is the hottest commodity, these topoi 
define the character that is required for producing it.
It comes as no surprise to find, as we might expect from a 
management consultant, that Wheatley is quite explicit about the 
important role her metaphors— many of the ethos-îorvaing topoi listed
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above— have in shaping new and desirable employee behaviors. In her 
metaphor of the “fractal organization,” she describes a “potent force” that 
is the combination of simply expressed expectations of acceptable 
behavior and the freedom available to individuals to assert 
themselves in non-deterministic ways. . . . [New-generation 
managers] trust in the power of guiding principles or values, 
knowing that they are strong enough influencers of behavior to 
shape every employee into a desired representative of the 
organization. These organizations expect to see similar behaviors 
show up at every level in the organization because those behaviors 
were patterned into the organizing principles at the very start. (132) 
This “potent force,” from a rhetorical perspective, is the coercive power of 
ethos to shape the habits, and hence the character, of aspiring symbolic 
analysts.
The New Ethos in the Computer-Mediated Classroom
Reich devotes two chapters of The Work o f Nations to “The 
Education of the Symbolic Analyst.” The learning of “facts,” which will 
soon be outdated in the rapidly changing knowledge economy, is 
practically irrelevant, a convenient by-product of more essential
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educational pursuits. These more essential tasks include learning “how to 
conceptualize problems and solutions” by training in “abstraction, system 
thinking, experimentation, and collaboration.. . . discovering patterns and 
meanings [and] new ways to represent reaUty” (229). These fortunately- 
educated children escape being spoon-fed an already-interpreted world:
Instead of emphasizing the transmission of information, the focus is 
on judgment and interpretation. The student is taught to get behind 
the data— to ask why certain facts have been selected, why they are 
assumed to be important, how they were deduced, and how they 
might be contradicted. The student leams to examine reality from 
many angles, in different lights, and thus to visualize new 
possibilities and choices. (230)
In other words, the student is prepared for his or her future employment as 
a knowledge-producer. Collaboration and negotiation prepare even very 
young students for their future vocation as networkers. Although many of 
the topoi in Bloom’s list still of necessity linger in the writing classroom, 
computer-mediated composition has proved itself quite well suited for 
instilling and reinforcing the new ethos of the symbohc analyst. Before I 
look specifically at the networked classroom, I shall reiterate some main
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themes from previous sections in regard to the relationship between the 
new economy and postmodern humanities curricula.
In “A Very Good Idea Indeed: The (Post)Modem Labor Force and 
Curricular Reform,” Masud Zavarzadeh and Donald Morton argue that 
Syracuse’s revised Enghsh and Textual Studies curriculum, and by 
impUcation others like it, was prompted by the kinds of shifts in the new 
economy’s labor needs that I have been examining and is therefore 
“comphcit in (post)modem capitahst practices” (66). The post-industrial 
labor force must be “more capable of ‘abstract thinking’—of conceptual 
operations which [are] fundamental to the business culture of computers 
and allied technologies and new modes of management” (67). In this new 
economy, the real function of the humanities is, as it always has been, “to 
develop the affective makeup of the labor force: to produce in the labor 
force the kind of (ideological) consciousness which situates the subject of 
labor in a manner necessary for the reproduction and maintenance of the 
existing social relations” (69). The crisis in the humanities curriculum was 
created by the gap between the Hnear, concrete literacies that sufficed in an 
age of Taylorization and white-collar routinization, and the new needs of a 
“flexible and agile high-tech labor force” (68).
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The specifics of the postmodern curriculum described by 
Zavarzadeh and Morton betray striking similarities to the concerns and 
needs of the management revolution described by some of the writers I 
have discussed above. For instance, Zavarzadeh and Morton describe what 
happens to “reading” in the revised curriculum:
. . . reading was no longer regarded as an activity aimed at recovering 
the meaning placed in the text by the author, but as an operation 
whose main purpose was to analyze the very processes that produce 
meaning itself. . .  . [reading became] a demonstration of the 
impossibility of representation . . .  an abstract process in which the 
issue was not the creation of meaning by the individual reader but 
instead the condition of possibility of meaning itself. (70-71).
The impossibility of representation and the processes that produce meaning 
provide the subtext for Wheatley’s fascination with the management 
metaphors she finds in the new science. She continually emphasizes that an 
outdated attachment to notions of objective reality feeds management’s 
desires for planning and prediction and must be supplanted: “There is only 
what we create through our engagement with others and with events” (7). 
The belief in objective reality, the Newtonian paradigm, and mimetic 
theories of representation served market capitalism and low-tech industry.
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but became useless for coping with a high-tech economy, a world where, as 
Peters puts it, “Disney and J. P. Morgan (entertainment and financial 
services) have replaced USX and Primerica (steel and cans) on Dow Jones’s 
list” {Liberation 8). Therefore, in Zavarzadeh and M orton’s words, “reform 
in the humanities curriculum [was] historically necessary in order to 
preserve capitalism” (71). PunctuaHty, decorum, order, resolution, 
frugality, moderation— the et/ios-forming topoi that helped manage work 
habits of a past economy— are rendered obsolete by a new economy in 
which the greatest company assets are human knowledge and imagination. 
And, as Peters and every other management theorist/consultant now 
struggles to answer, how do you manage human knowledge and 
imagination?
The new labor force, Zavarzadeh and Morton argue, needs a new 
subject of labor, one affectively trained by a revised and complicit 
humanities curriculum;
a subject who would recognize and acknowledge itself as not 
coherent, not unitary, not sovereign.. . . one that could think of 
itself as a spUt subject because a new labor force was itself a split 
labor force: a dispersed labor force which was appropriate to the 
new, pluricentral, late capitalism.. . .  a new subject that no longer
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thought of itself as an organic whole, but knew it was the effect of 
complex cultural mediations. (73)
That these concerns are not just the abstractions of postmodernists safely 
housed in marginalized humanities departments is made clear by business 
ethicist Marc Demarest. The firm is now a “knowledge system” whose 
main concern becomes “knowledge management,” and “[u]nderstanding 
how the knowledge that provides differentiation in the marketplace is (a) 
constructed, (b) embodied, (c) disseminated and (d) modified-through-use is 
increasingly ranked by CEOs as among their top strategic priorities.”
These are also priorities in the curricula of many cultural studies and 
rhetoric/composition programs, and it is questionable whether fine 
distinctions in the uses to which these “strategic priorities” are put really 
penetrate students’ consciousness (or our own). I am suggesting that the 
et^os-forming topoi will do their work in the service of evolving market 
needs regardless of our political stance toward them or our awareness of 
their power to coerce our students and ourselves into particular habits. 
While Zavarzadeh and Morton emphasize the affective nature of this 
subject-making process, I emphasize the rhetorical power of the ethos- 
forming topoi, and how those topoi structure not only subjectivity but the 
character that must be performed for workplace audiences. I will look in
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particular at discussions of computer-mediated composition, seeking 
instances of those topoi outlined in the previous section that will implant 
the habits future knowledge-workers will need to make them desirable and 
credible participants in the new economy.
The widespread availability of computer programs offering easy 
manipulation of text and symbols was a great boon for the segment of the 
middle class that would soon be called symbolic analysts by Reich. In the 
early years of experimentation with word processing to teach writing, 
teachers and researchers questioned the effects of the easy changeability of 
text: does it make students produce more copious texts? Are they more 
willing to substantially revise their texts? In a philosophical vein, the 
seeming fluidity and dynamic nature of electronic text raised 
phenomenological questions about the power of a writing medium to 
determine consciousness and structure subjectivity. My focus here is much 
more narrow: how did the incorporation of electronic writing into the 
composition classroom aid in the inculcation of habits that produce the 
new ethos required by the new economy?
With the development of hypertext and networked classrooms, 
electronic writing raised questions that go far beyond the old concern with 
the individual student’s word-processed text production. Now the
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discussion turned to the networked medium’s sometimes disturbing, 
sometimes liberating power to “decenter” the classroom. Student groups 
that engage in synchronous and asynchronous electronic discussions 
created in many teachers the beUef that here was a remarkable new tool for 
the student-centered classroom. Many teachers enthusiastically claimed, 
and students concurred, that class participation blossomed. The (at least 
partial or apparent) loss of teacherly authority gave students the freedom to 
be more self-directed and motivated in their learning with peer groups. In 
the most theoretically-informed classrooms, this greater student 
involvement and displacement of the teacher as sole dispenser of 
knowledge led students to discover that they themselves were the 
collaborative knowledge-makers: a good lesson indeed for aspiring 
symbolic analysts.
The et^os-forming topoi that accompany the evolution of these 
collaborative knowledge-makers we have seen emerge from contemporary 
management literature. The apparent dethroning of the teacher as central 
authority and knowledge-dispenser mirrors the much-touted leveling of 
corporate management hierarchies, which many new economy gurus hail 
as a democratizing of the workplace. Networked classrooms strongly 
encourage, or, as we shall see below, actually coerce students into the habits
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of gregariousness and loquacity— students are required under threat of 
grade punishment to write/talk a great deal to their peers. Like Webber’s 
example of the radical shift in the meaning of “talking around the water 
cooler” and the essential role of conversations at work, students in the 
computer classroom who aren’t “talking” in their chat room are 
admonished to “get to work— get talking!” Reich defines “networking” as 
“the studied process of knowing what is happening and simultaneously 
making oneself known” (237). The “networked” environment is well-suited 
for instilhng these necessary habits for future symbolic analysts. New 
configurations of authority in the classroom emerge, equipping students, 
through the materially-inculcated er/?os-structuring topoi, for the symbolic- 
analytic workplace where they will be expected to contribute to ongoing 
knowledge-producing conversations, not simply follow the orders of a 
manager.
In Fragments o f Rationality: Postmodemity and the Subject o f 
Composition, Lester Faigley discusses his own early experiments with this 
loss of teacherly authority in networked discussions. Analyzing a transcript 
of an online synchronous class discussion and referring to his own posts in 
third person, he writes that, because of the speed of the discussion and the 
large number of participants.
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there is no opportunity for Lester to make a conventional evaluation 
statement. . . .  he has lost control of the floor. . . .  By the end of this 
section [of the transcript] we see a reversal of roles, with the teacher 
replying and students making evaluative comments. . . .  In terms of 
discourse structure, Lester has become a student in his own class.
The paradox is that the class discussion has gone much farther and 
faster than it could have with Lester standing at the front. (180-81) 
His delight in the fact that the discussion has “gone farther and faster” 
reflects the managerial shift of focus from the old middle-class topos of 
efficiency to the updated one of effectiveness. Anyone who has analyzed a 
synchronous-chat transcript sees immediately that efficiency is impossible 
to achieve; but, the outcome of the chaotic, unpredictable, non-linear (all 
the metaphors Wheatley takes from the new sciences) transcript can be 
quite “effective” in terms of the final “product” of the conversation. 
Seemingly following Wheatley’s admonition to give up predictability for 
potential, Faigley increases potential by choosing to name himself “Lester;” 
thus, “Lester” rather than “Professor Faigley” appears on everyone’s 
screens preceding his conversational contributions. His abdication of 
authority or managerial control even turns into a role reversal, when he 
“becomefs] a student in his own class,” so the students can comply with
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Peters’ exhortation to aspiring symbolic analysts to break the rules, push 
the boundaries, risk the establishment’s ire, and even risk rude 
disagreement with the boss. The networked classroom is an ideal place to 
inculcate these habits of risk-taking loquacity and enforced gregariousness.
Faigley’s remarks on this experience also reflect the distinction 
between what Wheatley called the old “Newtonian” way of doing business 
and the unpredictable, fluid, chaotic needs of the new economy. Setting up 
a distinction between traditional and computer-mediated classroom 
practices, he writes:
In oral class discussions [in traditional classrooms], the remarks that 
stand out are those that neatly state positions and seem to tie up 
segments of knowledge. In Interchange [synchronous] transcripts, 
however, there are no such peaks followed by nods of agreement. 
The movement of discourse in Interchange is more wavelike, with 
topics ebbing and flowing intermingled with many crosscurrents 
. . . .  the movement recalls the opposition [that Bakhtin] described 
between the monologic centripetal forces of unity, authority, and 
truth and the dialogic centrifugal forces of multiplicity, equality, and 
uncertainty. (182-83)
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The outdated, “Newtonian” managerial schemes that sought unity of 
corporate purpose, centralized managerial authority, and prediction- 
enabling objective truth have been superseded. Wheatley, Webber, and 
Man ville urge the new conversational forces described by Faigley; the 
multiplicity and equality of a supposedly radically democratized 
workplace, and the necessary uncertainty and unpredictability of the 
conversations that can keep businesses profitable in the new economy. The 
title of one of Peters’ books sums it all up: Liberation Management:
Necessary Disorganization fo r the Nanosecond Nineties. Networked 
classrooms, when “successful,” brazenly intrude upon the teacher’s 
traditional role of providing a coherent, organized metanarrative: 
“Electronic discussions both invite participation and seriously limit a 
teacher’s ability to control the direction they take” (Faigley 185). Wheatley 
and other management theorists and consultants have likewise tried to 
convince traditional managers to give up their own metanarratives of 
coherence and control and to invite greater participation by employees to 
develop new potential and new possibilities for making (marketable) 
knowledge.
Faigley does have a few reservations about computer-mediated 
composition. For example, he fears that synchronous discussions are
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simply one more manifestation of the logic of the late capitalist 
marketplace: “Electronic written discussions are governed by the logic of 
consumer choice. Topics are introduced and consumed according to what 
students like at that moment and what they don’t like” (190). But he 
doesn’t appear to see any connection between this quahty of electronic 
written discussions and what he suggests are the desirable benefits of the 
medium: “giving voice to difference, decentering the authority of the 
teacher, [and] demonstrating the social construction of knowledge” (190). 
The management advice books I have examined are clearer about this 
connection, since the “logic of consumer choice” and the “logic of late 
capitalism” are precisely the rapidly shifting logics that created the 
management revolution and the emerging new work ethos that is required 
for businesses and individuals alike to situate themselves successfully within 
these logics. Recall Zavarzadeh and M orton’s description of the new subject 
of labor: “a subject who would recognize and acknowledge itself as not 
coherent, not unitary, not sovereign. . . . one that could think of itself as a 
split subject because a new labor force was itself a split labor force” (73). 
Faigley, too, marks this shift in English pedagogical practices and how they 
construct student subjectivities when he writes that it is difficult “for 
teachers to maintain a notion of students discovering their authentic selves
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through writing when student writers try on and exchange identities in 
electronic discussions, even from one message to the next” (191). The 
decentered, dispersed subject easily becomes habitual, “natural,” in this 
medium, ready to accept the demands of the decentered, disaggregated late 
capitalist organization.
Thus Faigley concludes that “electronic discourse explodes the belief 
in a stable unified self,” and, to assuage the uneasiness he still feels over the 
postmodern condition, he offers the hopeful suggestion that electronic 
discourse also “offers a means of exploring how identity is multiply 
constructed and how  agency resides in the power of connecting with others 
and building alliances” (199). Thus agency itself, the problematic and 
elusive desire of the postmodern subject, is promised to us if we will only 
restructure our character through the habitual practice of loquacity and 
gregariousness. Such a promise does not sound much different from 
Wheatley’s promise of the restructured workplace’s ability to fulfill the 
deepest human desires:
We are refocusing on the deep longings we have for community, 
meaning, dignity, and love in our organizational lives. We are 
beginning to look at the strong emotions that are part of being 
human, rather than segmenting ourselves (love is for home.
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discipline is for work) o r believing that we can confine workers into 
narrow roles, as though they were cogs in the machinery of 
production. (12)
The management revolution strives, then, to convince the symbohc analyst 
that the white-collar ahenation that so plagued the middle class at mid- 
century can now be overcome at work}* But Wheatley immediately makes 
it clear that control of employee behavior is still the goal of these promises 
of a more human workplace. Control can be achieved through “unseen 
forces” if the old visible means of coercion no longer function: “We now 
sense that some of the best ways to create continuity of behavior are 
through the use of forces that we can’t really see” (12). She uses metaphors 
from field theory to describe these “forces” and “unseen structures” that 
can “turn the employees’ energy into behavior for the organization,” 
structuring fields that “create behavior congruent with the organization’s
This ploy has apparently been quite persuasive to this class, since, as Reich notes, many 
symbolic analysts, unlike most routine producers and in-person servers, “would ‘work’ 
even if money were no object” (222). O f course, this may simply be another new topos 
to convince these workers’ audiences of their credibility and virtue. This topos suggests 
that the “habit-forming” nature of symbolic-analytic work subsumes the whole self (all 
subject positions) under the working self (the laboring subject). Work ethos is the only 
ethos, there is nothing to be alienated from, and the entire character has been restructured 
for the needs of the market. Here is the true coercive power of the “self-management” 
topos, that follows the symbolic analyst home, as Hochschild points out in The Time 
Bind.
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goals,” an “invisible geometry working on [the organization’s] behalf” (52, 
54). To locate agency, as Faigley does, in the ethos-lotvain% topoi that 
function as this “invisible geometry” conveniently empowers subjects of 
labor in the new economy to make profits for their firm, however 
decentered and disaggregated it (or they) may be.
These “forces” may not be as invisible as Wheatley asserts, however. 
In an electronic discussion entitled “Interactivity Online: Shared 
Environments for Teaching and Learning,” teachers of computer-mediated 
courses discuss via e-mail some of their problems and concerns as they 
adjust to the networked classroom.'^ One teacher writes of his students: 
“They need to be made aware that one cannot be passive on-line. I f  you are, 
you simply are not there. This will take some time. But, once they and we 
are aware of this then the real fruits of on-line interactivity will be realized” 
(my itahcs). Here, the refusal to participate (by those who resist 
gregariousness and loquacity) in an on-line discussion constitutes self- 
annihilation. Such self-elimination through resistance to new, forced habits 
is a foreshadowing of job problems down the road. Manville (who 
compared the new, democratic workplace to fourth century Athens), for
134
instance, describes the fate of employees who were not labile enough to 
adjust quickly to their organization’s management revolution: the 
employees who were
used to traditional hierarchical management structures, were 
confused by the newfound freedom they were given. Many people 
floundered about in their jobs and came to me or other senior 
members in the department and asked ‘just to be told what to do.’ 
Many people left or were asked to leave because they couldn’t 
handle the responsibility implied in their roles and didn’t understand 
that because of the knowledge intensity of what they were doing, 
they had to take more accountability for contributing to the work at 
hand. (394-95)
The mid-century middle-class topos of “responsibility” here subtly shifts to 
workers’ “accountability” for actively and quickly adjusting their character 
to match that required by the new management. Wanting to be “told what 
to do,” they are constructed by Manville as being just as “passive” as the 
students who resist on-line discussion. And, as the teacher above described
Since I will quote from many separate posts in this discussion, and since each post is 
archived with its own URL, I have chosen not to refer to each posting with the writer’s 
name and to reference only the index URL, to avoid citational clutter.
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those students as “simply not there,” the same fate awaited these 
employees— they left their jobs or were fired.
Another teacher responds to the previous post in the “Interactivity 
Online” forum: “You seem to be saying that one needs: 1. to force 
involvement and that this leads to interaction. At least that’s what I 
experienced. At any rate there was involvement if not universal 
interaction” (my italics). Here the coercive nature of these classrooms 
(contrary to their touted “freedom” and democratizing affects) is stated 
explicitly as the means to the desired goal of the class. Another respondent 
asks: “In f2f a student may be quiet but you can tell from their non-verbal 
behavior whether they are engaged, asleep, or somewhere else. In the 
online classroom, what assumptions are made about silence? How does one 
bring the quieter voices into the discoursed (my italics). This post expresses 
another aspect of the lack of traditional teacher control in the networked 
classroom: the inabiUty to detect resistant students’ possible motivations 
for their lack of loquacity. But the central theme in many of these posts is 
how to habituate students to that particular et/?os-structuring topos, to get 
them to work by getting them talking.
The discussion turns to student complaints about lack of structure, 
or inadequate structure, in computer-mediated courses as one reason for
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their sub-optimum participation. Less structure, or at least a more relaxed 
structure than these teachers were used to in traditional classrooms, it is 
unanimously agreed, is desirable and productive in the networked 
classroom, just as “necessary disorganization” has become a byword of the 
management revolution. Indeed, as another poster puts it, teachers should, 
like good new-economy managers, avoid any urge to over-structure the 
computer-mediated course: “there is a desire to present a ‘complete 
shrinkwrap package’ which militates against flexibility.” One frustrated 
teacher suggests that forcing students to adapt to this “flexibility” begin in 
the traditional classroom: “Too often my offers to students to let them 
design their course, select from a line of topics, create their personal 
outcome, have met with the same silence, or pleas— ‘what do you have in 
mind?’—to hostility—‘I payed my money for you to decide.’ ” These 
student pleas, of course, reflect those of the flustered employees in 
Manville’s organization that he deemed passive and, finally, not even there. 
This teacher continues: “15 or so years of passive schooling has trained 
learners w ell.. . .  Solution^ Some way o f teaching, forcing, modeling, cajoling 
and habituating students in f2 f  to he active learners. Then, carefully shift 
these skills on-line” (my italics). Whether begun in the traditional 
classroom or the networked, the forced habituation is the subtext of this
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entire conversation. Some posters are self-aware enough to offer examples 
of how their own grading practices “force” participation: “So I sort of 
‘force’ the participation issue by putting in my course many Httle deadhnes 
for completing various assignments and by (God forbid!) ‘grading’ students’ 
responses in our discussion forum.” This is a far cry from Bloom’s list, 
where grades might be used to force adherence to older middle-class habits 
like punctuality, cleanliness, self-reUance, and propriety. He goes on:
There are things that I want my students to do, and most of them 
won’t get those experiences if I don’t somehow hold them 
accountable for finishing all the projects.. . .  I have found that to 
help them most, I have to be very controlling and on top of 
everything that happens in the virtual classroom. And I stick by my 
nasty ol’ rules. And yet, even though I sound awful here— like a 
dictator— to myself even— the way my online course operates tends 
to encourage participation and not discourage.
Here the need to force particular experiences onto students is so great that 
the teacher risks his own ethos-, the habituation of students to the new ethos 
is so important that he becomes a dictator, so the students’ future managers 
won’t have to.
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s. Michael Halloran has argued that a theory of ethos is important 
for teachers of composition. W riting before the extensive implementation 
of computer-mediated composition, he argues:
If ethos is manifested in rhetorical action, and if ethos is formed by 
choosing ethical modes of action, it follows that educating a person 
in rhetorical action, schoohng him in proper rhetorical habits, is a 
means of forming his character. If we adopt the view that a theory of 
ethos is an important need for teachers of composition, we take on 
responsibility for shaping the character of our students. My own 
view is that in fact this is what we are doing whether we like it or 
not, whether we acknowledge it or not. In directing students to 
write this way rather than that, we tell them in effect to be this sort 
of character rather than that. (61)
Halloran’s statement reflects the Isocratean vision of the power of 
rhetorical education that I outlined at the end of Chapter One, even 
though it is set within the context of an article about Aristotle’s theory of 
ethos. Similar to Covey’s project, he also distinguishes his notion of ethos 
from those in composition who define it as “personality” or “voice.” He 
cites the Nicomachean Ethics, and concludes that
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Developing character, then, is a matter of pulling oneself up by one’s 
own bootstraps. To achieve courage, an aspect of ethos, I must act 
courageously over and over again until it becomes quite natural for 
me to act in a courageous fashion. When I have the habit of courage, 
I have the virtue of courage as part of my character. (61)
As I argued in Chapter One, Aristotle’s teaching on ethos was an attempt to 
negotiate the conflict between aristocratic habits that he wished to preserve 
and an unruly demos that he did not see as “pulling themselves up by their 
own bootstraps.” Such middle-class, agent-centered appropriations of 
Aristotle’s rhetoric must be complicated by a sociological investigation of 
class conflict. Computer-mediated classrooms shape an ethos in both 
teachers and students that conforms to the needs of knowledge workers in 
a new economy while demarcating that class from those with restricted 
access to emerging technologies.
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Chapter Three
Demarcating Science: Ethos and 
Knowledge Production in the Science Wars
Introduction
My argument in the previous two chapters has been that classes or 
groups construct their ethe in order to establish or maintain a demarcation 
from other classes or communities with which they are in present or 
potential conflict, and that a rhetorical understanding of ethos can be 
enhanced by historical and sociological perspectives on those classes. This 
chapter examines the demarcation of science, a theme with a long history 
in the philosophy and sociology of science, as another instance in which 
et^os-forming topoi play a predominant role. I begin with the scientific 
et6os-forming topoi, or institutionalized norms of science, that Robert 
Merton, a pioneer in the sociology of science, outlined over fifty years ago. 
Still prevalent in contemporary scholarship in rhetoric and sociology of 
science, the Mertonian norms have been highly effective in this century for 
the demarcation of science— and scientific knowledge— from various 
groups— and their non-scientific knowledges— with which science has
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come into conflict, including religion, the “irrational” beliefs of non- 
Westem cultures, the humanities, and the social sciences.
Recent trends in the sociology of science have largely, although not 
completely, overturned many of Merton’s assumptions about the role of 
sociologists who investigate scientific practices. I briefly outline some of 
the sahent features of these new developments, since they have exerted 
tremendous influence on rhetorical approaches to science; however, it is 
not my intention, nor would it be possible in a single chapter, to fully 
outline the complex debates that have structured the wide-ranging issues in 
contemporary science studies over the past thirty years. My focus remains 
on Merton’s topoi, and I argue that they remain highly effective in public 
debates about the nature, purpose, and vafidity of scientific knowledge. My 
first example of the public performance of scientific ethos grounded in 
Mertonian topoi is the 1982 McLean v  Arkansas case in which creation- 
scientists attempted to establish “balanced treatment” of evolution and 
creation-science teaching in public schools. In my second example, the 1996 
Sokal-5ocw/ Text affair, I argue that Mertonian topoi are again deployed in 
the attempt to fortify scientific ethos on a pubfic stage.
A secondary theme of this chapter is the problematic status of the 
subspecialty known as rhetoric of science. I discuss Lawrence Prelli’s A
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Rhetoric o f Science as an example of the appropriation of classical 
terminology for the analysis of scientific discourse, and Greg Myers’ 
Writing Biolo^, an example of the dual use of rhetorical and Uterary 
theory as tools for interpreting scientific texts. The Science Wars, a recent 
offshoot of the media’s exploitation of the Culture Wars, have been fueled 
by Paul Gross and Norm an Levitt’s 1994 Higher Superstition: The Academic 
Left and Its Quarrels with Science^ which scathingly attacks a variety of 
science studies scholars in Uterary theory and sociology. I find it 
noteworthy that neither Gross and Levitt, nor any of the numerous public 
commentators on the Sokal hoax, ever refer— either in disparagement or in 
praise— to any science studies scholarship in the field of rhetoric and 
composition. Therefore, I raise the question of rhetoric’s relation to 
sociology and to cultural studies, and ask if the rhetoric of science is doing 
something right— or something wrong.
Demarcating Science
In his classic 1942 essay, originally published under the title “Science 
and Technology in a Democratic Order,” Merton situates his account of 
scientific ethos in the context of what he calls the “revolt from science.”
The anti-science that causes Gross and Levitt and Sokal so much anxiety is
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nothing new, of course, having appeared in various manifestations since the 
era of early nineteenth-century Romanticism. Although these diverse 
instances of revolt from science are each distinct in their historical 
specificity, and although Merton’s sociological description of scientific 
practice has been critiqued and superseded by subsequent trends in the 
sociology of science, I return to his account of the normative structure of 
science for several reasons that are important for a rhetorical understanding 
of scientific ethos. According to Merton, scientists respond to “incipient 
and actual attacks upon the integrity of science” by clarifying and 
reaffirming scientific ethos (267-68). Thus he outlines the topoi that 
construct and fortify scientific ethos against the backdrop of public 
controversy over the validity of scientific authority. I highlight his pretext 
for writing in connection with my Chapter One discussion of topoi as 
material/discursive markers and organizers of habits and practices that act 
coercively on the rhetor, topoi that simultaneously encode and construct 
the stratification and organization of social groups. Scientific er^os-forming 
topoi are, then, a powerful example of class-demarcating topoi.
In my Introduction I discussed William Graham Sumner’s 
appropriation of the Greek notion of ethos for the sociological analysis of 
the operation of power in social groups and institutions. Merton employs
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Sumner’s notion of ethos for his functional analysis of how scientific 
institutions harness the habits of individuals to serve the overriding interest 
of the community— in the case of science, the extension of certified 
knowledge. Having cited Sumner’s Folkways on the concept of ethos, 
Merton writes:
The ethos of science is that affectively toned complex of values and 
norms which is held to be binding on the man of science. The norms 
are expressed in the form of prescriptions, proscriptions, 
preferences, and permissions. They are legitimatized in terms of 
institutional values. These imperatives, transmitted by precept and 
example and reenforced by sanctions are in varying degrees 
internalized by the scientist, thus fashioning his scientific conscience 
or, if one prefers the latter-day phrase, his superego. Although the 
ethos of science has not been codified, it can be inferred from the 
moral consensus of scientists as expressed in use and wont, in 
countless writings on the scientific spirit and in moral indignation 
directed toward contraventions of the ethos. (268-69)
In Chapter One, I introduced the notion of the logos of ethos as the 
habituation to ideologically informed practices which functions to keep 
members of a particular class “in their place.” Merton’s final sentence in
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this quotation suggests the constraining nature of scientific ethos upon the 
class “scientist,” a coercive social effect (also implied in “conscience” and 
“superego”) that, through the “moral indignation” of others in the group, 
functions to keep scientists “in their place” as publicly credible knowledge 
producers and spokespersons for the potential social uses of that 
knowledge. But his emphasis on social structures also makes exphcit the 
equivalence between et^os-forming topoi (institutional imperatives) and 
scientific technical methods. Merton explains:
The institutional goal of science is the extension of certified 
knowledge. The technical methods employed toward this end 
provide the relevant definition of knowledge: empirically confirmed 
and logically consistent statements of regularities (which are, in 
effect, predictions). The institutional imperatives (mores) derive 
from the goal and the methods. The entire structure of technical and 
moral norms implements the final objective. . .  . The mores of 
science possess a méthodologie rationale but they are binding, not 
only because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are 
believed right and good. They are moral as well as technical 
prescriptions. (270).
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Here Merton again echoes Sumner, who argued that the mores, as 
constitutive traits within a particular ethos, are considered by the group to 
be right and good. As I suggested in Chapter One, topoi are the places 
where social relations are kept in language, a linguistic, rhetorical 
storehouse of the elements of discourse that reflect the stratification and 
organization of social groups in any given culture. In other words, ethos- 
forming topoi consist of the habits and practices by which a culture 
arranges classed subgroups into relations of production. In the cases that I 
examine later in this chapter, scientific ethos in particular functions to 
arrange the classed subgroups of the humanities, social sciences, religion, 
and science into hierarchized relations of the production o f knowledge. 
Scientific ethos is such a powerful demarcator of class because, Merton 
suggests, it is structurally equivalent to scientific methodology and 
epistemological privilege; therefore, justifications of science that rely on 
rationahst philosophies of science are, in essence, presentations of scientific 
ethos.
A brief outline of each of Merton’s four elements of scientific ethos— 
universalism, communality, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism— 
will set up my discussion of how these topoi function to demarcate science 
from non-science in McLean and in the Sokal affair.
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U n iv e r s a l is m  guarantees that the “race, nationahty, rehgion, class, 
and personal qualities” of the individual scientist are irrelevant to the 
knowledge produced (Merton 270). Ethnocentrism and the subjectivity of 
the individual scientist (relativism or cultural determinism) are 
incompatible with scientific objectivity.'^ As the philosopher of science N. 
R. Campbell puts it, “Science is the study of those judgments concerning 
which universal agreement can be reached” (qtd. in Laudan 255). The Sokal 
affair generated much argument from this topos, as have recent trends in 
both the cultural and social studies of science.
M erton’s second element of scientific ethos, COMMUNISM, usually 
referred to as COMMUNALITY in the later literature, indicates that the 
“substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are 
assigned to the community.” Scientists do not individually claim 
intellectual property rights over the knowledge they produce; 
acknowledgment is hmited to recognition and esteem, sometimes 
commemorated by eponymy (the Copemican system, Boyle’s law). Thus
Updating his 1942 article in a footnote, Merton places the Western affirmation of 
universalism against the competing claims o f Marxist-Leninist science, which in the late 
1940s had attempted to prove “that science, like all culture in modem society, is national 
in form and class in content.” But, he concludes, “the criteria of validity o f claims to 
scientific knowledge are not matters of national taste and culture. Sooner or later, 
competing claims to validity are settled by universalistic criteria” (271 n 6).
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there is a moral imperative to communicate findings through publication 
for the scientific fraternity; the scientist who does not do so is considered 
“selfish and anti-social” (or, as I shall discuss below regarding the McLean 
case, not a scientist at all). This sense of communaHty, cooperation, and 
indebtedness to science’s cumulative achievements is expressed in Newton’s 
statement: “If I have seen farther it is by standing on the shoulders of 
giants” (Merton 273-75). Questions of peer review, grounded in arguments 
from the topos of communality, feature heavily in both McLean and in the 
Sokal affair.
D is in t e r e s t e d n e s s  serves the normative function of controlling 
scientists’ motives, which are regulated through their accountability to 
their peers. In Merton’s description, this norm keeps scientific fraud at a 
low level, compared to other professions. Disinterestedness, in the 
Mertonian view, demarcates science from other spheres of activity such as 
medicine and law, which, unhke science, were created by capitalism and 
therefore encourage practitioners to exploit laymen. Although scientific 
and technological achievements can be appropriated for interested 
purposes, the topos of disinterestedness, with a “firm basis in the public 
and testable character of science,” extends scientifically-produced certified 
knowledge to the pubUc.
149
Finally, through ORGANIZED SKEPTICISM, scientists suspend 
judgment, at least temporarily, and detach themselves from the attitudes 
and claims about various aspects of nature and society made by other 
rehgious, economic, and poUtical groups (277-78).
It is important to remember that M erton situates this discussion of 
scientific ethos in the context of “incipient and actual attacks” upon science. 
When the integrity of science is challenged by outside groups, the 
institution “must reexamine its foundations, restate its objectives, seek out 
its rationale,” and that is accompUshed, Merton claims, through 
“clarification and reaffirmation of the ethos of modem science” (267-68).
In both McLean and the Sokal affair, outside groups challenge the 
knowledge-producing prerogatives of science, and scientists still respond, 
forty and fifty years after Merton, by shoring up scientific ethos.
The four basic norms of scientific ethos that Merton describes are 
reiterated and recast rhetorically as topoi available for the construction of 
ethos in Lawrence PreUi’s extensive topos-based analysis of scientific 
argumentation in A Rhetoric o f Science (1991). Prelli organizes the topoi 
found in scientific argumentation into four broad categories: (1) problem- 
solution topoi (providing “good reasons” for scientific claims, such as 
experimental competence, replication, and originaHty; corroboration;
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quantitative precision; and predictive power); (2) evaluative topoi 
(including accuracy, internal and external consistency, scope, and 
simplicity); (3) exemplary topoi (discursive strategies such as examples, 
analogies, and metaphors); and (4) topoi that enhance the scientist’s ethos 
(Merton’s universahty, communality, disinterestedness, and skepticism). 
However, Merton’s sociological perspective in his 1942 article makes more 
exphcit, and I think more helpful, connections than does PrelH between 
these four ethos-iorxDxn.^  topoi and science’s technical methods (i.e., those 
that are argued through PreUi’s problem-solution and evaluative topoi). 
Prelli seems to think of the four er^os-forming topoi as elements that the 
scientific rhetor can “add and stir” to his or her discourse, rather than 
elements that are an essential part of the methods and epistemological goals 
of scientific argumentation. By focusing on the mventional and persuasive 
potential of scientific topoi as consciously chosen argumentative strategies, 
Prelh sidesteps the essential connection between the topoi of scientific ethos 
and the methodological and epistemological privileges that accrue to 
scientists who display that ethos. Prelli merely wants the rhetoric of science, 
grounded in an elaborate appropriation of classical rhetorical theory, to 
help scientists more efficiently achieve their communication goals, and his 
rhetoric of science focuses on the matching of claims to  community
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conventions and audience constraints, noncritically exam ining how 
scientific texts do what they do. Although Merton has also been criticized 
for developing a sociological perspective that merely serves as a 
justificatory adjunct to rationahst philosophies of science, I suggest that 
Merton’s understanding— that an ethos tied to institutional practices and 
knowledge-making privileges plays an essential role when science is 
attacked by outside groups and must defend itself on a public stage— offers 
a vision of ethos that more richly reflects the complex potentiafities of 
classical terminology. I will return to my problems with Prelli, and other 
rhetoric of science approaches, later in this chapter.
In the 1940s and 1950s, scholars who offered sociological and 
philosophical accounts of scientific activity made it their task to demarcate 
science as unique among intellectual disciplines. Science’s uniqueness 
derived from what was seen as the remarkable consensus achieved among 
scientists about the kinds of knowledge worth pursing, the methodological 
procedures for pursuing it, and the results of that knowledge as an accurate 
and truthful understanding of the natural world. In contrast, in the 
humanities and social sciences, it was argued, academic productivity was 
largely motivated by dissensus over these problems. In the sociology of 
science, this focus on the achievement of nearly universal consensus in
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science through adherence to the normative topoi outlined above was 
known as the Mertonian school. The rationahst philosophy of science, 
dominated by logical empiricists and later by Karl Popper, like Mertonian 
sociology, functioned as a handmaiden to science, offering its own 
rationahst explanations for why the achievement of scientific consensus led 
to truthful statements. As physicist-tumed-sociologist John Ziman claimed, 
consensus was “the basic principle upon which Science is founded. It is not 
a subsidiary consequence of the ‘Scientific Method’. It is the scientific 
method itself (qtd in Laudan 255). Mertonian norms functioned as a 
sociological equivalent to this epistemological and methodological focus on 
consensus in a way that did not threaten scientists’ cognitive authority in 
their own domain. Focusing its investigations on science as a social 
institution, Mertonian sociology sought to understand how science 
organized and regulated itself through the social roles of scientists, reward 
systems, competition, and the norms that regulated scientific behavior. The 
norm of universalism meant that the actual knowledge products of science 
were unaffected by social factors and were therefore exempt from 
sociological analysis. Hence, as critics would point out in the 1970s, a 
Mertonian perspective was complicit with rationahst philosophy’s position 
that scientific knowledge was expHcable in terms of its rational merits
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alone. Mertonian sociology highlighted consensus by describing the 
scientific ethos that kept science on its epistemological throne in the public 
eye and in its privileged place as important institution of knowledge 
production. Sociological, and for that matter rhetorical, accounts of 
scientific practice that follow the Mertonian paradigm leave in tact 
scientists’ cognitive authority over knowledge-making, and maintain 
science’s distinct epistemological status, clearly demarcated from other 
disciplines and knowledge-producing activities.
Sociologists Thomas Gieryn et al. claim that this demarcation 
activity has been essential in the professionalization of science as an 
institution that provides marketable services in knowledge production and 
that must establish and maintain control over markets for specialized 
knowledge or services. For instance, in the early twentieth century, 
American obstetricians successfully professionalized themselves by 
demarcating— creating a social boundary— between themselves and 
midwives, who offered similar knowledge and services in a competitive 
market. This demarcation was accomphshed by depicting to the public the 
obstetrician’s technically and scientifically superior services in contrast to 
the “vmscientific” and “risky” practices of “arrogant” and “superstitious” 
midwives. These demarcation arguments shifted public support and
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empowered obstetricians to successfully engage in organizational tactics 
that led to restrictive licensing practices and constraints on the medical 
instruments and pharmaceuticals available to midwives.
Writing in 1985, Gieryn et al. claim that while similar studies in the 
history of the professionalization of medicine and law have been popular 
since the 1960s, Uttle attention had been devoted to analogous processes in 
science. They argue that the production of knowledge for societal 
consumption functions within a knowledge market in which the State is a 
primary consumer. The State, of course, patronizes the production of 
science’s distinctive commodity to a much greater degree than it does 
competing forms of knowledge (poetry, for instance, receives very little 
State sponsorship, and religion, owing to the Establishment clause of the 
First Amendment, receives none). By continually negotiating and 
maintaining the demarcation of their knowledge-commodity and denying 
competitors cognitive authority in matters of knowledge about nature and 
technology and about the skills required to produce new knowledge, 
scientists create public demand for their brand of knowledge while their 
carefully demarcated non-scientific competitors are denied resources and 
credibility. The pubUc image of science is bolstered by the pubUc
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understanding of scientific ethos, particularly in historical moments when 
pubhc distrust of science is high.
This concern for demarcating science from competitive knowledge 
producers is clearly evident in Gross and Levitt’s Higher Superstition: The 
Academic and Its Quarrels with Science. They define the “academic left” 
as composed mainly of humanists and social scientists who have “a deep 
concern with cultural issues, and, in particular, a commitment to the idea 
that fundamental political change is urgently needed and can be achieved 
only through revolutionary processes rooted in a wholesale revision of 
cultural categories” (3). The academic left is portrayed as “muddleheaded” 
and “hostile to science.” They concede that “naturally enough” the 
academic left dislikes certain social uses of science, but they quickly 
estabhsh that their quarrel is mainly with those cultural theorists who 
display “open hostility toward the actual content of scientific knowledge 
and toward the assumption, which one might have supposed universal 
among educated people, that scientific knowledge is reasonably reliable and 
rests on a sound methodology” (2, their italics). This hostility they label 
medieval, anti-Enlightenment, and irrational, a hostility that leads to a 
dangerous displacement of received cultural values by “an entirely novel 
ethos” (3). It is, then, scientific ethos that they impficitly understand as
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under attack, an ethos that, as Merton shows, is intricately bound up with 
the “sound methodology” of scientific knowledge-making practices and 
even the “actual content” of the results of those practices.
Gross and Levitt also echo Gieryn et al.’s recognition of the 
professional stake in science’s control over knowledge production in a 
competitive market, and hence the urgency of reinforcing a sagging public 
acceptance of science’s demarcation from knowledge-producing 
competitors. They express alarm over the threat to
the capabihty of the larger culture . . .  to interact fruitfully with the 
sciences, to draw insight from scientific advances, and, above all, to 
evaluate science intelligently. To the extent that the academic left’s 
critique becomes the dominant mode of thinking about science on 
the part of nonscientists, that thinking will be distorted and 
dangerously irrelevant. (4)
Here, humanist and social scientist “midwives” peddle their brand of 
knowledge wares in competition with science. Like midwives, their 
methods and products, according to Gross and Levitt, must be clearly 
demarcated from those of science, and their knowledge defined as inferior. 
Gross and Levitt register surprise that the science critics have not armed 
themselves by “crowding into science and mathematics lecture rooms” to
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learn more about the enemy, but instead have “overcome their former 
timidity or indifference [to science] not by studying it in detail but rather 
by creating a repertoire of rationalizations for avoiding such study” (6). 
Thus the stage is set for the stream of humanities and social science 
knowledge-bashing generated in the wake of Sokal’s hoax. The Sokal 
debate generated the same sort of demarcating name-calling that proved 
effective in the midwife debate: those who attack the cognitive authority of 
scientists are arrogant, superstitious, unscientific, and pose a threat to the 
pubhc’s well-being. Marking the academic left as hostile outsiders. Gross 
and Levitt’s polemical treatise urges academic scientists to fortify the 
“epistemic dignity of genuine science” by policing the university’s 
curricular borders, weeding out the “pseudoscientific nonsense” that has 
infiltrated humanities and social sciences courses that audaciously offer 
insights about the workings of science, and voicing their opposition to 
tenure promotions of scholars who engage in objectionable forms of 
science studies.
In this section I introduced M erton’s explanation of scientific ethos 
and discussed how Mertonian sociology, in tandem with rationalist 
philosophy, bolsters the “epistemic dignity” of science and helps to 
maintain its monopoly over certified knowledge production. By the 1970s,
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however, ideological developments in sociology and reactions against the 
Mertonian paradigm fueled significant challenges to the demarcation of 
science from other realms of knowledge. The next section looks more 
closely at this intrusion into previously privileged scientific territory that 
prompted hostile reactions from science’s supporters.
Erasing the Boundary: Symmetry and the Strong Programme
New developments in the sociology of science since the 1970s 
(whose practitioners demarcate themselves from Mertonian sociology of 
science [SS] by calling their project the sociology of scientific knowledge 
[SSK]) have rejected the Mertonian paradigm and reflect the concerns of 
ideological critique and postmodern theory that flowered in the 1960s. 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions in 1962 sparked new 
directions in the sociology of science, and in the 1960s and 1970s many 
sociologists and historians shifted their focus from consensus to 
controversy and dissensus among scientists. In its new focus on dissensus, 
many sociologists of science abandoned what they saw as the earlier 
sociology’s complicity with rationahst defenses of scientific knowledge that 
demarcated it from other knowledge-making activities. New explanations
159
saw scientific practices as social and rhetorical endeavors much like those of 
any other discipline or institution.
Traditional theories of the sociology of knowledge (those of Karl 
Mannheim and Emile Durkheim, for instance) had expanded Marx’s 
notions of social determinism into realms of knowledge such as legal, 
pohtical, rehgious, and artistic ideas. The knowledge produced by science, 
however, remained exempt from social explanations. David Bloor’s now 
classic Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976) combines an expansion of 
traditional sociology of knowledge with a critique of Mertonian sociology 
of science by opening with the question: “Can the sociology of knowledge 
investigate and explain the very content and nature of scientific 
knowledge?” (1). His call for a “strong programme” in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) sets out to answer this question with a 
resounding yes. Alan Chalmers, a historian and philosopher of science 
whose work Gross and Levitt praise, explains Bloor’s achievement: “Bloor, 
and a number of like-minded sociologists, have had the nerve to take the 
cognitive content of science as the object of their sociological explanations 
and their endeavours are typically interpreted by traditionalists as 
threatening the epistemological status of science” (82).
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Bloor also attacked what had been recognized as a division of labor 
in the study of science: sociologists interested in the distinction between 
“knowledge” and “belief” investigated social factors that accounted for 
adherence to erroneous knowledge by particular social groups (often called 
the “sociology of error”), while (rationalist) philosophers explained the 
rational basis for scientific truth. Bloor invades philosophical territory by 
challenging the asymmetry of this division of labor, arguing that sociology 
could, and should, also investigate social factors that accounted for the 
“belief” in scientific knowledge. In other words, he takes issue with the 
asymmetrical assumption that false knowledge is caused by social or 
subjective factors while true (scientific) knowledge is simply the upshot of 
rational processes: “Nothing makes people do things that are correct but 
something does make, or causes them to go wrong. . . . the rational aspects 
of science are held to be self-moving and self-explanatory” (6-7). Greg 
Myers offers a concise example:
One should use the same modes of explanation for belief in 
witchcraft or phrenology as for belief in electromagnetic waves or 
neuroendocrinology. The particular explanations behind these 
beliefs may, of course, be different, but one can’t say, in this 
approach, that the nineteenth-century pubhc believed in phrenology
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for cultural reasons, whereas we believe in neuroendocrinology 
because it is true. (20-21).
Bloor’s strong programme and his argument for symmetry— that the same 
kinds of social factors that had long served to explain “error” should also be 
employed to explain “true knowledge”— fueled an enormous amount of 
sociological research in this new direction.
It is this symmetrical orientation that also appeals to most 
proponents of cultural studies of science. Andrew Ross sums up the 
opposing positions in terms of non-expert invasions of scientific territory: 
[Should non-scientists] have some say in the decision-making 
processes that define and shape the work of the professional 
scientific community? Some scientists (including Sokal presumably) 
would say yes, and in some countries, non-expert citizens do indeed 
participate in these processes. All hell breaks loose, however, when 
the following question is asked. Should non-experts have anything to 
say about scientific methodology and epistemology? After centuries 
of scientific racism, scientific sexism, and scientific domination of 
nature one might have thought this was a pertinent question to ask. 
(“Sokal Hoax”)
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In effect, science’s special status as a unique discipline with privileged 
methodologies and epistemological outcomes was under attack. At the 
same time, competing knowledges from locations outside the academy also 
threatened science’s privileged position (animal rights and radical 
environmental activists, to name only two of Gross and Levitt’s additional 
targets, which they consider to be compUcit with the “academic left”). Like 
the Greek aristocracy in fourth century Athens and the middle class of late 
twentieth century America, science was threatened with status-slippage, 
perhaps more seriously than at any time earlier in this century. Science was 
under siege, from elsewhere in the academy, from non-academic activists, 
and from fundamentalist religion. As I will argue in the following sections, 
in this case, as in my Chapters One and Two, the class-demarcating needs 
of scientists are met by appeals to ethos.
However, there are many critics of SSK working in science studies 
who still see science as epistemologically privileged. Bloor’s chief 
sociological critic, Larry Laudan, opposes the focus on dissensus and 
continues to hold that the most significant “puzzle” to be explained about 
science is consensus. Laudan argues that the remarkable degree of consensus 
that characterizes science is even more surprising because science, unlike 
“some ecclesiastical rehgion [that] had settled upon a body of doctrine
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which was to be its permanent dogma,” is always in flux. Older views are 
quickly abandoned, and most scientists “will unhesitatingly change horses 
in midstream to embrace a point of view which had never even been heard 
of a decade before. . . . That a consensus can be shaped and re-shaped amid 
such flux is indeed remarkable” (255). Any remaining controversy among 
scientists is understood as disagreement over matters of fact that will 
sooner or later be resolved by additional evidence. Recalcitrant scientists 
are explained away asymmetrically— their “errors” are the result of the 
irrationality that always threatens human beings, and individual scientists, 
like anyone else, can fall prey to subjective influences, personal interest, 
emotional involvement, or irrational stubbornness. As in the Mertonian 
paradigm, the “sociology of error” explains away dissensus as a subjective 
phenomenon that deviates from scientific ethos. Thus, for these critics of 
the new sociology, science still “works” because of consensus, and this view 
continues the task of demarcating science from other classes of intellectual 
activity.
Gross and Levitt and Sokal are aware of these competing strands in 
sociology, and they do not attack sociologists who remain in the older 
school. Chalmers writes, “Not even the most orthodox defenders of the 
autonomy and rationality of science would deny that there is a role for
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sociology” in analyzing problems related to science’s impact on, for 
instance, the environment and the social uses of genetic engineering (81). 
Sokal places himself in this camp, defending himself against Stanley Fish’s 
accusation that he opposes all sociology of science:
Fish implies that I am opposed to all sociology of science, and that I 
fail to understand the elementary distinction between sociology of 
science and science. Give me a break! I have no objection whatsoever 
to sociology of science, which at its best can clarify the important 
pohtical and economic issues surrounding science and technology. 
My only objection is to bad sociology of science— numerous 
examples of which are praised (!) in my parody article in the 
spring/summer 1996 issue of Social Text. (“Sokal Replies”)
There are, in this view, social issues raised by science that are the proper 
domain for the sociology of science, but the demarcation line is crossed 
when sociological or rhetorical explanations for the actual content of 
scientific knowledge are also probed as “socially constructed.” However, in 
the wake of the Sokal hoax, even the “good” (asymmetrical) sociology of 
science comes under attack for offering nothing but commonplaces.
Edward Rothstein writes in the New York Times., “Obviously, science is 
affected by the pressures of ordinary life. Obviously, economic interests
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help determine what areas of research flourish, and obviously, pohtical 
pressures can affect innovation. Obviously, scientific questions are raised in 
one era and not another partly because of changes in culture.”
There are, of course, many shades of “social constructionism,” some 
of them perceived by science’s supporters as more threatening than others.
I find it significant that neither Gross and Levitt, nor Sokal, nor any of 
their supporters in the media bUtz in the wake of Sokal’s hoax, ever so 
much as mention the rhetoric of science as practiced by scholars situated in 
the field of rhetoric and composition. What does this omission suggest 
about the relationship between rhetoric of science and sociology of science, 
or between rhetoric of science and cultural studies? Is this neglect due to a 
complete unawareness of this marginaHzed subspecialty in a marginalized 
discipline? O r is it because the work of the rhetoric of science falls on the 
side of those approaches to science that they do not find threatening to 
their status or epistemological privilege, and that Rothstein would indict 
for merely stating the obvious?
In Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction o f Scientific 
Knowledge, Greg Myers unwittingly suggests as much about his own work. 
Although he dismisses the Mertonian paradigm and aligns his rhetorical 
approach with Bloor’s strong programme and the SSK focus on
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controversy and dissensus, Myers writes that the biologists he studied 
“were not surprised by what I had to say, and were only surprised by the 
lengths to which I went to say i t . . . .  [They did not deny] that social 
processes were going on, and that these processes involved texts” (xiii). N ot 
unlike PreUi’s approach, Myers interprets scientific texts in order to 
discover how they construct scientific authority, a project which neither 
threatens science’s status nor defends other knowledges that compete with 
science. “I do not see the analysis of scientific texts,” Myers writes, “as a 
project of debunking science” (247). After supposedly demonstrating the 
solely rhetorical nature of Mertonian norms, he concludes, “the norms of 
science tell us about its rhetoric, not about its ethos; to accept them as 
functional is to promote an ahistorical view of science and to accept 
uncritically science’s view of itself” (22-24). His complete dissociation of 
“rhetoric” from a sociological notion of ethos is symptomatic of the 
limitations of this “rhetorical” approach to science. I am not suggesting that 
the Mertonian paradigm be reinstated wholesale, but I would suggest that 
these “unsurprising” approaches to the rhetoric of science might be well 
served by a more careful consideration of what Merton’s discussion of 
scientific ethos has to offer. I agree with proponents of SSK that Merton’s 
larger project was complicit with rationahst defenses of science and
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therefore did not threaten scientists’ epistemological privileges. But his 
analysis of scientific ethos, particularly given its emphasis on science’s need 
to demarcate its processes and products for a public audience in the context 
of a present or impending “revolt from science,” has been too quickly 
dismissed.
In “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science” DiUp Gaonkar 
offers a wide-ranging critique of the current state of the rhetoric of science. 
I focus on two aspects of that critique here. First, Gaonkar expresses 
dissatisfaction with “the interpretive turn,” which he links to twentieth- 
century neo-Aristotelianism in rhetorical criticism and which leads to a 
problematic notion of rhetoric as a “hermeneutic metadiscourse” rather 
than rhetoric as a civic force. Second, he disapproves of the appropriation 
of what he calls the “thin terminology” of classical rhetorical theory (by 
which he means Aristotelian terminology) that he finds in most rhetoric of 
science scholarship. While I am largely sympathetic with his first critique, 
and also with his critique of classical terminology as it is currently deployed 
in much rhetoric of science, I hope that my discussion in these three 
chapters has at least suggested that Aristotehan terminology, particularly 
when complicated and expanded by sociological perspectives, is by no 
means “thin.”
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The Aristotelian vocabulary that accompanies the interpretive turn 
Gaonkar finds wanting. By “thinness” he means “the abstract quality of the 
traditional vocabulary as illustrated, for instance, in the tripartite scheme of 
proofs {ethos, pathos, and logos) that enables one to find its presence in 
virtually any discourse practice” (33). (He later discusses uses of stasis, 
arrangement, and style in rhetoric of science.) He concedes that such a 
vocabulary may be adequate as a heuristic aid to performance. Its 
inadequacy for critical reading, however, is demonstrated in the 
preponderance of rhetorical analyses (particularly of scientific texts) that he 
finds “dismal,” mere catalogues of rhetorical techniques and typologies of 
arguments, “translations” of complexly situated discourses into an 
oversimplified vocabulary that was intended for production, not 
interpretation. In his lengthy analysis of Prelli’s topical method, for 
example, he argues that there is little value in the mere “redescription” of a 
scientific text in the thin terms of classical rhetoric; such a reading “simply 
translates a scientific paper from one idiom to another” (69). It also suggests 
why rhetoric of science might go unmentioned in the science wars.
Gaonkar finds the interpretive turn problematic because it 
portended the globalization of rhetoric as a mode of understanding, a 
method of reading, that displaced a view of rhetoric as a civic force with a
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pedagogical interest in performance rather than interpretation of texts. He 
links the interpretive turn to neo-Aristotelianism and describes the 
interpretive thrust of contemporary rhetorical studies as “fatally bound” to 
an Aristotehan vocabulary, even when attempts are made to expand 
rhetoric’s vision of Aristotle. Since in the interpretive mode “what is 
rhetorical in any given case is invariably an effect of one’s reading,” then “a 
master reader can produce such an effect in relation to virtually any object” 
(29). Thus rhetoric is universahzed. This globahzing move Gaonkar links 
to “the pohtics of repression and recognition,” the interpretive assumption 
being that discourses not claiming to be rhetorical can now be interpreted 
as such; their rhetoricity has been repressed, but is recognized by the 
master reader. In this globalizing drive, science is the furthest outpost, the 
location where the greatest repression of rhetoric has taken place. If science 
can be shown to be rhetorical, nothing can escape. The interpretive turn, 
then, bears a deep affinity with the strong programme in that science, like 
all other discourses, is subject to symmetrical analysis (although as we have 
seen in Myers and Prelli, for example, this does not mean that all 
rhetoricians of science therefore attack or compete with science’s 
knowledge claims).
170
Gaonkar, however, notes several striking differences between 
rhetoric of science and SSK, one of which serves as an introduction to the 
following section. He explains the traditional distinction between internal 
and external discursive practices, internal referring to those that are 
practiced within a specific scientific discourse community and external 
referring to scientific discourse addressed to other scientific (or 
nonscientific) communities and to the public. In recent years, Gaonkar 
claims, rhetoric of science has moved toward the internal pole, through 
their focus on writing within discourse communities (Prelli and Myers are 
prime examples of this move). This has occurred, he claims, because the 
attempt “to read science rhetorically encounters greater resistance as one 
moves from the external to the internal,” and studies involving the external 
pole are more obviously rhetorical from the outset. Therefore, rhetorical 
analysis of internal scientific texts advances the drive to globalize rhetoric. 
Gaonkar notes that SSK had, from the start, problematized this distinction 
between internal and external, while rhetoric of science clings to it. 
However, I would argue that this problematization is evident even in 
Merton’s analysis of scientific ethos: he describes internal norms that 
supposedly serve to validate scientific claims, but at the same time bolster 
science’s epistemic authority for those outside the scientific community.
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A Mertonian view of the ethos of science, particularly because it has 
become so entrenched in pubHc consciousness, proves useful in scientists' 
attempts to demarcate themselves and their knowledge market share from 
would-be usurpers. One instructive example is the case against creation 
science in McLean v  Arkansas, a case which is analyzed at length both by 
Prelli and by Gieryn et al. It deserves attention here because it 
demonstrates how the Mertonian view of scientific ethos functions in the 
pubhc sphere to demarcate science from non-science and maintain science’s 
professionalized control over science curricula.
Ethos and the Demarcation of Science 
in the McLean Creationist Dispute
When the boundaries between classes of knowledge-producers are 
violated, when the lines of demarcation between objective scientific 
knowledge and socially determined opinions are in danger of becoming 
blurred, ethos work helps to redefine and shore up those defiled boundaries. 
That boundary w ork includes denying cognitive authority to the 
competition, which, for science, involves establishing for a pubhc audience 
its own ethos as superior and showing that competing knowledge producers 
lack such ethos. Since Mertonian ethos-{otvaia% topoi are essentially tied to a
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rationalist philosophy of science that justifies science’s cognitive authority 
and epistemological privilege, attacking the competition as unworthy 
usurpers of knowledge production can be accomplished by attacking the 
competition’s ethos. This section describes the ethos boundary work in 
McLean V Arkansas, a striking public example of this demarcating game.
On March 19, 1981, the governor of Arkansas signed into law Act 
590, titled “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science 
Act.” On May 27 of that year the ACLU, on behalf of a group of Arkansas 
citizens and organizations, filed suit, charging that Act 590 was in violation 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and arguing that 
“since creation science is not science . . .  the only real effect of Act 590 is 
the advancement of religion” and to attempt to force non-science material 
into science curricula (qtd in Prelh 220). Thus a significant portion of the 
trial focused on the definition of science and the attempt by the plaintiffs to 
demarcate creationism from science— in effect, to argue that creation- 
science, despite its attempt to appropriate scientific authority by calling 
itself science, was not science at all but reUgion. Their argument proceeded 
along essentially Mertonian lines, offering expert testimony that science is 
simply what scientists do, and what they do is in accord with the 
Mertonian elements of scientific ethos outlined earlier in this chapter. The
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plaintiffs presented, persuasively to the judge, a picture of creationists as a 
group that did not qualify as “scientists” because they did not practice the 
normative elements of scientific ethos-, communality, skepticism, 
universahty, and disinterestedness.
U. S. District Court Judge William Overton’s decision in favor of 
the plaintiffs refers to the “scientific community” no less than nine times, 
arguing that creationists’ practices place them clearly outside of that 
community and hence outside of science. Any “communality” that 
creationists might have among themselves is beside the point, for he accepts 
the testimony of the plaintiff s witnesses that science is what scientists do: 
Creation science . . . not only fails to follow the canons of dealing 
with scientific theory, it also fails to fit the more general descriptions 
of ‘what scientists think’ and ‘what scientists do.’ The scientific 
community consists of individuals and groups, nationally and 
internationally, who work independently in such varied fields as 
biology, paleontology, geology, and astronomy. Their work is 
published and subject to review and testing by their peers. The 
journals for publication are both numerous and varied. There is, 
however, not one recognized scientific journal which has published 
an article espousing the creation science theory . . .  {McLean)
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Arguing from the topes of communality, the plaintiffs persuaded Overton 
that creationists’ practices did not demonstrate this aspect of scientific ethos. 
Creationists were not found on the payrolls of leading research institutions, 
they did not publish in authorized scientific journals, indeed they did not 
even submit their technical claims about creationism for peer review. 
Although creationist witnesses countered these charges by claiming that 
scientific Journals were biased and would censor their potential 
contributions anyway, the judge noted in his decision that “no [creationist] 
witness produced a scientific article for which publication has been 
refused.” As Prelli explains the persuasiveness of the communality topos, 
the judge “directly defended the scientific community and its members as 
appropriate agencies for deciding what does and does not count as 
reasonable science” (223). Having failed to establish the communal element 
of their presumed scientific ethos, the creationists were well on their way to 
being demarcated as non-scientists.
The plaintiffs’ case also attacked creationists for not practicing the 
organized skepticism that a Mertonian vision of scientific ethos demands. 
Witnesses for the plaintiffs testified that scientists always remained 
tentative about their results, looking skeptically at their assumptions and 
their data. In the words of the judge’s decision:
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A scientific theory must be tentative and always subject to revision 
or abandonment in light of facts that are inconsistent with, or 
falsify, the theory. A theory that is by its own terms dogmatic, 
absolutist, and never subject to revision is not a scientific theory. 
{McLeari)
The plaintiffs persuasively portrayed creationists as dogmatists who adhere 
a priori to Biblical authority regardless of any technical claims they might 
make about biological processes, fossil evidence, or scientific dating 
methods. Most of the creationists involved in the trial were members of the 
Creation Research Society, which requires members to take an oath of 
faith in the Bibhcal account of creation. By signing such a statement, the 
judge was persuaded, creationists abandon the skepticism required of 
scientific ethos.
Creationists were also shown to lack disinterestedness. The drafters 
of Act 590 were motivated by a political agenda with religious aims. In 
Mertonian and logical empiricist explanations of science, any subjective or 
political interests that might motivate scientists are ultimately filtered out 
by the scientific method, or, in sociological terms, by the institutional 
procedures that ensure adherence to normative scientific practices that 
guarantee objectivity in the evaluation of knowledge claims; thus ultimate
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disinterestedness is assured. Since creationists, as we have seen, do not 
participate in these institutional procedures, and since their original 
motives for implementing Act 590 were clearly political, their 
disinterestedness was not defensible.
Both Prelli and Gieryn et al. agree that the plaintiffs covertly 
deployed Mertonian topoi and therefore used scientific ethos to drive a 
wedge between creationists and evolutionists. However, the differences 
between the two analyses, one from a rhetorician and one from 
sociologists, highlight some of the difficulties facing rhetoric of science that 
I touched on above. Prelli’s rhetorical analysis, although thorough and 
informed to an extent by Gieryn et al.’s earlier article, simply redescribes 
the inventional strategies of both plaintiffs and defendants by cataloguing 
the topoi used by both parties, naming the “rhetorical exigence” as 
demarcation, and identifying the primary stasis as a conjectural issue: 
“What is scientific about creationism?” Even though here Prelli has taken 
on an instance of external scientific discourse, his analysis merely 
redescribes the case, translating it into “thin” classical terminology, as 
Gaonkar claims.
How do Gieryn et al. go beyond thin redescription? First, they 
establish the “market model” of the professionalization of science that
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explains why the “demarcation exigence” even arises and highlights the 
public forum in which science denies expertise and authority to 
competitors. Thus they emphasize the professional stake in the trial. 
Second, they accentuate the historical contingency of demarcations of 
science by devoting equal time to the earlier Scopes trial, arguing that 
although the result of both trials was the demarcation of science from 
religion, the differences in the two are more significant than the 
similarities. At Scopes, they argue, the ideology of science established the 
uniqueness of its commodity, and although differentiated from religious 
knowledge, both kinds of knowledge “were presented as distinctive but 
complementary realms of culture.” At McLean, science and religion (as 
creation-science) are in competition. ReUgion here is “an illegitimate 
intruder poaching on the professional authority” that gives professional 
scientists alone the license to define science (405-06).
Although both PreUi and Gieryn et al. acknowledge the effectiveness 
of Mertonian topoi at McLean, the sociological analysis more clearly echoes 
Merton’s words from forty years earlier: “After a long period of relative 
security, during which the pursuit and diffusion of knowledge had risen to 
a leading place if indeed not to the first rank in the scale of cultural values, 
scientists are compelled to vindicate the ways of science” to the public
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(Merton 268). Even the losers at McLean recognized the importance of a 
pubhc forum: after the decision that outlawed “balanced treatment,” 
Arkansas senator Hoisted, who sponsored Act 590, said, “I feel like we 
really won because people are talking about it, kids will be asking about it. 
Teachers will have to talk about creation-science . . . All the hoopla, the 
publicity—that’s just what I wanted” (qtd in Gieryn et al. 405). Although 
the outcome of the Sokal affair is yet to be resolved, it appears at present 
that only the scientists and Sokal’s supporters are happy that the dispute 
has gone public.
The Sokal Affair: Elite versus Elite?
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” (referred to hereafter as the hoax 
essay), the essay by New York University physicist Alan Sokal that began 
the Sokal affair, appeared in a double-volume spring/summer 1996 issue of 
Social Text devoted to the “Science Wars.” Most of the essays in this issue 
by science studies scholars address the 1994 book. Higher Superstition: The 
Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science^ by Paul Gross and Norman 
Levitt. In one sense, it is appropriate that Sokal’s essay found its way into 
print in this collection, since Sokal claims to have been originally inspired
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by Gross and Levitt’s book to further investigate their allegations against 
science studies. Appearing at the same time as this issue of Social Text was 
another article in Lingua Franca, “A Physicist Experiments with Cultural 
Studies” (referred to hereafter as the exposé article), in which Sokal 
revealed the hoax and explained his several motivations for having 
perpetrated it. The expose article focuses on the lack of evidence and 
argument in his hoax essay, “the dubiousness of its central thesis” that is 
“held together by vague rhetoric” and “citations of authority, plays on 
words, strained analogies, and bald assertions” gleaned from Derrida,
Lacan, Irigaray, and “some controversial philosophical pronouncements of 
Heisenberg and Bohr.” He reveals that the physics in his hoax essay was 
nonsense, rebukes the Social Text editors for failing to seek the opinion of a 
physicist on matters which they were ill-equipped to judge, and concludes 
that they published the hoax essay for the simple reason that they liked its 
conclusion, that “the content and methodology of postmodern science 
provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project.” 
While Gross and Levitt’s earlier book, although widely reviewed, generated 
little public awareness of the science wars, Sokal’s expose assured far- 
reaching dissemination in the public media: the story of the hoax was 
covered by a variety of newspapers and magazines from the New York
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Times front page. Village Voice, and Newsweek to Disney’s Discover 
magazine and was featured on television by Rush Limbaugh and C N N ’s 
The Capital Gang. In the wake of the Culture Wars, the Sokal affair gave 
the media another opportunity to disparage intellectualism and lampoon 
the Left, “while bolstering the sagging image of the ‘scientist’ as a figure of 
authority and a man of reason and good sense” (Osborne 55). I am not here 
interested in adjudicating, or even raising, the philosophical issues in the 
debate (although I agree with Osborne that Sokal’s “philosophical” views 
about science would be rejected by nearly all philosophers of science); 
rather, following Merton’s lead, I am interested in what the debate was 
about /or the media, that is, the pubhc perception of science and its 
competitors.
In Chapter One I discussed the necessity of elite Greek orators’ 
negotiation of ethos for an audience who distrusted their aristocratic wealth 
and superior education. Ober’s analysis of fourth century speeches offers 
numerous examples of the Greek orator, fully aware of the proclivities of 
his audience, posing as a speaker of simple origins while highlighting the 
silver-tongued but potentially anti-democratic rhetoric of his opponent.
This strategy of aHgning oneself with the audience’s fear of education’s 
ability to undermine democracy, charging one’s opponents with ehtism.
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and depicting one’s opponents as clever speakers and wily sophists who 
want to subvert the will of the demos are also frequently in evidence in the 
numerous responses to the Sokal affair. Just as the drama of the deUberative 
or forensic oratorical contest was played out for the demos by competing 
elite orators, so too was the drama of the Sokal affair played out for a 
pubhc audience by scientists versus the humanities and social sciences 
scholars who study science, both sides charging the other with ehtism.
With its Enhghtenment heritage, science has something of a head 
start in its attempt to ahgn itself with democratic distrust of ehte privilege. 
Steve Fuller explains science’s “supposedly exemplary status as the open 
society, the very model of pubhc debate and democratic governance in the 
modem era, one which promises to incorporate all of humanit}\ typically 
through a process of citizen education.” Fuller goes on to cite defenders of 
science who have even claimed that because of experimental science’s 
“participatory character and its uniformly critical yet reasoned attitudes 
toward knowledge claims,” it was actually the first social institution “to 
reahze fully the promise of the Athenian pohs.” Even Merton, in Fuller’s 
view, “represented science as perhaps the only sphere in modem society 
where the principles of participatory democracy may actually apply.” Once 
he examines the “fine print” of the contract between science and
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democracy, however. Fuller finds some disturbing complications: “is the 
goal of Enhghtenment to incorporate everyone as contentious contributors 
to scientific discourse or as compHant consumers of science-based 
technologies? . .  . Knowledge can be universally distributed, yet its 
production remain concentrated in the hands of the relative few” (280- 
281). Thus, although the scientists involved in and responding to Sokal’s 
hoax take advantage of this ready-made identification with democratic 
ideals, academic and non-academic critics of science have increased public 
awareness of science’s anti-democratic tendencies in recent decades, either 
through castigating science as an elite institution that disqualifies other 
ways of knowing from competing in the public marketplace (as physicians 
did with midwifery), or through disenchantment w ith the actual methods 
and products of science (for instance, the animal rights activists and radical 
environmentalist tactics that Gross and Levitt attack along with the 
“academic left”).
Several of the articles in Social Texfs Science Wars issue comment on 
the decline of science’s traditional elite status. D orothy Nelkin asks what 
the Science Wars are really about, and answers that they are “surely not 
about the real power of humanists, who are hardly about to topple the 
scientific enterprise.” Nelkin describes the post-World War II manifestation
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of science’s Enlightenment heritage as a “social contract” between science 
and the pubhc that “was built on the premise that scientific information 
was a public resource, that what was good for science was good for the 
state,” a contract that granted science a high degree of autonomy and 
furthered the reputation of scientists as disinterested knowledge seekers and 
producers. But this faith in science underwent erosion with the antiwar and 
environmental movements of the 1960s, and over the next two decades, 
with the growth of the animal rights movement, creationist challenges to 
the teaching of evolution, gay-rights activists’ questioning of scientific 
research on AIDS therapies, and other widely publicized critiques of 
science, the marriage between science and the state deteriorated into a 
tension-filled relationship. The end of the Cold War led to government 
cutbacks in technoscience research, and public faith in scientists’ 
disinterestedness withered as it became clear that much scientific research 
was now done not for the good of the public but for the profit of the 
corporation (Nelkin 94-96). Commenting on the Sokal hoax, Nelkin said, 
“scientists used to have great autonomy and no accountabihty. That 
contract has broken down” (qtd. in McMillen). Others involved in the 
Sokal affair, however, still present science as a dangerous ehte institution: 
responding to Sokal’s exposé, Andrew Ross writes, “Why does science
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matter so much? because its power, as a civil religion, as a social and 
political authority, affects our daily Hves and the parlous condition of the 
natural world more than does any other domain of knowledge” (“Sokal 
Hoax”). In a section of the Spring 1997 issue of Social Text devoted to 
responses to the Sokal hoax, M. Susan Lindee remarks on the fact that 
Sokal’s intended audience was not the science studies community but the 
larger pubhc. This observation is made in the context of her explanation of 
the role of public support for science “not merely in the practical matter of 
funding but in the estabHshment of scientific data as a high-status, 
compelling guide to pohcy, legal decision making, and personal behavior” 
(140). Science studies scholars continue making allegations of elitism; 
science struggles to bolster its sagging ethos by discrediting science studies.
Sokal and his supporters turn the tables, however, by arguing that 
the disreputable and dangerous elites in the debate are actually the 
humanists and sociologists who attack science’s authority and control over 
scientific knowledge production. In the Lingua Franca expose, Sokal 
explicitly draws on science’s Enhghtenment heritage to charge the 
postmodern humanities with elitism:
For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with 
science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational
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thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural 
and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications 
promoted by the powerful— not to mention being desirable human 
ends in their own right.
Alerting the media to yet another academic squabble related to the Culture 
Wars, Sokal got his public audience. In the media frenzy that ensued, 
commentators who came to Sokal’s defense followed his lead in setting up 
the Social Text editors as elite members of an aristocratic academic 
community. Lindee writes:
Joumahsts told a story of powerful intellectuals hoodwinked by 
their own impenetrable jargon. . . .  Those seeming to possess 
knowledge (the editors of an academic journal) were revealed to be 
ignorant. Power relations were upset; the strong brought down by 
the clever. . . . The journalists had to see the Social Text editors as 
powerful and secure, and Sokal as living only by his wits. (139)
Gary Kamiya, for instance, in “Transgressing the Transgressors: Toward a 
Transformative Hermeneutics of Total Bullshit,” describes humanities
Much of the response to Sokal’s hoax and exposé focused on another demarcation 
debate between the Cultural Left and the Enlightenment Left. Although, as I briefly 
indicate, the “Left v Left” battle is closely tied to the science demarcation debate, I do not 
deal with it here.
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scholarship as “pious, obscurantist, jargon-filled cant” and Social Text as “a 
prestigious journal” with “high-powered editors,” while Sokal is a “clever 
academic, armed with the not-so-secret passwords” who has “the effrontery 
to place a whoopi cushion under the Supreme Throne of Post-Modernist 
Progressive Rectitude.” Peter Berkowtiz in the New Republic calls the Social 
Text editors “arrogant” and postmodernism “boastful, haughty and 
dismissive,” adding that “those who have never performed an experiment 
or mastered an equation” display “a sneering superiority based on the 
alleged insight that science is a form of literary invention distinguished 
primarily by its outsized social cachet” (15). Erich Eichman in The New 
Criterion describes prominent cultural studies scholars as glamorous, 
fashionable, and trendy celebrities. In The Nation, Katha Pollitt sides with 
Sokal’s image of the Enlightenment Left and bemoans “the development in 
the 1980s of an academic celebrity system that meshes in funny, glitzy ways 
with the worlds of art and entertainment, with careerism,” Even the 
impartial treatment of the hoax by Liz McMillen in the Chronicle o f Higher 
Education speaks to the local-level elitism that fueled the hoax (both Sokal 
and Ross are NYU professors): “Mr. Ross, who directs a new, high-profile 
program in American studies, has been covered by glossy magazines. Mr. 
Sokal is a member of a department that is by contrast less visible. It is
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ranked 53"^  among 147 doctoral programs in physics, according to the 
National Research Council."
Another complication in this battle of ehte versus ehte arises, 
however, when it becomes clear, through both accusation and Social Texfs 
own admission, that the hoax essay reached print largely due to Sokal’s 
privileged position as a scientist. Ross and the Social Text editors were 
charged with vulnerabihty to the deception precisely because they do 
respect scientific authority. Sokal’s exposé article aUudes to the irony of the 
editors deferring to the “cultural authority of technoscience, ” accusations 
of “science envy” were legion, and Kamiya gleefully notes, “A man in a lab 
coat can even order around a deconstructionist!” Bruce Robbins, co-editor 
with Ross for the Social Text Collective, admitted that they were hoaxed 
“because we thought [Sokal] was a progressive scientist, a physicist who 
was willing to be publicly critical of scientific orthodoxies” (qtd in 
Osborne 55), and acknowledges in another article that the hoax showed 
how “some scientific ignorance and some absentmindedness could combine 
with much enthusiasm for a supposed political ally to produce a case of 
temporary bUndness” (Robbins 58). I do not think it uncharitable to read 
into Robbins’ confessions the subtext that the cultural authority of a 
scientist propounding postmodernist connections between his field and
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theirs might enhance the influence of Social Text's issue on the science wars. 
Like the creationists in McLean who hoped that some authority might 
attach to their position by calling themselves “creation-scientists,” Ross 
pulled Sokal’s hoax from the slush pile and chose to publish, in the science 
wars issue, an essay that he had earlier rejected, having categorized Sokal as 
a “difficult, uncooperative author” who insisted that “his article would 
appear as is, or not at all” (Ross, “Sokal Hoax”). Gieryn et al.’s analysis of 
the creationists’ tactics is applicable to Ross and Robbins: they tried “to use 
the authority of science to pursue intellectual, political or religious agendas 
that do not coincide with agendas pursued by the professional scientific 
community” (Gieryn et al. 403).
In his first response to Sokal’s Lingua Franca exposé, Ross claims 
that the editors considered his article “to be a little hokey” and that it 
would have been considered “sophomoric and/or outdated” if it had come 
from a humanist or social scientist, but, after some deliberation, they 
“concluded that this article was the earnest attempt of a professional 
scientist to seek some kind of affirmation from postmodern philosophy for 
developments in his field,” and even read it “as an act of good faith of the 
sort that might be worth encouraging” (“Sokal Hoax”). Hence they 
encourage the struggling scientist to come over to their side; his authority
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as a scientist grants him the same leeway, although on different grounds, 
that would be granted to a powerful, well-estabHshed scholar who is 
actually a member of the community he is writing for. Gesa Kirsch speaks 
to this issue in her excellent study of women scholars’ struggles to achieve 
authority within their academic discourse communities, which, in its focus 
on authority if not on gender, sheds light on Ross’s explanation. Kirsch 
explains that established scholars have more freedom in their writing 
because they are perceived as authorities: “well-known scholars typically 
have more Hberty to make bold statements, draw conclusions, or argue for 
controversial positions than do younger scholars” (51). Although Sokal 
crossed discourse community Hnes to perpetrate his hoax, his status as a 
scientist (even a relatively unrecognized one in his own community) 
afforded him the authority to be granted freedom by Ross to make 
statements that, Ross admits, would not have seen print had they been 
written by someone in the cultural studies or humanities community. As 
Kirsch writes, “part of having authority entails being perceived as an 
authority” (49). Sokal’s status as scientist bolsters what Ross tries to pass off 
later as damaged ethos in an article that wasn’t really “their cup of tea” 
(“Sokal Hoax”). Of course, Sokal was also criticized for using his cultural 
authority as a scientist to imagine that he could accomplish the stunt in the
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first place. Kirsh points out that a writer must experience himself or herself 
as accepted by others to speak authoritatively; Sokal obviously experienced 
himself
as having the authority to speak in another discipline.** Unfortunately for 
Social Text, his experience of himself was not off the mark. Rather than 
castigating Sokal for scientific arrogance and breach of trust, or Ross for 
blind desire for a scientific ally, I prefer to see his, and Ross’s, perception of 
his authority as symptomatic of the broad public faith in scientific ethos.
So far in this section I have addressed issues of scientific ethos in a 
general way, examining accusations of elitism from both sides and 
suggesting that Sokal’s situated ethos, i.e., the authority granted him because 
of his status as a scientist, outweighed his more problematic, “hokey” 
textually constructed ethos in the hoax essay. My larger claim in this 
chapter, however, is that the debates that raged in the Sokal affair drew 
heavily on the Mertonian topoi that proved so effective at McLean.
Likewise, in Higher Superstition, Gross and Levin make the purposely outrageous claim 
that, should for some reason humanities departments disappear from the university, 
scientists could cobble together an acceptable humanities curriculum based on their 
supposedly broad collective knowledge of the great cultural works. Needless to say, in 
their view humanists would prove amusingly deficient if these roles were reversed.
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Ethos Wars in the Sokal Affair
I have made two points about scientific ethos in this chapter that bear 
repeating here. First, in the face of threats to science’s exclusive control 
over its knowledge commodities, Merton’s four topoi— universalism, 
communality, disinterestedness, and skepticism— working in conjunction 
with each other, are not just methodological imperatives that fortify 
science’s epistemological privilege; they also structure scientific ethos. That 
is, through the communal practices of peer review and publication, 
scientific claims made by scientists who employ an appropriate skepticism 
and that the community deems disinterested reach the status of universal (if 
provisional) truths. Second, as we have seen in Ross’s and Robbins’ 
explanations of why they published the hoax essay, scholars in the cultural 
studies of science are not immune to the powerful sway of scientific ethos, 
and are just as likely to demand scientists’ adherence to Mertonian norms as 
they are to recognize the ideological function of those norms. In effect, 
many scholars in science studies call on scientists not to abandon these 
markers of scientific ethos, but rather to more fully live up to them (not 
unlike the fourth century Athenian demos demanded a particular ethos and 
accountability from Greek elite rhetors). Expanding on these two points, 
this section examines the interaction of Mertonian topoi in the Sokal affair
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and how they are deployed by Sokal and his supporters to discredit the 
ethos— and the knowledge products— of science studies.
The topos of organized skepticism of received truths is evident in 
Sokal’s confusion over Robbins’ statement that “truth can be another 
source of oppression.” As a self-proclaimed in-the-trenches old Leftist who 
holds to the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment, Sokal writes 
that this statement simply makes no sense to him. In its full context, 
Robbins’ statement reads:
Is it in the interests of women, African Americans, and other super­
exploited people to insist that truth and identity are social 
constructions? Yes and no. No, you can’t talk about exploitation 
without respect for empirical evidence and a universal standard of 
justice. But yes, truth can be another source of oppression. It was 
not so long ago that scientists gave their full authority to 
explanations of why women and African Americans (not to speak of 
gays and lesbians) were inherently inferior or pathological or both. 
Explanations like these continue to appear in newer and subtler 
forms. Hence, there is a real need for a social constructionist critique 
of knowledge. . .  . [But] those of us who do cultural politics 
sometimes act as if the questioning of reality were of self-evident.
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universal, and paramount ethical and political value, as if truth were 
always and everywhere a weapon of the Right. In fact, it’s almost 
impossible to belong to the Left, or to an academic discipline, 
without some functional sense of truth. (59)
For Sokal, the “truths” of women’s and African Americans’ inferiority are 
not “truths” at all. The goal of Enhghtenment-inspired science is to explode 
such ideological myth-making that calls itself “scientific” and expose the 
cultural influences that produce such falsities. Therefore, he sees little sense 
in lambasting “science” for producing such culturally biased hypotheses, 
because, contaminated as they are by subjectivism, they will eventually be 
demolished. It is this process that Sokal calls “reason,” science’s constant 
skepticism about its own received truths, a self-questioning attitude that he 
claims postmodernists, blinded by doctrinaire adherence to their 
authorities, do not possess.
Although Pollitt in The Nation recognizes and bemoans the fact that 
the hoax’s encouragement of anti-intellectualism by the media and the 
public will also discredit useful work by several women in science studies 
(Dorothy Nelkin, Hilary Rose, and Ruth Hubbard, for instance), her essay 
denounces the cultural Left for its combination of “covert slavishness to 
authority with the most outlandish radical posturing.” Thus the
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postmodern Left is criticized for its lack of skepticism about its own 
received truths. Because Gross and Levitt and Sokal devote so much of 
their texts to gleeful out-of-context citations of “murky” postmodern 
writing, much of the debate focused on the impenetrable language of 
postmodern “gurus” such as Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan. Speaking to 
this issue, PoUitt writes that the real comedy of the hoax is “that it suggests 
that even the postmodernists don’t really understand one another’s writing 
and make their way through the text by moving from one famiHar name or 
notion to the next hke a frog jumping across a murky pond by way of lily 
pads.” Skepticism about the received doctrines of postmodern authorities is 
found wanting. Just as the judge at McLean was persuaded that creationists 
lacked skepticism and adhered a priori to a literahst Biblical dogma, so too 
in the Sokal affair pubHc intellectual judges were quick to interpret Sokal’s 
hoax as an indicator of the lack of skepticism on the part of the Social Text 
editors.
O f course, postmodernist language suggests a certain kind of 
skepticism, for instance, Lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarratives.” 
Berkowitz differentiates this kind of skepticism from an older skepticism 
grounded in liberal political theory, a “healthy skepticism that proclaims 
that human beings lack certain knowledge about what is good and just and
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true,” a skepticism based in “philosophical modesty,” unlike the “boastful, 
haughty and dismissive” postmodern increduHty that “focuses narrowly on 
what is supposedly false and pernicious.” Any skepticism that 
postmodernists might be admitted to possess is demarcated from the 
skepticism “proper” to science and an open society.
Social and cultural studies of science have for decades attacked 
science, suUied by military and industrial sponsorship, for its claims to 
disinterestedness. Osborne, who sees the Sokal affair as “a set-piece 
confrontation between a new, culturally-based academic Left and its 
scientifically-oriented predecessor,” identifies Social Text's mistake as 
allowing “the lure of an ally within the scientific establishment to dictate 
judgment about the piece; to allow political convenience to suspend 
intellectual judgment.” Thus the decision to publish was “representative of 
an overly strategic approach to intellectual matters, characteristic of that 
section of the cultural Left to which Social Text, broadly speaking, belongs” 
(54, 55). In his hoax essay, Sokal suggests that postmodern science, if it is to 
be truly liberatory, must be subordinated to emancipatory political 
strategies, and in the exposé he criticizes the editors for their unquestioning 
acceptance of his “imphcation that the search for truth in science must be 
subordinated to a political agenda.” Thus, from the pen of a scientist, the
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topos of disinterestedness is turned back against those who have long 
attacked science’s lack of disinterestedness.
In McLean, arguments from the topos of commimahty took the 
form of demonstrations that creationists not only were not pubHshed in 
authoritative scientific journals but did not even submit their work for peer 
review to the community of scientists. Sokal likewise plays on the topos of 
communahty by charging that the Social Text editors “felt comfortable 
publishing an article on quantum physics without bothering to consult 
anyone knowledgeable in the subject” and later in the same article 
reiterates the point: “It’s understandable that the editors of Social Text were 
unable to evaluate critically the technical aspects of my article (which is 
exactly why they should have consulted a scientist)” (“A Physicist 
Experiments”). That this accusation is based in a long-standing and publicly 
acknowledged topos of scientific ethos is evident from the amount of 
comment it received in the wake of Sokal’s revelation. Berkowitz follows 
Sokal’s lead and censures Social Text for their arrogance in publishing “a 
bold reinterpretation of an abstruse dimension of theoretical physics 
without soliciting the evaluation of anyone trained in the field.” Ross, 
obviously aware of the power of this argument, recounts at length “the 
history of the editorial process regarding Sokal’s article,” explaining the
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editorial practices of the Social Text collective and why the journal is non­
refereed. Unfortunately, to the ears of a pubUc still fully attuned to 
Mertonian norms, his explanations sound as hollow as the creation- 
scientists' defense that their lack of pubhcations was due to the bias of 
scientific journals. Sokal, hke the plaintiffs and judge in McLean, simply 
claims the prerogative of the scientific community to pass judgment on 
reputedly scientific claims. If Ross chose not to submit an article about 
physics to that community, he is at fault.
Ross’s response to the Lingua Franca exposé suggests that Sokal 
further played on the communality topos:
We made a general request to him a) to excise a good deal of the 
philosophical speculation and b) to excise most of his footnotes. 
Sokal seemed resistant to any general revisions of this sort, and 
indeed insisted on retaining almost all of his footnotes and 
bibliographic apparatus on the grounds that his peers, in science, 
expected extensive documentation of this sort. (“Sokal Hoax”)
Sokal turns the communahty topos back against Ross, however, when he 
claims that “despite my repeated requests during the editorial process for 
substantive comments, suggestions and criticisms, none were ever received, 
just an acceptance letter” (“Sokal Rephes”). Sokal does what he is supposed
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to do— he submits his claim for peer review. However, these accusations 
and counter-accusations emphasize, as they did at McLean, the 
communality topos, as an element of scientific ethos, functions to serve the 
scientist when attempts are made to cross community lines.
In the exposé article, Sokal is the first to acknowledge the ethical 
issues raised by his deception, opening the discussion to the issue of trust in 
the larger academic community, but immediately tying it back to the 
journal’s responsibihty for communal vaHdation of claims:
O f course. I'm not oblivious to the ethical issues involved in my 
rather unorthodox experiment. Professional communities operate 
largely on trust; deception undercuts that trust. But it is important 
to understand exactly what I did. My article is a theoretical essay 
based entirely on publicly available sources, all of which I have 
meticulously footnoted. All works cited are real, and all quotations 
are rigorously accurate; none are invented. Now, it’s true that the 
author doesn't believe his own argument. But why should that 
matter? The editors’ duty as scholars is to judge the validity and 
interest of ideas, without regard for their provenance. (That is why 
many scholarly journals practice blind refereeing.) (“A Physicist 
Experiments”)
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Ross and his supporters attempt to expand the normative function of the 
communality topos to the larger academic community, defending 
themselves by pointing to Sokal’s already confessed violation of the norms 
of that expanded collective enterprise. Since Sokal had already pled guilty, 
all that can be done is praise the Social Text editors for their magnanimous 
“faith" (which can only be read as “faith" in a scientist)-.
the parody made use of a certain trust in the value of statements 
within a professional and institutional context. Social Text, by 
publishing the work of a physicist was attempting to extend a 
discourse beyond the boundaries of its usual practitioners, and this 
meant an even greater act of faith in the person submitting. Sokal 
violated that trust. (Day)
In his New York Times response to the hoax and the exposé, Stanley Fish 
carries this move to its extreme, charging Sokal with (scientific?) fraud and 
citing The Proceedings o f the National Academy o f Science’, “fraud is said to go 
‘beyond error to erode the foundation of trust on which science is built’." 
But his argument about faith slides problematically from communality in 
science to communahty in the academy as a whole, which precisely misses 
the point that the science wars are about demarcating science from the 
other disciplines he mentions:
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. . .  it is Alan Sokal, not his targets, who threatens to undermine the 
intellectual standards he vows to protect. Remember, science is 
above all a communal effort. N o scientist (and for that matter, no 
sociologist or literary critic) begins his task by inventing anew the 
facts he will assume, the models he will regard as exemplary and the 
standards he tries to be faithful to. They are all given by the 
tradition of inquiry he has joined, and for the most part he must 
take them on faith. And he must take on faith, too, the reports 
offered to him by colleagues, all of whom are in the same position, 
unable to start from scratch and therefore dependent on the 
information they receive from fellow researchers.
Although it is arguable from the perspective of any discipline that scholars 
in these fields always try  “to  be faithful to” the established models and 
standards of their disciplinary predecessors. Fish’s more egregious slip-up 
occurs when he simply ignores disciplinary boundaries, gathering them all 
under “the tradition of inquiry,” suggesting that Sokal is a “colleague” who 
is “in the same position” as the Social Text editors. True, the scientist 
joining the scientific community does not “start from scratch,” but the 
Social Text editors are members of a different community with different 
models, standards, and traditions. Science is indeed “a communal effort,”
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but the topos of communality serves to demarcate science from its 
competitors, not to gather them all under its community umbrella.
Finally, universalism becomes an important topos of the Sokal affair 
because so much of the commentary focuses on the science critics’ 
relativism. Rothstein voices the commonly held notion that demarcates 
science from the humanities, conceding that in both realms, premises, rules 
of argument, and institutions of authority function in the processes of 
knowledge creation, but in science “there exist facts and truths that are 
invariant— unaltered by culture, politics and prejudices. . . . That may be 
one reason why science has such prestige and power.” A detailed discussion 
of the relativism versus universahsm debate arose at the October 30, 1996 
NYU panel discussion entitled “After the Media Event: Politics, Culture 
and the Social Text Affair.” Sokal described a scenario reported in the New 
York Times that had him baffled: a Zuni community had contested 
scientists’ access to ancestral skeletal remains because the scientists would 
use their data as further evidence that Native Americans migrated from 
Asia to N orth America across the Bering Strait, a view that contradicted 
the Zuni’s autochthonous beliefs. As reported by Eichmann in The New 
Criterion,
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For Mr. Sokal, this controversy showed the fooHshness of local 
knowledge.’ Clearly reason, objectivity, and evidence were on the 
side of the archeologists. . . .  As Mr. Sokal was at pains to point out, 
these warring explanations of human origins were mutually 
exclusive: they could both be wrong, but they could not both be 
right. (78-79)
The institutional norms that construct scientific ethos— disinterestedness, 
skepticism, communahty, and universalism— function interdependently to 
provide argumentative strategies that fortify science’s demarcation from 
other knowledge-making practices and that attempt to maintain science’s 
knowledge-producing privileges when threatened by outside groups.
Rhetoric and Cultural Studies in the Science Wars
I have explored the problematic relationship between rhetoric of 
science and SSK, but the Science Wars also raise questions about the 
relationship between rhetoric and postmodern cultural studies. Much of 
the commentary on the hoax betrays the binary thinking that earlier in this 
century sustained logical positivism’s notion of meaningful statements in 
opposition to poetic and metaphorical language that might soothe the soul 
or rouse the masses to action but that held no truth-value. For instance.
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Sokal’s supporters refer to the hoax essay’s “impressive-sounding but 
largely meaningless expoundings” (Freedman), “intentional gibberish” 
(Brown 17), and “dehberate nonsense” (Kimball) that highHghted both the 
inabihty of the Social Text editors “to distinguish serious argument from 
utter nonsense” (Berkowitz 15) and “the vacuousness of academic theory 
and the absurd incoherence of the language in which it is perpetrated” 
(Eichman 77).
In the expose article, Sokal explains his strategy in the hoax: he has 
tied together citations of Derrida, Lacan, and Irigaray with “vague rhetoric 
about ‘nonlinearity,’ ‘flux’ and ‘interconnectedness,emphasizing that 
“nowhere in all of this is there anything resembling a logical sequence of 
thought; one finds only citations of authority, plays on words, strained 
analogies, and bald assertions” (“A Physicist Experiments”). Also in the 
exposé article, Sokal’s understanding of “rhetoric” is clearly equivalent to 
“cultural studies” and to postmodern theories of “language games:”
Social Text’s acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual 
arrogance of Theory— meaning postmodernist Uterary theory— 
carried to its logical extreme. N o wonder they didn't bother to 
consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ‘text,’ then knowledge of 
the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another
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branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and language 
games,’ then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina 
of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility 
becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for 
evidence and logic.
Sokal presents cultural studies and rhetoric in binary opposition to a logical 
empiricist insistence on “logical consistency” backed by “evidence” leading 
to “knowledge of the real world.” Those on the cultural studies side of the 
debate counter with a postmodern poetics that asserts the metaphorical 
nature of all language, including that of science. Donna Haraway replies, 
“What Sokal doesn’t know is that there is a whole literature on metaphors 
and how nature took on legal language and property metaphors” (qtd in 
McMillen).
Sokal’s logical empiricist understanding of “metaphors” versus “logic 
and evidence” gives rise to his condemnation of cultural studies of science 
as “subjectivist.” Gross and Levitt also make this distinction in their 
chapter devoted to the ridicule of literary scholars such as N . Katherine 
Hayles who. Gross and Levitt perceive, read chaos theory or quantum 
physics as reflections of postmodern shifts across culture:
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O f course, anyone is free to read pictures of fractal geometry and the 
like subjectively as emblems for a revolution in sensibility— or in 
politics, for that matter. The point is, however, that this is utterly 
subjective; it is poetry of the most idiosyncratic sort. Postmodern 
cultural transformation is no more inscribed in the mathematical 
pecuharities of nonlinear dynamical systems than Nazi doctrine is to 
be read in the geometric configuration of the swastika. To hold 
otherwise is to revert to the magical, emblematic thinking of 
premodem (rather than postmodern) times. (105)
Gross and Levitt, Sokal and his supporters, seem to find this notion of 
rhetoric as metaphoricity far more threatening to their epistemic privilege 
and knowledge-producing franchise than the rhetorics deployed by, for 
example, Prelli and Myers in the rhetoric of science. Gaonkar points to a 
possible reason for this difference in his critique of the humanist paradigm, 
based on a particular reading of Aristotle and Cicero, whose “governing 
feature is the positioning of the rhetor as the generating center of discourse 
and its ‘constitutive’ power.” This view constructs the ideal (scientific) 
rhetor as a consciously deUberating agent who recognizes “the situational 
constraints, including the specificity of the audience addressed” and whose 
rhetorical choices reflect a “capacity for ‘prudence’ and who ‘invents’
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discourse that displays an ingenium and who all along observes the norms 
of timeliness (kairos), appropriateness {to prepon), and decorum that testify 
to a mastery of sensus communis” (48). This agent-centered strategic and 
intentional model still exerts, Gaonkar claims, too great an influence in 
rhetoric of science. PreUi, for instance, believes that his topical method 
could facihtate communication, and if scientists were instructed in it they 
could negotiate their controversies more successfully. Gaonkar sees here an 
Enhghtenment view of scientists “as self-monitoring rational actors who 
seek to advance knowledge through mutual understanding" and reads 
scientific texts or discourse practices as a manifestation of strategic 
consciousness, a position that SSK, with its focus on “the sheer materiahty 
of science as an institutional practice” has abandoned. Strategic 
consciousness, though, “marginaHzes structures that govern human agency: 
language, the unconscious, and capital” (Gaonkar 51, 68, 70).
My own project in the last three chapters has appropriated a 
sociological notion of ethos (that Sumner took from the Greeks in the first 
place) to argue that the intersection of sociology and classical rhetorical 
terminology need not appropriate Aristotelian terminology in this agent- 
centered fashion. I have attempted to begin a conversation between 
rhetorical and sociological notions of ethos, because a rhetoric that claims
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its roots in classical theories of public debate between differently-situated 
classes (classes with different access to cultural authority and political 
power), finds in ethos a dialectic between rhetorical agency and structures 
that govern that agency. My discussion of ethos is simply one element, one 
point of connection, in that web that explores the relationship between 
rhetoric and structures that define relationships between differently 
situated classes, whether those be the elite and demos in ancient Greece, the 
middle-class worker in the twentieth century and the globally webbed 
symbolic analyst, or the sciences and the humanities in the contemporary 
academy.
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